When agents trade in a Duality-based Cost Function prediction market, they collectively implement the learning algorithm Follow-The-Regularized-Leader [Abernethy et al., 2013]. We ask whether other learning algorithms could be used to inspire the design of prediction markets. By decomposing and modifying the Duality-based Cost Function Market Maker's (DCFMM) pricing mechanism, we propose a new prediction market, called the Smooth Quadratic Prediction Market, the incentivizes agents to collectively implement general steepest gradient descent. Relative to the DCFMM, the Smooth Quadratic Prediction Market has a better worst-case monetary loss for AD securities while preserving axiom guarantees such as the existence of instantaneous price, information incorporation, expressiveness, no arbitrage, and a form of incentive compatibility. To motivate the application of the Smooth Quadratic Prediction Market, we independently examine agents' trading behavior under two realistic constraints: bounded budgets and buy-only securities. Finally, we provide an introductory analysis of an approach to facilitate adaptive liquidity using the Smooth Quadratic Prediction Market. Our results suggest future designs where the price update rule is separate from the fee structure, yet guarantees are preserved.

Its market capitalization is roughly $8 billion higher than Amazon’s at the close of trading on Tuesday, making it the fifth-largest stock in the world.

As foundation models are increasingly deployed as interacting agents in multi-agent systems, their collective behavior raises new challenges for trustworthiness, transparency, and accountability. Traditional coordination mechanisms, such as centralized oversight or adversarial adjudication, struggle to scale and often obscure how decisions emerge. We introduce a market-making framework for multi-agent large language model (LLM) coordination that organizes agent interactions as structured economic exchanges. In this setup, each agent acts as a market participant, updating and trading probabilistic beliefs, to converge toward shared, truthful outcomes. By aligning local incentives with collective epistemic goals, the framework promotes self-organizing, verifiable reasoning without requiring external enforcement. Empirically, we evaluate this approach across factual reasoning, ethical judgment, and commonsense inference tasks. Market-based coordination yields accuracy gains of up to 10% over single-shot baselines while preserving interpretability and transparency of intermediate reasoning steps. Beyond these improvements, our findings demonstrate that economic coordination principles can operationalize accountability and robustness in multi-agent LLM systems, offering a scalable pathway toward self-correcting, socially responsible AI capable of maintaining trust and oversight in real world deployment scenarios.

We analyze sources of error in prediction market forecasts in order to bound the difference between a security's price and the ground truth it estimates.

Prior work has investigated variations of prediction markets that preserve participants' (differential) privacy, which formed the basis of useful mechanisms for purchasing data for machine learning objectives. Such markets required potentially unlimited financial subsidy, however, making them impractical.

Prior work has investigated variations of prediction markets that preserve participants' (differential) privacy, which formed the basis of useful mechanisms for purchasing data for machine learning objectives. Such markets required potentially unlimited financial subsidy, however, making them impractical.

We present ABIDES-MARL, a framework that combines a new multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) methodology with a new realistic limit-order-book (LOB) simulation system to study equilibrium behavior in complex financial market games. The system extends ABIDES-Gym by decoupling state collection from kernel interruption, enabling synchronized learning and decision-making for multiple adaptive agents while maintaining compatibility with standard RL libraries. It preserves key market features such as price-time priority and discrete tick sizes. Methodologically, we use MARL to approximate equilibrium-like behavior in multi-period trading games with a finite number of heterogeneous agents-an informed trader, a liquidity trader, noise traders, and competing market makers-all with individual price impacts. This setting bridges optimal execution and market microstructure by embedding the liquidity trader's optimization problem within a strategic trading environment. We validate the approach by solving an extended Kyle model within the simulation system, recovering the gradual price discovery phenomenon. We then extend the analysis to a liquidity trader's problem where market liquidity arises endogenously and show that, at equilibrium, execution strategies shape market-maker behavior and price dynamics. ABIDES-MARL provides a reproducible foundation for analyzing equilibrium and strategic adaptation in realistic markets and contributes toward building economically interpretable agentic AI systems for finance.

We investigate the mechanisms by which medium-frequency trading agents are adversely selected by opportunistic high-frequency traders. We use reinforcement learning (RL) within a Hawkes Limit Order Book (LOB) model in order to replicate the behaviours of high-frequency market makers. In contrast to the classical models with exogenous price impact assumptions, the Hawkes model accounts for endogenous price impact and other key properties of the market (Jain et al. 2024a). Given the real-world impracticalities of the market maker updating strategies for every event in the LOB, we formulate the high-frequency market making agent via an impulse control reinforcement learning framework (Jain et al. 2025). The RL used in the simulation utilises Proximal Policy Optimisation (PPO) and self-imitation learning. To replicate the adverse selection phenomenon, we test the RL agent trading against a medium frequency trader (MFT) executing a meta-order and demonstrate that, with training against the MFT meta-order execution agent, the RL market making agent learns to capitalise on the price drift induced by the meta-order. Recent empirical studies have shown that medium-frequency traders are increasingly subject to adverse selection by high-frequency trading agents. As high-frequency trading continues to proliferate across financial markets, the slippage costs incurred by medium-frequency traders are likely to increase over time. However, we do not observe that increased profits for the market making RL agent necessarily cause significantly increased slippages for the MFT agent.

Algorithmic collusion has emerged as a central question in AI: Will the interaction between different AI agents deployed in markets lead to collusion? More generally, understanding how emergent behavior, be it a cartel or market dominance from more advanced bots, affects the market overall is an important research question. We propose a hierarchical multi-agent reinforcement learning framework to study algorithmic collusion in market making. The framework includes a self-interested market maker (Agent~A), which is trained in an uncertain environment shaped by an adversary, and three bottom-layer competitors: the self-interested Agent~B1 (whose objective is to maximize its own PnL), the competitive Agent~B2 (whose objective is to minimize the PnL of its opponent), and the hybrid Agent~B$^\star$, which can modulate between the behavior of the other two. To analyze how these agents shape the behavior of each other and affect market outcomes, we propose interaction-level metrics that quantify behavioral asymmetry and system-level dynamics, while providing signals potentially indicative of emergent interaction patterns. Experimental results show that Agent~B2 secures dominant performance in a zero-sum setting against B1, aggressively capturing order flow while tightening average spreads, thus improving market execution efficiency. In contrast, Agent~B$^\star$ exhibits a self-interested inclination when co-existing with other profit-seeking agents, securing dominant market share through adaptive quoting, yet exerting a milder adverse impact on the rewards of Agents~A and B1 compared to B2. These findings suggest that adaptive incentive control supports more sustainable strategic co-existence in heterogeneous agent environments and offers a structured lens for evaluating behavioral design in algorithmic trading systems.

Prediction markets are economic mechanisms for aggregating information about future events through sequential interactions with traders. The pricing mechanisms in these markets are known to be related to optimization algorithms in machine learning and through these connections we have some understanding of how equilibrium market prices relate to the beliefs of the traders in a market. However, little is known about rates and guarantees for the convergence of these sequential mechanisms, and two recent papers cite this as an important open question. In this paper we show how some previously studied prediction market trading models can be understood as a natural generalization of randomized coordinate descent which we call randomized subspace descent (RSD). We establish convergence rates for RSD and leverage them to prove rates for the two prediction market models above, answering the open questions. Our results extend beyond standard centralized markets to arbitrary trade networks.