Online advertising platforms use automated auctions to connect advertisers with potential customers, requiring effective bidding strategies to maximize profits. Accurate ad impact estimation requires considering three key factors: delayed and long-term effects, cumulative ad impacts such as reinforcement or fatigue, and customer heterogeneity. However, these effects are often not jointly addressed in previous studies. To capture these factors, we model ad bidding as a Contextual Markov Decision Process (CMDP) with delayed Poisson rewards. For efficient estimation, we propose a two-stage maximum likelihood estimator combined with data-splitting strategies, ensuring controlled estimation error based on the first-stage estimator's (in)accuracy. Building on this, we design a reinforcement learning algorithm to derive efficient personalized bidding strategies. This approach achieves a near-optimal regret bound of O(dH2 T), where d is the contextual dimension, H is the number of rounds, and T is the number of customers. Our theoretical findings are validated by simulation experiments.

We study the problem of designing procurement auctions for the strategic uncapacitated facility location problem: a company needs to procure a set of facility locations in order to serve its customers and each facility location is owned by a strategic agent. Each owner has a private cost for providing access to their facility (e.g., renting it or selling it to the company) and needs to be compensated accordingly. The goal is to design truthful auctions that decide which facilities the company should procure and how much to pay the corresponding owners, aiming to minimize the total cost, i.e., the monetary cost paid to the owners and the connection cost suffered by the customers (their distance to the nearest facility). We evaluate the performance of these auctions using the frugality ratio. We first analyze the performance of the classic VCG auction in this context and prove that its frugality ratio is exactly 3. We then leverage the learning-augmented framework and design auctions that are augmented with predictions regarding the owners' private costs. Specifically, we propose a family of learning-augmented auctions that achieve significant payment reductions when the predictions are accurate, leading to much better frugality ratios. At the same time, we demonstrate that these auctions remain robust even if the predictions are arbitrarily inaccurate, and maintain reasonable frugality ratios even under adversarially chosen predictions. We finally provide a family of "error-tolerant" auctions that maintain improved frugality ratios even if the predictions are only approximately accurate, and we provide upper bounds on their frugality ratio as a function of the prediction error.

Repeated multi-unit auctions, where a seller allocates multiple identical items over many rounds, are common mechanisms in electricity markets and treasury auctions. We compare the two predominant formats: uniform-price and discriminatory auctions, focusing on the perspective of a single bidder learning to bid against stochastic adversaries. We characterize the learning difficulty in each format, showing that the regret scales similarly for both auction formats under both fullinformation and bandit feedback, as Θ( T)and Θ(T2/3), respectively. However, analysis beyond worst-case regret reveals structural differences: uniform-price auctions may admit faster learning rates, with regret scaling as Θ( T)in settings where discriminatory auctions remain at Θ(T2/3). Finally, we provide a specific analysis for auctions in which the other participants are symmetric and have unitdemand, and show that in these instances, a similar regret rate separation appears.

ROI constraints and budget constraints, is widely adopted by advertisers. A key challenge lies in designing algorithms for non-truthful mechanisms with ROI constraints. While prior work has addressed truthful auctions or non-truthful auctions with weaker benchmarks, this paper provides a significant improvement: We develop online bidding algorithms for repeated first-price auctions with ROI constraints, benchmarking against the optimal randomized strategy in hindsight. In the full feedback setting, where the maximum competing bid is observed, our algorithm achieves a near-optimal eO( T)regret bound, and in the bandit feedback setting (where the bidder only observes whether the bidder wins each auction), our algorithm attains eO(T3/4)regret bound.

Differentiable economics--the use of deep learning for auction design--has driven progress in multi-item auction design with additive and unit-demand valuations. However, there has been little progress for combinatorial auctions (CAs), even in the simplest and yet important single bidder case, due to exponential growth of the bundle space with the number of items. We address this challenge by introducing a deep network architecture for a menu-based CA, which supports the first dominantstrategy incentive compatible (DSIC), revenue-optimizing single-bidder CA. Our idea is to generate a bundle distribution through an ordinary differential equation (ODE) applied to a tractable initial distribution. Our method, BUNDLEFLOW, learns suitable ODE-based transforms, one for each menu element, to optimize expected revenue. BUNDLEFLOW achieves up to 2.23 higher revenue than baselines on standard CA testbeds and scales up to 500 items.

ROI constraints and budget constraints, is widely adopted by advertisers. A key challenge lies in designing algorithms for non-truthful mechanisms with ROI constraints. While prior work has addressed truthful auctions or non-truthful auctions with weaker benchmarks, this paper provides a significant improvement: We develop online bidding algorithms for repeated first-price auctions with ROI constraints, benchmarking against the optimal randomized strategy in hindsight. In the full feedback setting, where the maximum competing bid is observed, our algorithm achieves a near-optimal $\tilde O(\sqrt{T})$ regret bound, and in the bandit feedback setting (where the bidder only observes whether the bidder wins each auction), our algorithm attains $\tilde O(T^{3/4})$ regret bound.

We study the problem of learning to bid when the bidder's value is dynamic, i.e., when the current value depends on past outcomes. Specifically, we consider a bidder participating in repeated second-price auctions whose value depends on the time elapsed since their last successful bid, with auctions arriving in continuous time and only aggregated feedback revealed at the end of the horizon. Such a bidder must (1) balance the immediate benefit of winning the current auction against its impact on future values and (2) learn unknown environmental parameters. We derive regret bounds for a class of learning methods that combine plug-in estimators with a differential-equation characterization of the optimal policy, and show that a specific confidence bound algorithm learns the optimal policy with a near optimal regret of $\widetilde{O}(\log N)$ for piecewise linear primitives, and $\widetilde{O}(N^{1/3})$ for general, smooth primitives, achieving these regrets without explicit randomization. These theoretical results are supported by numerical experiments.

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Logged advertising auctions make offline reserve-price evaluation attractive but risky. Replay tables can identify policies with large apparent yield gains, yet they can also hide weak threshold support, multiple-comparison effects, subgroup harm, and bidder-response uncertainty. Existing replay and off-policy evaluation methods estimate or rank policy values, but they do not directly answer the operational question of whether the available evidence is strong enough to justify validation. This paper develops a support-aware offline decision framework for reserve-policy selection. Rather than outputting a single point-estimate winner, the framework converts logged evidence into a conservative decision object consisting of certified policies, statistically dominated alternatives, and unresolved candidates requiring further validation. The main theoretical result gives a unified finite-catalog guarantee showing that, under simultaneous uncertainty control and conservative support gates, the framework preserves the best gate-passing policy while eliminating only policies with certified regret. Supporting results characterize support-localized replay generalization, establish information-theoretic threshold-resolution limits, and quantify when heterogeneous bidder response can overturn localized replay rankings. Experiments on iPinYou real-time-bidding logs show that the leading reserve rule achieves a 47.66% replay lift in season two, a 40.71% simultaneous lower-bound lift, and a 43.87% frozen out-of-time replay lift in season three. The framework reduces a 19-policy catalog to a two-policy validation shortlist while certifying non-harm across 44 advertiser, exchange, and region segments. The results support the central claim that offline reserve-policy evaluation should produce certified validation decisions rather than point-estimate rankings alone.

Shilling is the use of artificial bids to make competition appear stronger and push prices upward. We study repeated first-price auctions in which shilling affects feedback but not allocation: the learner wins or loses against the real competing bid, but after a loss observes the maximum of the real bid and an independent shill bid. Thus the manipulation changes what the learner observes and hence how it learns to bid, without changing the outcome of the current auction. We analyze regret with respect to the best bid benchmark, assuming that the shill-bid distribution is known. Even then, shilling can mask the real bid, while useful side information appears only through intermittent low-shill events. Our algorithm combines a robust interval-elimination branch, which ignores the shilled report and achieves the dynamic-pricing rate $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(T^{2/3})$, with an optimistic branch that debiases losing-side reports and exploits the resulting suffix information when it is reliable and achieves the first-price auctions rate $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{T})$. A validation and racing procedure lets the algorithm use these optimistic updates without knowing the right scale or feedback geometry in advance. We complement the upper bounds with a matching lower bound, up to logarithmic factors, in the single-active-region case. Overall, the results show that even feedback-only shilling can sharply alter the statistical difficulty of repeated bidding.