Towards Substantive Conceptions of Algorithmic Fairness: Normative Guidance from Equal Opportunity Doctrines

Khan, Falaah Arif, Manis, Eleni, Stoyanovich, Julia

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence 

In this work we use Equal Oppportunity (EO) doctrines from political philosophy to make explicit the normative judgements embedded in different conceptions of algorithmic fairness. We contrast formal EO approaches that narrowly focus on fair contests at discrete decision points, with substantive EO doctrines that look at people's fair life chances more holistically over the course of a lifetime. We use this taxonomy to provide a moral interpretation of the impossibility results as the incompatibility between different conceptions of a fair contest -- foward-facing versus backward-facing -- when people do not have fair life chances. We use this result to motivate substantive conceptions of algorithmic fairness and outline two plausible fair decision procedures based on the luck-egalitarian doctrine of EO, and Rawls's principle of fair equality of opportunity. Equality of Opportunity (EO) is a philosophical doctrine that objects to morally arbitrary and irrelevant factors affecting people's access to desirable positions, and the social goods attached to them (such as opportunity and wealth). In an EO-respecting society, all people, irrespective of their morally arbitrary characteristics, such as socio-economic background, gender, race, or disability status, have comparable access to the opportunities that they desire. Similarly, in fair machine learning (fair-ML), we are usually interested in ensuring that the outputs of algorithmic systems, specially those used in critical social contexts, do not systematically skew along the lines of membership in protected groups based on gender, race, or disability. In so far as protected groups are constructed on the basis of morally arbitrary factors, the moral desiderata of EO doctrines from political philosophy align exactly with the fairness-related concerns in machine learning. In this work, we employ ideas from the rich literature on Equality of Opportunity from political philosophy [1-11] to clarify the normative foundations of fairness and justice-related interventions, and gauge the efficacy of current algorithmic approaches that attempt to codify these criteria. There are two broad principles of EO, namely, the principle of fair contests and the principle of fair life chances. Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. The principle of fair contests, commonly understood as the nondiscrimination principle, says that competitions for desirable positions should be open to all and should be adjudicated based on competitors' relevant merits, or qualifications.

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