AB S TRACT This study evaluates the performance of various classifiers in three distinct models: r esponse, r isk, and r esponse - r isk, concerning credit card mail campaigns and default prediction. In the r esponse model, the Extra Trees classifier demonstrates the highest recall level (79.1%), emphasizing its effectiveness in identifying potential responders to targeted credit card offers. Conversely, in the r isk model, the Random Forest classifier exhibits remarkable specificity of 84.1%, crucial for identifying customers least likely to default. Furthermore, in the multi - class r esponse - r isk model, the Random Forest classifier achieve s the highest accuracy (83.2%), indicating its efficacy in discerning both potential responders to credit card mail campaign and low - risk credit card users . In this study, we optimized various performance metrics to solve a specific credit risk and mail responsiveness business problem.

In this episode of we cover the news of the week and take a closer look at the Gemini 3, Google's latest AI model and chatbot. In today's episode, host Zoë Schiffer is joined by senior writer Max Zeff to discuss five stories you need to know about this week--from the political fallout after the release of the Epstein files, to why two young Mormon men created an app to help men stop "gooning." Then, we dive into Gemini 3's release and how companies like Google and OpenAI are honing in on AI profitability. Please help us improve by filling out our listener survey . Write to us at uncannyvalley@wired.com . You can always listen to this week's podcast through the audio player on this page, but if you want to subscribe for free to get every episode, here's how: If you're on an iPhone or iPad, open the app called Podcasts, or just tap this link . Today on the show we're bringing you five stories that you need to know about this week, including how companies like Google and OpenAI are honing in on profitability as they develop their AI consumer-facing products. I'm joined today by WIRED's Senior Writer Max Zeff. It's great to be here.

If she rejects it, she remains on hold until a new task proposal arrives.

If she rejects it, she remains on hold until a new task proposal arrives.

Category V ariable Definition Tax Avoidance CETR Cash Effective T ax Rate = Cash Taxes Paid / Pre - tax Income GETR GAAP Effective Tax Rate = T otal Tax Expense / Pre - tax Income CETR3 Three - year average CETR GETR3 Three - year average GETR CETR5 Five - year average CETR GETR5 Five - year average GETR A_CETR Adjusted Cash Effective Tax Rate A_GETR Adjusted GAAP Effective T ax Rate A_CETR3 Adjusted three - year average CETR A_GETR3 Adjusted three - year average GETR A_CETR5 Adjusted five - year average CETR A_GETR5 Adjusted five - year average GETR TSTA Total Book - T ax Difference (accrual - based measure) TSDA Discretionary Book - Tax Difference (discretionary accrual - based measure) Profitability ROA Return on Assets = Net Income / Lagged T otal Assets ROE Return on Equity = Net Income / Lagged Equity CFO Operating Cash Flow scaled by total assets LOSS Loss dummy (1 if prior - year net income < 0) Stability LEV Leverage = T otal Liabilities / Total Assets CUR Current Ratio = Current Assets / Current Liabilities SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets PPE Ratio of Property, Plant, and Equipment to total assets AGE Natural logarithm of firm age (based on year of establishment) INVREC Ratio of inventories and receivables to total assets Growth GRW Sales growth rate MB Market - to - Book Ratio = Market Capitalization / Book Equity TQ Tobin's Q = (Market Capitalization + Total Liabilities) / T otal Assets Market Valuation & Governance KOSPI KOSPI listing status dummy BIG4 Big4 audit dummy FORN Foreign ownership share (%) OWN Largest shareholder ownership share (%) Stability Measures Stability measures reflect a firm's financial soundness and its ability to meet obligations. Leverage (LEV) is defined as total liabilities divided by total assets, indicating the firm's degree of financial leverage. The current ratio (CUR), calculated as current assets divided by current liabilities, captures short - term liquidity and payment capacity. Firm size (SIZE) is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets, providing a quantitative indicator of scale. The proportion of property, plant, and eq uipment (PPE), defined as tangible fixed assets divided by total assets, is used to assess the structural stability of the asset base.

Algorithmic collusion has emerged as a central question in AI: Will the interaction between different AI agents deployed in markets lead to collusion? More generally, understanding how emergent behavior, be it a cartel or market dominance from more advanced bots, affects the market overall is an important research question. We propose a hierarchical multi-agent reinforcement learning framework to study algorithmic collusion in market making. The framework includes a self-interested market maker (Agent~A), which is trained in an uncertain environment shaped by an adversary, and three bottom-layer competitors: the self-interested Agent~B1 (whose objective is to maximize its own PnL), the competitive Agent~B2 (whose objective is to minimize the PnL of its opponent), and the hybrid Agent~B$^\star$, which can modulate between the behavior of the other two. To analyze how these agents shape the behavior of each other and affect market outcomes, we propose interaction-level metrics that quantify behavioral asymmetry and system-level dynamics, while providing signals potentially indicative of emergent interaction patterns. Experimental results show that Agent~B2 secures dominant performance in a zero-sum setting against B1, aggressively capturing order flow while tightening average spreads, thus improving market execution efficiency. In contrast, Agent~B$^\star$ exhibits a self-interested inclination when co-existing with other profit-seeking agents, securing dominant market share through adaptive quoting, yet exerting a milder adverse impact on the rewards of Agents~A and B1 compared to B2. These findings suggest that adaptive incentive control supports more sustainable strategic co-existence in heterogeneous agent environments and offers a structured lens for evaluating behavioral design in algorithmic trading systems.

Precise short-term price prediction in the highly volatile cryptocurrency market is critical for informed trading strategies. Although Temporal Fusion Transformers (TFTs) have shown potential, their direct use often struggles in the face of the market's non-stationary nature and extreme volatility. This paper introduces an adaptive TFT modeling approach leveraging dynamic subseries lengths and pattern-based categorization to enhance short-term forecasting. We propose a novel segmentation method where subseries end at relative maxima, identified when the price increase from the preceding minimum surpasses a threshold, thus capturing significant upward movements, which act as key markers for the end of a growth phase, while potentially filtering the noise. Crucially, the fixed-length pattern ending each subseries determines the category assigned to the subsequent variable-length subseries, grouping typical market responses that follow similar preceding conditions. A distinct TFT model trained for each category is specialized in predicting the evolution of these subsequent subseries based on their initial steps after the preceding peak. Experimental results on ETH-USDT 10-minute data over a two-month test period demonstrate that our adaptive approach significantly outperforms baseline fixed-length TFT and LSTM models in prediction accuracy and simulated trading profitability. Our combination of adaptive segmentation and pattern-conditioned forecasting enables more robust and responsive cryptocurrency price prediction.

If she rejects it, she remains on hold until a new task proposal arrives.

Algorithmic pricing is increasingly shaping market competition, raising concerns about its potential to compromise competitive dynamics. While prior work has shown that reinforcement learning (RL)-based pricing algorithms can lead to tacit collusion, less attention has been given to the role of macroeconomic factors in shaping these dynamics. This study examines the role of inflation in influencing algorithmic collusion within competitive markets. By incorporating inflation shocks into a RL-based pricing model, we analyze whether agents adapt their strategies to sustain supra-competitive profits. Our findings indicate that inflation reduces market competitiveness by fostering implicit coordination among agents, even without direct collusion. However, despite achieving sustained higher profitability, agents fail to develop robust punishment mechanisms to deter deviations from equilibrium strategies. The results suggest that inflation amplifies non-competitive dynamics in algorithmic pricing, emphasizing the need for regulatory oversight in markets where AI-driven pricing is prevalent.