One Formalization of Virtue Ethics via Learning
Govindarajulu, Naveen Sundar, Bringjsord, Selmer, Ghosh, Rikhiya
–arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence
Separate from the two main camps in ethics, deontological ethics (D) and consequentialism (C), there is virtue ethics (V). While there has been extensive formal, computational, and mathematical work done on deontological ethics and consequentialism, there has been very little or almost no work done in formalizing and making rigorous virtue ethics. Proponents of V might claim that it is not feasible to do so given V's emphasis on character and traits, rather than individual actions or consequencens. From the perspective of machine and robot ethics, this is not satisfactory. If V is to be considered to be on equal footing with D and C for the purpose of building morally competent machines, we need to start with formalizing parts of virtue ethics.
arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence
May-20-2018
- Country:
- Oceania > Australia
- North America > United States
- New York > Rensselaer County
- Troy (0.04)
- Illinois > Cook County
- Chicago (0.04)
- California
- San Francisco County > San Francisco (0.14)
- San Mateo County > San Mateo (0.04)
- New York > Rensselaer County
- Europe
- Netherlands (0.04)
- United Kingdom > England
- Oxfordshire > Oxford (0.14)
- Cambridgeshire > Cambridge (0.14)
- Genre:
- Research Report (0.50)
- Technology: