Feature-Level Adversarial Attacks and Ranking Disruption for Visible-Infrared Person Re-identification

Visible-infrared person re-identification (VIReID) is widely used in fields such as video surveillance and intelligent transportation, imposing higher demands on model security. In practice, the adversarial attacks based on VIReID aim to disrupt output ranking and quantify the security risks of models. Although numerous studies have been emerged on adversarial attacks and defenses in fields such as face recognition, person re-identification, and pedestrian detection, there is currently a lack of research on the security of VIReID systems. To this end, we propose to explore the vulnerabilities of VIReID systems and prevent potential serious losses due to insecurity. Compared to research on single-modality ReID, adversarial feature alignment and modality differences need to be particularly emphasized. Thus, we advocate for feature-level adversarial attacks to disrupt the output rankings of VIReID systems.