From Probability to Consilience: How Explanatory Values Implement Bayesian Reasoning

Recent work in cognitive science has uncovered a diversity of explanatory values, or dimensions along which we judge explanations as better or worse. We propose a Bayesian account of how these values fit together to guide explanation. The resulting taxonomy provides a set of predictors for which explanations people prefer and shows how core values from psychology, statistics, and the philosophy of science emerge from a common mathematical framework. In addition to operationalizing the explanatory virtues associated with, for example, scientific argument-making, this framework also enables us to reinterpret the explanatory vices that drive conspiracy theories, delusions, and extremist ideologies. Intuitively, philosophically, and as seen in laboratory experiments, explanations are judged as better or worse on the basis of many different criteria. These explanatory values appear in early childhood [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] and their influence extends to some of the most sophisticated social knowledge formation processes we know [6]. We lack, however, an understanding of the origin of these values or an account of how they fit together to guide belief formation. The multiplicity of values also appears to conflict with Bayesian models of cognition, which speak solely in terms of degrees of beliefs and suggest we judge explanations as better or worse on the basis of a single quantity, the posterior likelihood (see Glossary). In this opinion, we show how to resolve these conflicts by arguing that previously-identified explanatory values capture different components of a full Bayesian calculation and, when considered together and weighed appropriately, implement Bayesian cognition. This framework shows how key explanatory values identified by laboratory experiments and philosophers of science--co-explanation, descriptiveness, precision, unification, power, and simplicity--emerge naturally from the mathematical structure of probabilistic inference, thereby reconciling them with Bayesian models of cognition [7, 8]. Second, it shows how these values combine to produce preferences for one explanation over another.