Automated negotiation is a well-known mechanism for autonomous agents to reach agreements. To realize beneficial agreements quickly, it is key to employ a good bidding strategy. When a negotiating agent has a good back-up plan, i.e., a high reservation value, failing to reach an agreement is not necessarily disadvantageous. Thus, the agent can adopt a risk-seeking strategy, aiming for outcomes with a higher utilities. Accordingly, this paper develops an optimal bidding strategy called MIA-RVelous for bilateral negotiations with private reservation values. The proposed greedy algorithm finds the optimal bid sequence given the agent's beliefs about the opponent in $O(n^2D)$ time, with $D$ the maximum number of rounds and $n$ the number of outcomes. The results obtained here can pave the way to realizing effective concurrent negotiations, given that concurrent negotiations can serve as a (probabilistic) backup plan.

Multiagent coordination in cooperative multiagent systems (MASs) has been widely studied in both fixed-agent repeated interaction setting and the static social learning framework. However, two aspects of dynamics in real-world multiagent scenarios are currently missing in existing works. First, the network topologies can be dynamic where agents may change their connections through rewiring during the course of interactions. Second, the game matrix between each pair of agents may not be static and usually not known as a prior. Both the network dynamic and game uncertainty increase the coordination difficulty among agents. In this paper, we consider a multiagent dynamic social learning environment in which each agent can choose to rewire potential partners and interact with randomly chosen neighbors in each round. We propose an optimal rewiring strategy for agents to select most beneficial peers to interact with for the purpose of maximizing the accumulated payoff in repeated interactions. We empirically demonstrate the effectiveness and robustness of our approach through comparing with benchmark strategies. The performance of three representative learning strategies under our social learning framework with our optimal rewiring is investigated as well.

The annual International Automated Negotiating Agents Competition (ANAC) is used by the automated negotiation research community to benchmark and evaluate its work andto challenge itself. The benchmark problems and evaluation results and the protocols and strategies developed are available to the wider research community.

The Automated Negotiating Agents Competition is an international event that, since 2010, has contributed to the evaluation and development of new techniques and benchmarks for improving the state-of-the-art in automated multi-issue negotiation. A key objective of the competition has been to analyze and search the design space of negotiating agents for agents that are able to operate effectively across a variety of domains. The competition is a valuable tool for studying important aspects of negotiation including profiles and domains, opponent learning, strategies, bilateral and multilateral protocols. Two of the challenges that remain are: How to develop argumentation-based negotiation agents that next to bids, can inform and argue to obtain an acceptable agreement for both parties, and how to create agents that can negotiate in a human fashion.