Optimal Incremental Preference Elicitation during Negotiation

Costly preference elicitation has also been studied The last two decades have seen a growing interest in the setting of auctions; notably by Conen and Sandholm in the development of automated agents that are [2001] and Parkes [2005]. These works are primarily able to negotiate on the user's behalf. When representing aimed at designing mechanisms that can avoid unnecessary a user in a negotiation, it is essential for the elicitation. Costly preference elicitation may alternatively be agent to understand the user's preferences, without cast as a problem in which agents have to allocate costly computational exposing them to elicitation fatigue. To this end, we resources to compute their valuation [Larson and propose a new model in which a negotiating agent Sandholm, 2001], but this work focuses on interactions between may incrementally elicit the user's preference during different strategies.