A new wave of theft is rocking the luxury car industry--mixing high-tech with old-school chop-shop techniques to snag vehicles while they're in transport. When Sam Zahr first saw the gray Rolls-Royce Dawn convertible with orange interior and orange roof, he knew he'd found a perfect addition to his fleet. "It was very appealing to our clientele," he told me. As the director of operations at Dream Luxury Rental, he outfits customers in the Detroit area looking to ride in style to a wedding, a graduation, or any other event with high-end vehicles--Rolls-Royces, Lamborghinis, Bentleys, Mercedes G-Wagons, and more. But before he could rent out the Rolls, Zahr needed to get the car to Detroit from Miami, where he bought it from a used-car dealer. His team posted the convertible on Central Dispatch, an online marketplace that's popular among car dealers, manufacturers, and owners who want to arrange vehicle shipments. It's not too complicated, at least in theory: A typical listing includes the type of vehicle, zip codes of the origin and destination, dates for pickup and delivery, and the fee. Anyone with a Central Dispatch account can see the job, and an individual carrier or transport broker who wants it can call the number on the listing. Zahr's team got a call from a transport company that wanted the job. They agreed on the price and scheduled pickup for January 17, 2025.

Russia unleashed a barrage of missile and drone strikes on Ukraine as a short-lived Easter ceasefire expired. Russian forces launched 96 drones and three missiles on eastern and southern Ukraine overnight, Ukraine's Air Force reported on Monday. The swift return to major hostilities following a pause declared by Russian President Vladimir Putin comes as the United States struggles to persuade Moscow to agree on a longer-term ceasefire. The overnight assault targeted Ukraine's Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk and Cherkasy regions, the Air Force wrote on Telegram. Air defence units intercepted 42 drones and redirected another 47.

We study a contextual version of the repeated brokerage problem. In each interaction, two traders with private valuations for an item seek to buy or sell based on the learner's-a broker-proposed price, which is informed by some contextual information. The broker's goal is to maximize the traders' net utility-also known as the gain from trade-by minimizing regret compared to an oracle with perfect knowledge of traders' valuation distributions. We assume that traders' valuations are zero-mean perturbations of the unknown item's current market value-which can change arbitrarily from one interaction to the next-and that similar contexts will correspond to similar market prices. We analyze two feedback settings: full-feedback, where after each interaction the traders' valuations are revealed to the broker, and limited-feedback, where only transaction attempts are revealed. For both feedback types, we propose algorithms achieving tight regret bounds. We further strengthen our performance guarantees by providing a tight 1/2-approximation result showing that the oracle that knows the traders' valuation distributions achieves at least 1/2 of the gain from trade of the omniscient oracle that knows in advance the actual realized traders' valuations.

The Cost-aware Dynamic Multi-Workflow Scheduling (CDMWS) in the cloud is a kind of cloud workflow management problem, which aims to assign virtual machine (VM) instances to execute tasks in workflows so as to minimize the total costs, including both the penalties for violating Service Level Agreement (SLA) and the VM rental fees. Powered by deep neural networks, Reinforcement Learning (RL) methods can construct effective scheduling policies for solving CDMWS problems. Traditional policy networks in RL often use basic feedforward architectures to separately determine the suitability of assigning any VM instances, without considering all VMs simultaneously to learn their global information. This paper proposes a novel self-attention policy network for cloud workflow scheduling (SPN-CWS) that captures global information from all VMs. We also develop an Evolution Strategy-based RL (ERL) system to train SPN-CWS reliably and effectively. The trained SPN-CWS can effectively process all candidate VM instances simultaneously to identify the most suitable VM instance to execute every workflow task. Comprehensive experiments show that our method can noticeably outperform several state-of-the-art algorithms on multiple benchmark CDMWS problems.

With the emergence of data marketplaces, the demand for methods to assess the value of data has increased significantly. While numerous techniques have been proposed for this purpose, none have specifically addressed graphs as the main data modality. Graphs are widely used across various fields, ranging from chemical molecules to social networks. In this study, we break down graphs into two main components: structural and featural, and we focus on evaluating data without relying on specific task-related metrics, making it applicable in practical scenarios where validation requirements may be lacking. We introduce a novel framework called blind message passing, which aligns the seller's and buyer's graphs using a shared node permutation based on graph matching. This allows us to utilize the graph Wasserstein distance to quantify the differences in the structural distribution of graph datasets, called the structural disparities. We then consider featural aspects of buyers' and sellers' graphs for data valuation and capture their statistical similarities and differences, referred to as relevance and diversity, respectively. Our approach ensures that buyers and sellers remain unaware of each other's datasets. Our experiments on real datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach in capturing the relevance, diversity, and structural disparities of seller data for buyers, particularly in graph-based data valuation scenarios.

In social decision-making among strategic agents, a universal focus lies on the balance between social and individual interests. Socially efficient mechanisms are thus desirably designed to not only maximize the social welfare but also incentivize the agents for their own profit. Under a generalized model that includes applications such as double auctions and trading networks, this study establishes a socially efficient (SE), dominant-strategy incentive compatible (DSIC), and individually rational (IR) mechanism with the minimum total budget expensed to the agents. The present method exploits discrete and known type domains to reduce a set of constraints into the shortest path problem in a weighted graph. In addition to theoretical derivation, we substantiate the optimality of the proposed mechanism through numerical experiments, where it certifies strictly lower budget than Vickery-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms for a wide class of instances.