Participatory Budgeting with Donations and Diversity Constraints
Chen, Jiehua, Lackner, Martin, Maly, Jan
–arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence
Our chosen model is based on PB with cardinal preferences, i.e., voters have numbers associated with projects Participatory budgeting (PB) is a democratic process that reflect their preferences. Cardinal preferences capture, where citizens jointly decide on how to allocate e.g., settings with approval ballots (only 0 and 1 public funds to indivisible projects. This paper are used), settings where voters can distribute points to focuses on PB processes where citizens may projects (where usually the sum of points is bounded), give additional money to projects they want to see and settings where these numbers accurately correspond funded. We introduce a formal framework for this to the utility of voters. Further, we allow for diversity kind of PB with donations. Our framework also constraints [Bredereck et al., 2018; Benabbou et al., 2019; allows for diversity constraints, meaning that each Yang et al., 2019; Chen et al., 2020a]: Each project belongs project belongs to one or more types, and there are to one or more types (based on classifications such as "youth lower and upper bounds on the number of projects and education" or "transport and mobility") and for each type of the same type that can be funded. We propose there is a minimum and maximum number of projects to be three general classes of methods for aggregating the funded. This can also model city-wide referenda where districts citizens' preferences in the presence of donations have their own "project quota".
arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence
Apr-30-2021
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- Government > Voting & Elections (0.45)
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