Our society increasingly benefits from Artificial Intelligence (AI). Unfortunately, more and more evidence shows that AI is also used for offensive purposes. Prior works have revealed various examples of use cases in which the deployment of AI can lead to violation of security and privacy objectives. No extant work, however, has been able to draw a holistic picture of the offensive potential of AI. In this SoK paper we seek to lay the ground for a systematic analysis of the heterogeneous capabilities of offensive AI. In particular we (i) account for AI risks to both humans and systems while (ii) consolidating and distilling knowledge from academic literature, expert opinions, industrial venues, as well as laypeople -- all of which being valuable sources of information on offensive AI. To enable alignment of such diverse sources of knowledge, we devise a common set of criteria reflecting essential technological factors related to offensive AI. With the help of such criteria, we systematically analyze: 95 research papers; 38 InfoSec briefings (from, e.g., BlackHat); the responses of a user study (N=549) entailing individuals with diverse backgrounds and expertise; and the opinion of 12 experts. Our contributions not only reveal concerning ways (some of which overlooked by prior work) in which AI can be offensively used today, but also represent a foothold to address this threat in the years to come.

Issue salience is a major determinant in voters' decisions. Candidates and political parties campaign to shift salience to their advantage - a process termed priming. We study the dynamics, strategies and equilibria of campaign spending for voter priming in multi-issue multi-party settings. We consider both parliamentary elections, where parties aim to maximize their share of votes, and various settings for presidential elections, where the winner takes all. For parliamentary elections, we show that pure equilibrium spending always exists and can be computed in time linear in the number of voters. For two parties and all settings, a spending equilibrium exists such that each party invests only in a single issue, and an equilibrium can be computed in time that is polynomial in the number of issues and linear in the number of voters. We also show that in most presidential settings no equilibrium exists. Additional properties of optimal campaign strategies are also studied.

In multi-agent reinforcement learning, a commonly considered paradigm is centralized training with decentralized execution. However, in this framework, decentralized execution restricts the development of coordinated policies due to the local observation limitation. In this paper, we consider the cooperation among neighboring agents during execution and formulate their interactions as a graph. Thus, we introduce a novel encoder-decoder architecture named Factor-based Multi-Agent Transformer ($f$-MAT) that utilizes a transformer to enable communication between neighboring agents during both training and execution. By dividing agents into different overlapping groups and representing each group with a factor, $f$-MAT achieves efficient message passing and parallel action generation through factor-based attention layers. Empirical results in networked systems such as traffic scheduling and power control demonstrate that $f$-MAT achieves superior performance compared to strong baselines, thereby paving the way for handling complex collaborative problems.

In multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), the centralized training with decentralized execution (CTDE) framework has gained widespread adoption due to its strong performance. However, the further development of CTDE faces two key challenges. First, agents struggle to autonomously assess the relevance of input information for cooperative tasks, impairing their decision-making abilities. Second, in communication-limited scenarios with partial observability, agents are unable to access global information, restricting their ability to collaborate effectively from a global perspective. To address these challenges, we introduce a novel cooperative MARL framework based on information selection and tacit learning. In this framework, agents gradually develop implicit coordination during training, enabling them to infer the cooperative behavior of others in a discrete space without communication, relying solely on local information. Moreover, we integrate gating and selection mechanisms, allowing agents to adaptively filter information based on environmental changes, thereby enhancing their decision-making capabilities. Experiments on popular MARL benchmarks show that our framework can be seamlessly integrated with state-of-the-art algorithms, leading to significant performance improvements.

This paper presents a Multi-Agent Norm Perception and Induction Learning Model aimed at facilitating the integration of autonomous agent systems into distributed healthcare environments through dynamic interaction processes. The nature of the medical norm system and its sharing channels necessitates distinct approaches for Multi-Agent Systems to learn two types of norms. Building on this foundation, the model enables agents to simultaneously learn descriptive norms, which capture collective tendencies, and prescriptive norms, which dictate ideal behaviors. Through parameterized mixed probability density models and practice-enhanced Markov games, the multi-agent system perceives descriptive norms in dynamic interactions and captures emergent prescriptive norms. We conducted experiments using a dataset from a neurological medical center spanning from 2016 to 2020.

The availability of challenging simulation environments is pivotal for advancing the field of Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL). In cooperative MARL settings, the StarCraft Multi-Agent Challenge (SMAC) has gained prominence as a benchmark for algorithms following centralized training with decentralized execution paradigm. However, with continual advancements in SMAC, many algorithms now exhibit near-optimal performance, complicating the evaluation of their true effectiveness. To alleviate this problem, in this work, we highlight a critical issue: the default opponent policy in these environments lacks sufficient diversity, leading MARL algorithms to overfit and exploit unintended vulnerabilities rather than learning robust strategies. To overcome these limitations, we propose SMAC-HARD, a novel benchmark designed to enhance training robustness and evaluation comprehensiveness. SMAC-HARD supports customizable opponent strategies, randomization of adversarial policies, and interfaces for MARL self-play, enabling agents to generalize to varying opponent behaviors and improve model stability. Furthermore, we introduce a black-box testing framework wherein agents are trained without exposure to the edited opponent scripts but are tested against these scripts to evaluate the policy coverage and adaptability of MARL algorithms. We conduct extensive evaluations of widely used and state-of-the-art algorithms on SMAC-HARD, revealing the substantial challenges posed by edited and mixed strategy opponents. Additionally, the black-box strategy tests illustrate the difficulty of transferring learned policies to unseen adversaries. We envision SMAC-HARD as a critical step toward benchmarking the next generation of MARL algorithms, fostering progress in self-play methods for multi-agent systems. Our code is available at https://github.com/devindeng94/smac-hard.

The justice system has increasingly employed AI techniques to enhance efficiency, yet limitations remain in improving the quality of decision-making, particularly regarding transparency and explainability needed to uphold public trust in legal AI. To address these challenges, we propose a large language model based multi-agent framework named AgentsBench, which aims to simultaneously improve both efficiency and quality in judicial decision-making. Our approach leverages multiple LLM-driven agents that simulate the collaborative deliberation and decision making process of a judicial bench. We conducted experiments on legal judgment prediction task, and the results show that our framework outperforms existing LLM based methods in terms of performance and decision quality. By incorporating these elements, our framework reflects real-world judicial processes more closely, enhancing accuracy, fairness, and society consideration. AgentsBench provides a more nuanced and realistic methods of trustworthy AI decision-making, with strong potential for application across various case types and legal scenarios.

Minecraft has emerged as a valuable testbed for embodied intelligence and sequential decision-making research, yet the development and validation of novel agents remains hindered by significant engineering challenges. This paper presents MineStudio, an open-source software package designed to streamline embodied policy development in Minecraft. MineStudio represents the first comprehensive integration of seven critical engineering components: simulator, data, model, offline pretraining, online finetuning, inference, and benchmark, thereby allowing users to concentrate their efforts on algorithm innovation. We provide a user-friendly API design accompanied by comprehensive documentation and tutorials. The complete codebase is publicly available at https://github.com/CraftJarvis/MineStudio.

In the rapidly evolving landscape of GameFi, a fusion of gaming and decentralized finance (DeFi), there exists a critical need to enhance player engagement and economic interaction within gaming ecosystems. Our GameFi ecosystem aims to fundamentally transform this landscape by integrating advanced embodied AI agents into GameFi platforms. These AI agents, developed using cutting-edge large language models (LLMs), such as GPT-4 and Claude AI, are capable of proactive, adaptive, and contextually rich interactions with players. By going beyond traditional scripted responses, these agents become integral participants in the game's narrative and economic systems, directly influencing player strategies and in-game economies. We address the limitations of current GameFi platforms, which often lack immersive AI interactions and mechanisms for community engagement or creator monetization. Through the deep integration of AI agents with blockchain technology, we establish a consensus-driven, decentralized GameFi ecosystem. This ecosystem empowers creators to monetize their contributions and fosters democratic collaboration among players and creators. Furthermore, by embedding DeFi mechanisms into the gaming experience, we enhance economic participation and provide new opportunities for financial interactions within the game. Our approach enhances player immersion and retention and advances the GameFi ecosystem by bridging traditional gaming with Web3 technologies. By integrating sophisticated AI and DeFi elements, we contribute to the development of more engaging, economically robust, and community-centric gaming environments. This project represents a significant advancement in the state-of-the-art in GameFi, offering insights and methodologies that can be applied throughout the gaming industry.

Building trust between humans and robots has long interested the robotics community. Various studies have aimed to clarify the factors that influence the development of user trust. In Human-Robot Interaction (HRI) environments, a critical aspect of trust development is the robot's ability to make its behavior understandable. The concept of an eXplainable Autonomous Robot (XAR) addresses this requirement. However, giving a robot self-explanatory abilities is a complex task. Robot behavior includes multiple skills and diverse subsystems. This complexity led to research into a wide range of methods for generating explanations about robot behavior. This paper presents a systematic literature review that analyzes existing strategies for generating explanations in robots and studies the current XAR trends. Results indicate promising advancements in explainability systems. However, these systems are still unable to fully cover the complex behavior of autonomous robots. Furthermore, we also identify a lack of consensus on the theoretical concept of explainability, and the need for a robust methodology to assess explainability methods and tools has been identified.