Results

In this section we prove the theoretical results around the dual curriculum game and use these results to show approximation bounds for our methods, given that they have reached a Nash equilibrium (NE). The first theorem is the main result that allows us to analyze dual curriculum games. The high-level result says that the NE of a dual curriculum game are approximate NE of the base game from the perspective of any of the individual players, or from the perspective of the joint strategy. Let Bbe the maximum difference between U1t and U2t, and let (π,θ1,θ2) be a NE for G. Then (π,pθ1 + (1 p)θ2) is an approximate NE for the base game with either teacher or for a teacher optimizing their joint objective. More precisely, it is a 2Bp(1 p)-approximate NE when Ut = pU1t + (1 p)U2t, a 2B(1 p)-approximate NE when Ut = U1t, and a 2Bp-approximate NE when Ut = U2t. At a high level, this is true because, for low values of p, the best-response strategies for the individual players can be thought of as approximate-best response strategies for the joint-player, and vis-versa. Since the Nash Equilibrium consists of each of the players playing their own best response, they must be playing an approximate best response for the joint-player. We provide a formal proof below: Proof. Let B be the maximum difference between U1t and U2t, and let (π,θ1,θ2) be a Nash Equilibrium for G. Then consider pθ1 + (1 p)θ2 as a strategy in the base game for the joint player pU1t + (1 p)U2t.