Machine unlearning is a fundamental mechanism that enforces the right to be forgotten. Existing unlearning studies that rely on label manipulation or task-gradient reversal often deliver limited unlearning effectiveness. Moreover, they can undermine the original learning objective and typically do not guarantee equivalence to standard unlearning by retraining. In this paper, we propose \textbf{ManiF-SMC} (\textbf{Mani}fold \textbf{F}orgetting with \textbf{S}elf \textbf{M}ode \textbf{C}onnectivity), motivated by the observation that a model retrained on the remaining data tends to classify erased samples by their semantic similarity to the retained data. We begin with systematically recasting the approximate unlearning as pushing each erased sample away from its original learned manifold representation centroid toward its nearest semantic neighbors in the retained data. This reformulation aligns unlearning with retraining behavior and operates purely in representation space, reducing reliance on labels and task-specific gradients. To tackle the manifold representation-based unlearning problem, ManiF-SMC encapsulates the unlearning and representation preservation goals in a margin-based triplet loss. Because finding a suitable margin for unlearning is challenging, we propose a self-mode-connectivity module that rapidly reconstructs the local manifold to guide the adaptive margins generation for each unlearning case. Extensive experiments on four representative datasets show that ManiF-SMC achieves unlearning effectiveness comparable to state-of-the-art approximate methods while operating solely within the model's representation space.

Membership Inference Attacks (MIA) aim to infer whether a target data record has been utilized for model training or not. Existing MIAs designed for large language models (LLMs) can be bifurcated into two types: reference-free and reference-based attacks. Although reference-based attacks appear promising performance by calibrating the probability measured on the target model with reference models, this illusion of privacy risk heavily depends on a reference dataset that closely resembles the training set. Both two types of attacks are predicated on the hypothesis that training records consistently maintain a higher probability of being sampled. However, this hypothesis heavily relies on the overfitting of target models, which will be mitigated by multiple regularization methods and the generalization of LLMs. Thus, these reasons lead to high false-positive rates of MIAs in practical scenarios.We propose a Membership Inference Attack based on Self-calibrated Probabilistic Variation (SPV-MIA). Specifically, we introduce a self-prompt approach, which constructs the dataset to fine-tune the reference model by prompting the target LLM itself. In this manner, the adversary can collect a dataset with a similar distribution from public APIs.Furthermore, we introduce probabilistic variation, a more reliable membership signal based on LLM memorization rather than overfitting, from which we rediscover the neighbour attack with theoretical grounding. Comprehensive evaluation conducted on three datasets and four exemplary LLMs shows that SPV-MIA raises the AUC of MIAs from 0.7 to a significantly high level of 0.9.

Recent works have presented methods to identify if individual text sequences were members of the model's training data, known as membership inference attacks (MIAs). We demonstrate that the apparent success of these MIAs is confounded by selecting non-members (text sequences not used for training) belonging to a different distribution from the members (e.g., temporally shifted recent Wikipedia articles compared with ones used to train the model). This distribution shift makes membership inference appear successful. However, most MIA methods perform no better than random guessing when discriminating between members and non-members from the same distribution (e.g., in this case, the same period of time).Even when MIAs work, we find that different MIAs succeed at inferring membership of samples from different distributions.Instead, we propose a new dataset inference method to accurately identify the datasets used to train large language models.

We believe that our work can deepen the understanding and methodology of MIAs in the context of VLLMs.

Neural Information Processing Systems http://nips.cc/

In model inversion attacks (MIAs), adversaries attempt to recover the private training data by exploiting access to a well-trained target model.

Membership Inference Attacks (MIAs) are widely used to quantify training data memorization and assess privacy risks. Standard evaluation requires repeated retraining, which is computationally costly for large models. One-run methods (single training with randomized data inclusion) and zero-run methods (post hoc evaluation) are often used instead, though their statistical validity remains unclear. To address this gap, we frame MIA evaluation as a causal inference problem, defining memorization as the causal effect of including a data point in the training set. This novel formulation reveals and formalizes key sources of bias in existing protocols: one-run methods suffer from interference between jointly included points, while zero-run evaluations popular for LLMs are confounded by non-random membership assignment. We derive causal analogues of standard MIA metrics and propose practical estimators for multi-run, one-run, and zero-run regimes with non-asymptotic consistency guarantees. Experiments on real-world data show that our approach enables reliable memorization measurement even when retraining is impractical and under distribution shift, providing a principled foundation for privacy evaluation in modern AI systems.

In model inversion attacks (MIAs), adversaries attempt to recover private training data by exploiting access to a well-trained target model. Recent advancements have improved MIA performance using a two-stage generative framework. This approach first employs a generative adversarial network to learn a fixed distributional prior, which is then used to guide the inversion process during the attack. However, in this paper, we observed a phenomenon that such a fixed prior would lead to a low probability of sampling actual private data during the inversion process due to the inherent distribution gap between the prior distribution and the private data distribution, thereby constraining attack performance. To address this limitation, we propose increasing the density around high-quality pseudo-private data--recovered samples through model inversion that exhibit characteristics of the private training data--by slightly tuning the generator. This strategy effectively increases the probability of sampling actual private data that is close to these pseudo-private data during the inversion process. After integrating our method, the generative model inversion pipeline is strengthened, leading to improvements over state-of-the-art MIAs. This paves the way for new research directions in generative MIAs.