Superintelligence Cannot be Contained: Lessons from Computability Theory
Alfonseca, Manuel (Universidad Autonoma de Madrid) | Cebrian, Manuel (Center for Humans & Machines, Max-Planck Institute for Human Development) | Fernandez Anta, Antonio (IMDEA Networks Institute) | Coviello, Lorenzo (Google, USA) | Abeliuk, Andrés (USC Information Sciences Institute) | Rahwan, Iyad (Center for Humans & Machines, Max-Planck Institute for Human Development)
–Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Superintelligence is a hypothetical agent that possesses intelligence far surpassing that of the brightest and most gifted human minds. In light of recent advances in machine intelligence, a number of scientists, philosophers and technologists have revived the discussion about the potentially catastrophic risks entailed by such an entity. In this article, we trace the origins and development of the neo-fear of superintelligence, and some of the major proposals for its containment. We argue that total containment is, in principle, impossible, due to fundamental limits inherent to computing itself. Assuming that a superintelligence will contain a program that includes all the programs that can be executed by a universal Turing machine on input potentially as complex as the state of the world, strict containment requires simulations of such a program, something theoretically (and practically) impossible. "Machines take me by surprise with great frequency. This is largely because I do not do sufficient calculation to decide what to expect them to do." Alan Turing (1950), Computing Machinery and Intelligence, Mind, 59, 433-460
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Jan-5-2021
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