Reinforcement Learning of Simple Indirect Mechanisms

Over the last fifty years, a large body of research in microeconomics has introduced many different mechanisms for resource allocation. Despite the wide variety of available options, "simple" mechanisms such as posted price and serial dictatorship are often preferred for practical applications, including housing allocation [Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez, 1998], online procurement [Badanidiyuru et al., 2012], or allocation of medical appointments [Klaus and Nichifor, 2019]. There has been considerable interest in formalizing different notions of simplicity. Li [2017] identifies mechanisms that are particularly simple from a strategic perspective, introducing the concept of obviously strategyproof mechanisms; under obviously strategyproof mechanisms, it is obvious that an agent cannot profit by trying to game the system, as even the worst possible final outcome from behaving truthfully is at least as good as the best possible outcome from any other strategy. Pycia and Troyan [2019] introduce the still stronger concept of strongly obviously strategyproof (SOSP) mechanisms, and show that this class can essentially be identified with sequential price mechanisms, where agents are visited in turn and offered a choice from a menu of options (which may or may not include transfers). SOSP mechanisms are ones in which an agent is not even required to consider her future (truthful) actions to understand that the mechanism is obviously strategyproof.