An Approach to Stochastic Dynamic Games with Asymmetric Information and Hidden Actions

We study, in discrete time, a general class of sequential stochastic dynamic games with asymmetric information. We consider a setting where the underlying system has Markovian dynamics controlled by the agents' joint actions. Each agent's instantaneous utility depends on the agents' joint actions and the system state. At each time instant each agent makes a private noisy observation that depends on the current system state and the agents' actions in the previous time instant. In addition, at each time instant all agents may have a common noisy observation of the system state and their actions in the previous time instant. The agents' actions are hidden, that is, each agent's actions are not directly observable by the other agents. Therefore, at every time instant agents have asymmetric and imperfect information about the game's history. Dynamic games with the above features arise in engineering (cybersecurity, transportation, energy markets), in economics (industrial organization), and in socio-technological applications. As pointed out in Tang et al (2022), the key challenges in the study of dynamic games with asymmetric information are: (i) The domain of agents' strategies increases with time, as the agents acquire information over time.