A Characterization of the Single-Peaked Single-Crossing Domain

In other words, there is no perfect voting rule that one domains may admit efficient algorithms for social choice could always use, independently of the circumstances. However, problems that are hard for general preferences. This observation this result holds under the assumption that there are no has recently led to a new wave of interest in constraints on the voters' preferences. Thus, a common strategy restricted domains within the computational social choice to circumvent Arrow's theorem is to consider restricted community (Conitzer 2009; Walsh 2007; Faliszewski et al. preference domains, i.e., assume that the voters' preferences 2011; Brandt et al. 2010; Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, and have additional structure. It may then be possible to show Hemaspaandra 2011; Betzler, Slinko, and Uhlmann 2013; that various negative consequences of Arrow's theorem do Cornaz, Galand, and Spanjaard 2012; 2013; Skowron et al. not hold.