Wooldridge, Michael

Strategic Social Network Analysis

AAAI Conferences

How can individuals and communities protect their privacy against social network analysis tools? How do criminals or terrorists organizations evade detection by such tools? Under which conditions can these tools be made strategy proof? These fundamental questions have attracted little attention in the literature to date, as most social network analysis tools are built around the assumption that individuals or groups in a network do not act strategically to evade such tools. With this in mind, we outline in this paper a new paradigm for social network analysis, whereby the strategic behaviour of network actors is explicitly modeled. Addressing this research challenge has various implications. For instance, it may allow two individuals to keep their relationship secret or private. It may also allow members of an activist group to conceal their membership, or even conceal the existence of their group from authoritarian regimes. Furthermore, it may assist security agencies and counter terrorism units in understanding the strategies that covert organizations use to escape detection, and give rise to new strategy-proof countermeasures.

Boolean Hedonic Games

AAAI Conferences

We study hedonic games with dichotomous preferences. Hedonic games are cooperative games in which players desire to form coalitions, but only care about the makeup of the coalitions of which they are members; they are indifferent about the makeup of other coalitions. The assumption of dichotomous preferences means that, additionally, each player's preference relation partitions the set of coalitions of which that player is a member into just two equivalence classes: satisfactory and unsatisfactory. A player is indifferent between satisfactory coalitions, and is indifferent between unsatisfactory coalitions, but strictly prefers any satisfactory coalition over any unsatisfactory coalition. We develop a succinct representation for such games, in which each player's preference relation is represented by a propositional formula. We show how solution concepts for hedonic games with dichotomous preferences are characterised by propositional formulas.

Closeness Centrality for Networks with Overlapping Community Structure

AAAI Conferences

Certain real-life networks have a community structure in which communities overlap. For example, a typical bus network includes bus stops (nodes), which belong to one or more bus lines (communities) that often overlap. Clearly, it is important to take this information into account when measuring the centrality of a bus stop - how important it is to the functioning of the network. For example, if a certain stop becomes inaccessible, the impact will depend in part on the bus lines that visit it. However, existing centrality measures do not take such information into account. Our aim is to bridge this gap. We begin by developing a new game-theoretic solution concept, which we call the Configuration semivalue, in order to have greater flexibility in modelling the community structure compared to previous solution concepts from cooperative game theory. We then use the new concept as a building block to construct the first extension of Closeness centrality to networks with community structure (overlapping or otherwise). Despite the computational complexity inherited from the Configuration semivalue, we show that the corresponding extension of Closeness centrality can be computed in polynomial time. We empirically evaluate this measure and our algorithm that computes it by analysing the Warsaw public transportation network.

Rational Verification: From Model Checking to Equilibrium Checking

AAAI Conferences

Rational verification is concerned with establishing whether a given temporal logic formula φ is satisfied in some or all equilibrium computations of a multi-agent system – that is, whether the system will exhibit the behaviour φ under the assumption that agents within the system act rationally in pursuit of their preferences. After motivating and introducing the framework of rational verification, we present formal models through which rational verification can be studied, and survey the complexity of key decision problems. We give an overview of a prototype software tool for rational verification, and conclude with a discussion and related work.

Imperfect Information in Reactive Modules Games

AAAI Conferences

Reactive Modules is a high-level modelling language for concurrent, distributed, and multi-agent systems, which is used in a number of practical model checking tools. Reactive Modules Games are a game-theoretic extension of Reactive Modules, in which agents in a system are assumed to act strategically in an attempt to satisfy a temporal logic formula representing their individual goal. Reactive Modules Games with perfect information have been closely studied, and the complexity of game theoretic decision problems relating to such games have been comprehensively classified. However, to date, no work has considered the imperfect information case. In this paper we address this gap, investigating Reactive Modules Games in which agents have only partial visibility of their environment.


AAAI Conferences

This is an exciting time to be an artificial intelligence researcher. AI technologies and applications have truly entered our everyday lives, with AI systems in use throughout society. Against this backdrop of AI’s remarkable success, the Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-2015), to be held in Buenos Aires, Argentina between 25 and 31 July 2015, is poised to break several records. This is the first time the flagship international AI conference has been held in South America, and the number of submissions to the technical program has reached an historical high. These proceedings collect some of the most exciting research taking place in AI today and offer a window into the future. The theme of this year’s conference is Artificial Intelligence and Arts. Being held in Argentina, the home of Tango, the conference will feature invited talks, performances, demos and a technical track dedicated to the exploration and celebration of AI’s growing role in the Arts, both in enriching and producing Arts and in injecting art into AI to make it an elegant and more accessible scientific discipline.

A Graphical Representation for Games in Partition Function Form

AAAI Conferences

We propose a novel representation for coalitional games with externalities, called Partition Decision Trees. This representation is based on rooted directed trees, where non-leaf nodes are labelled with agents' names, leaf nodes are labelled with payoff vectors, and edges indicate membership of agents in coalitions. We show that this representation is fully expressive, and for certain classes of games significantly more concise than an extensive representation. Most importantly, Partition Decision Trees are the first formalism in the literature under which most of the direct extensions of the Shapley value to games with externalities can be computed in polynomial time.

Efficient Computation of Semivalues for Game-Theoretic Network Centrality

AAAI Conferences

Solution concepts from cooperative game theory, such as the Shapley value or the Banzhaf index, have recently been advocated as interesting extensions of standard measures of node centrality in networks. While this direction of research is promising, the computation of game-theoretic centrality can be challenging. In an attempt to address the computational issues of game-theoretic network centrality, we present a generic framework for constructing game-theoretic network centralities. We prove that all extensions that can be expressed in this framework are computable in polynomial time. Using our framework, we present the first game-theoretic extensions of weighted and normalized degree centralities, impact factor centrality,distance-scaled and normalized betweenness centrality,and closeness and normalized closeness centralities.

Reasoning about Equilibria in Game-Like Concurrent Systems

AAAI Conferences

Our aim is to develop techniques for reasoning about game-like concurrent systems, where the components of the system act rationally and strategically in pursuit of logicallyspecified goals. We first present a computational model for such systems, and investigate its properties. We then define and investigate a branching-time logic for reasoning about the equilibrium properties of such systems. The key operator in this logic is a path quantifier [NE]phi which asserts that phi holds on all Nash equilibrium computations of the system.

Reasoning About the Transfer of Control

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

We present DCL-PC: a logic for reasoning about how the abilities of agents and coalitions of agents are altered by transferring control from one agent to another. The logical foundation of DCL-PC is CL-PC, a logic for reasoning about cooperation in which the abilities of agents and coalitions of agents stem from a distribution of atomic Boolean variables to individual agents -- the choices available to a coalition correspond to assignments to the variables the coalition controls. The basic modal constructs of DCL-PC are of the form coalition C can cooperate to bring about phi. DCL-PC extends CL-PC with dynamic logic modalities in which atomic programs are of the form agent i gives control of variable p to agent j; as usual in dynamic logic, these atomic programs may be combined using sequence, iteration, choice, and test operators to form complex programs. By combining such dynamic transfer programs with cooperation modalities, it becomes possible to reason about how the power of agents and coalitions is affected by the transfer of control. We give two alternative semantics for the logic: a direct semantics, in which we capture the distributions of Boolean variables to agents; and a more conventional Kripke semantics. We prove that these semantics are equivalent, and then present an axiomatization for the logic. We investigate the computational complexity of model checking and satisfiability for DCL-PC, and show that both problems are PSPACE-complete (and hence no worse than the underlying logic CL-PC). Finally, we investigate the characterisation of control in DCL-PC. We distinguish between first-order control -- the ability of an agent or coalition to control some state of affairs through the assignment of values to the variables under the control of the agent or coalition -- and second-order control -- the ability of an agent to exert control over the control that other agents have by transferring variables to other agents. We give a logical characterisation of second-order control.