In one major section we discuss the imprecision, the incompleteness, the openendedness, and the uncertainty of people's knowledge. In the other major section we discuss strategies people use to make different types of deductive, negative, and functional inferences, and the way uncertainties combine in these inferences. Keywords Semantics, inference, cognitive processes, natural language processing, human memory, question-answering systems, deduction, analogy 1. Introduction In this paper we will discuss how to represent and process information in a computer in ways that are natural to people. This does not mean doing away completely with representations and procedures which computers have traditionally used, but adding new representations and procedures which they have not used. People often store and communicate imprecise, incomplete, and unquantified information; they often assert truth or falsity in relative terms; and they seldom seem to use rigorous logic in their inferential processes. Because of these conditions, people seem to have an almost infinite information processing capacity, with inference making and problem solving abilities more refined and far more flexible than any existing computer program. How can we study these human capabilities in order to make our machines show similar performance? A combination of approaches is perhaps best. Observation of people's behavior, introspection, some experimentation, protocol analysis, and synthesis of computer programs can all be valuable techniques.

The intention is as follows.

The frame problem in representing natural-language information is discussed. It is argued that the problem is not restricted to problem-solving-type situations, in which it has mostly been studied so far, but also has a broader significance. A new solution to the frame problem, which arose within a larger system for representing natural-language information, is described. The basic idea is to extend the predicate calculus notation with a special operator, Unless, with peculiar properties. Some difficulties with Unless are described.

And-or graphs and theorem-proving graphs determine the same kind of search space and differ only in the direction of search: from axioms to goals, in the case of theorem-proving graphs, and in the opposite direction, from goals to axioms, in the case of and-or graphs. Bidirectional search strategies combine both directions of search. We investigate the construction of a single general algorithm which covers unidirectional search both for and-or graphs and for theorem-proving graphs, bidirectional search for path-finding problems and search for a simplest solution as well as search for any solution. We obtain a general theory of completeness which applies to search spaces with infinite or-branching. In the case of search for any solution, we argue against the application of strategies designed for finding simplest solutions, but argue for assigning a major role in guiding the search to the use of symbol complexity (the number of symbol occurrences in a derivation).

Selected quotes:"The Science Research Council has been receiving an increasing number of applications for research support in the rather broad field with mathematical engineering and biological aspects which often goes under the general description Articial Intelligence (Al). The research support applied for is sufficient in volume, and in variety of discipline involved, to demand that a general view of the field be taken by the Council itself.""To supplement the important mass of specialist and detailed information available to the Science Research Council its Chairman decided to commission an independent report by someone outside the Al field but with substantial general experience of research work in multidisciplinary fields including fields with mathematical, engineering and biological aspects."-----"Most workers in Al research and in related elds confess to a pro nounced feeling of disappointment in what has been achieved in the past twenty-five years. Workers entered the feld around 1950, and even around 1960, with high hopes that are very far from having been realised in 1972. In no part of the field have the discoveries made so far produced the major impact that was then promised.""In the meantime, claims and predictions regarding the potential results of Al research had been publicised which went even farther than the expectations of the majority of workers in the field whose embarrassments have been added to by the lamentable failure of such inflated predictions.""These general statements are expanded in a little more detail in the rest of section 3, which has been influenced by the views of large numbers of people listed in section 1 but which like the whole of this report represents in the last analysis only the personal view of the author. Before going into such detail he is inclined, as a mathematician, to single out one rather general cause for the disappointments that have been experienced: failure to recognise the implications of the 'combinatorial explosion'."See also: BBC TV - June 1973 - Lighthill Controversy Debate at the Royal Institution with Professor Sir James Lighthill, Professor Donald Michie, Professor Richard Gregory and Professor John McCarthy.Also in Lighthill, J., Sutherland, N. S., Needham, R. M., Longuet-Higgins, H. C., and Michie, D. (Eds.), Artificial Intelligence: A Paper Symposium. Science Research Council of Great Britain.

"In this paper we describe some major new additions to the STRIPS robot problem-solving system. The first addition is a process for generalizing a plan produced by STRIPS so that problem-specific constants appearing in the plan are replaced by problem-independent parameters.The generalized plan, stored in a convenient format called a triangle table, has two important functions. The more obvious function is as a single macro action that can be used by STRIPS—either in whole or in part—during the solution of a subsequent problem. Perhaps less obviously, the generalized plan also plays a central part in the process that monitors the real-world execution of a plan, and allows the robot to react "intelligently" to unexpected consequences of actions.We conclude with a discussion of experiments with the system on several example problems."Artificial Intelligence 3:251-288

The problem we consider in this paper is that of discovering formal rules which will enable us to decide when a question posed in English can be answered on the basis of one or more declarative English sentences. To illustrate how this may be done in very simple cases we give rules which translate certain declarative sentences and questions involving the quantifiers'some', 'every', 'any', and'no' into a modified first-order predicate calculus, and answer the questions by comparing their translated forms with those of the declaratives. We suggest that in order to capture the meanings of more complex sentences it will be necessary to go beyond the first-order predicate calculus, to a notation in which the scope of words other than quantifiers and negations is clearly indicated. We conclude by describing a notational form for connected sentences, which seems to be a natural extension of Chomsky's'deep structures'.

One example of this will suffice.

A general game-playing program must know the rules of the particular playing game. These rules are:(1) an algorithm indicating the winning state;(2) an algorithm enumerating legal moves. A move gives a set of changes from the present situation.There are two means of giving these rules:(1) We can write a subroutine which recognizes if we have won and another which enumerates legal moves. Such a subroutine is a black box giving to the calling program the answer: 'you win' or 'you do not win', or the list of legal moves. But it cannot know what is in that subroutine.(2) We can also define a language in which we describe the rules of a game. The program investigates the rules written with this language and finds some indications to improve its play. Artificial Intelligence and Heuristic Programming Edinburgh University Press

Amsterdam: North-Holland.