Facility Location Problem with Capacity Constraints: Algorithmic and Mechanism Design Perspectives

We consider the facility location problem in the one-dimensional setting where each facility can serve a limited number of agents from the algorithmic and mechanism design perspectives. From the algorithmic perspective, we prove t hat the corresponding optimization problem, where the goal is t o locate facilities to minimize either the total cost to all ag ents or the maximum cost of any agent is NPhard. However, we show that the problem is fixed-parameter tractable, and the optimal solution can be computed in polynomial time whenever the number of facilities is bounded, or when all facilit ies have identical capacities. We then consider the problem fro m a mechanism design perspective where the agents are strategic and need not reveal their true locations. We show that sev - eral natural mechanisms studied in the uncapacitated setti ng either lose strategyproofness or a bound on the solution qua l-ity for the total or maximum cost objective. We then propose new mechanisms that are strategyproof and achieve approximation guarantees that almost match the lower bounds.