Equilibrium Refinements for Multi-Agent Influence Diagrams: Theory and Practice

Multi-agent influence diagrams (MAIDs) are a popular form of Previous work on MAIDs has focussed on Nash equilibria as graphical model that, for certain classes of games, have been shown the core solution concept [20]. Whilst this is arguably the most important to offer key complexity and explainability advantages over traditional solution concept in non-cooperative game theory, if there extensive form game (EFG) representations. In this paper, we are many Nash equilibria we often wish to remove some of those extend previous work on MAIDs by introducing the concept of a that are less'rational'. Many refinements to the Nash equilibrium MAID subgame, as well as subgame perfect and trembling hand have been proposed [17], with two of the most important being perfect equilibrium refinements. We then prove several equivalence subgame perfect Nash equilibria [26] and trembling hand perfect results between MAIDs and EFGs. Finally, we describe an open equilibria [27]. The first rules out'non-credible' threats and the second source implementation for reasoning about MAIDs and computing requires that each player is still playing a best-response when their equilibria.