Certified Defences Against Adversarial Patch Attacks on Semantic Segmentation

Adversarial patch attacks are an emerging security threat for real world deep learning applications. Previous work on certifiably defending against patch attacks has mostly focused on image classification task and often required changes in the model architecture and additional training which is undesirable and computationally expensive. Physically realizable adversarial attacks are a threat for safety-critical (semi-)autonomous systems such as self-driving cars or robots. Adversarial patches (Brown et al., 2017; Karmon et al., 2018) are the most prominent example of such an attack. Their realizability has been demonstrated repeatedly, for instance by Lee & Kolter (2019): an attacker places a printed version of an adversarial patch in the physical world to fool a deep learning system. While empirical defenses (Hayes, 2018; Naseer et al., 2019; Selvaraju et al., 2019; Wu et al., 2020) may offer robustness against known attacks, it does not provide any guarantees against unknown future attacks (Chiang et al., 2020). Thus, certified defenses for the patch threat model, which allow guaranteed robustness against all possible attacks for the given threat model, are crucial for safety-critical applications. Research on certifiable defenses against adversarial patches can be broadly categorized into certified recovery and certified detection. In contrast, certified detection (McCoyd et al., 2020; Xiang & Mittal, 2021b; Han et al., 2021; Huang & Li, 2021) provides a weaker guarantee by only aiming at detecting inputs containing adversarial patches. While certified recovery is more desirable in principle, it typically comes at a high cost of reduced performance on clean data. In practice, certified detection might be preferable because it allows maintaining high clean performance. Most existing certifiable defenses against patches are focused on image classification, with the exception of DetectorGuard (Xiang & Mittal, 2021a) and ObjectSeeker (Xiang et al., 2022b) that certifiably defend against patch hiding attacks on object detectors. Moreover, existing defences are not easily applicable to arbitrary downstream models, because they assume either that the downstream model is trained explicitly for being certifiably robust (Levine & Feizi, 2020; Metzen & Yatsura, 2021), or that the model has a certain network architecture such as BagNet (Zhang et al., 2020; Metzen & Yatsura, 2021; Xiang et al., 2021) or a vision transformer (Salman et al., 2021; Huang & Li, 2021). A notable exception is PatchCleanser (Xiang et al., 2022a), which can be combined with arbitrary downstream models but is restricted to image classification. Figure 1: (a) A simple patch attack on the Swin transformer (Liu et al., 2021) manages to switch the prediction for a big part of the image.