Dynamic Auction: A Tractable Auction Procedure

Auction processes have been a well-established research Different from one-shot combinatorial auctions, the main theme in economics and recently become an emerging research issue of a dynamic auction is whether the procedure can lead topic in AI due to a set of related computational challenges to an equilibrium state (Walrasian equilibrium) at which all (Cramton et al. 2006). It is well-known that the problem the selling items are effectively allocated to the buyers (equilibrium of winner determination in a combinatorial auction is allocation) and the price of each bundle of items NPcomplete (Rothkopf et al. 1998; Sandholm 2002). However, gives the buyers their best values (equilibrium price). It most of the discussions on the computational issues has been observed that without certain assumptions on buyers' of combinatorial auctions are based on one-shot sealed-bid value functions, there is no guarantee for a dynamic mechanisms. This paper aims to make a contribution towards auction to converge toward an equilibrium (Gul and Stacchetti the discussions on dynamic procedures of combinatorial 1999). Kelso and Crawford (1982) proposed a condition, auctions.