Solving Zero-Sum Security Games in Discretized Spatio-Temporal Domains
Xu, Haifeng (University of Southern California) | Fang, Fei (University of Southern California) | Jiang, Albert Xin (University of Southern California) | Conitzer, Vincent (Duke University) | Dughmi, Shaddin (University of Southern California) | Tambe, Milind (University of Southern California)
Among the many deployment areas of Stackelberg Security games, a major area involves games played out in space and time, which includes applications in multiple mobile defender resources protecting multiple mobile targets. Previous algorithms for such spatio-temporal security games fail to scale-up and little is known ofthe computational complexity properties of these problems.This paper provides a novel oracle-based algorithmic framework for a systematic study of different problem variants of computing optimal (minimax) strategies in spatio-temporal security games. Our framework enables efficient computation of a minimax strategy when the problem admits a polynomial-time oracle. Furthermore,for the cases in which efficient oracles are difficultto find, we propose approximations or prove hardness results.
Jul-14-2014
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