Misinformation detectors often rely on superficial cues (i.e., shortcuts) that correlate with misinformation in training data but fail to generalize to the diverse and evolving nature of real-world misinformation. This issue is exacerbated by large language models (LLMs), which can easily generate convincing misinformation using simple prompts. We introduce TRUTHOVERTRICKS, a unified evaluation paradigm for measuring shortcut learning in misinformation detection. TRUTHOVERTRICKS categorizes shortcut behaviors into intrinsic shortcut induction and extrinsic shortcut injection, and evaluates seven representative detectors across 14 popular benchmarks, along with two new factual misinformation datasets, NQ-Misinfo and Streaming-Misinfo. Empirical results reveal that existing detectors suffer severe performance degradation when exposed to both naturally occurring and adversarially crafted shortcuts. To address this, we propose the Shortcut Mitigation Framework (SMF), an LLM-augmented data augmentation framework that mitigates shortcut reliance through paraphrasing, factual summarization, and sentiment normalization. SMF consistently enhances robustness across 16 benchmarks, forcing models to rely on deeper semantic understanding rather than shortcut cues.

Capability evaluations play a crucial role in assessing and regulating frontier AI systems. The effectiveness of these evaluations faces a significant challenge: strategic underperformance, or "sandbagging", where models deliberately underperform during evaluation.

Visual personalization is essential in user-facing AI systems such as smart homes and healthcare, where aligning model behavior with user-centric concepts is critical. However, recent large Vision-Language Models (VLMs), despite their broad applicability, remain underexplored in their ability to adapt to individual users. In this paper, we introduce MMPB, the first extensive benchmark for evaluating VLMs on personalization. MMPB comprises 10k image-query pairs and includes 111 personalizable concepts across four categories: humans, animals, objects, and characters, with the human category enriched with preference-grounded queries.

Achieving fine-grained control over subject identity and semantic attributes (pose, style, lighting) in text-to-image generation, particularly for multiple subjects, often undermines the editability and coherence of Diffusion Transformers (DiTs).

Reinforcement learning (RL) has emerged as a powerful post-training technique to incentivize the reasoning ability of large language models (LLMs). However, LLMs can respond very inconsistently to RL finetuning: some show substantial performance gains, while others plateau or even degrade. To understand this divergence, we analyze the per-step influence of the RL objective and identify two key conditions for effective post-training: (1) RL-informative rollout accuracy, and (2) strong data co-influence, which quantifies how much the training data affects performance on other samples. Guided by these insights, we propose behavior injection, a task-agnostic data augmentation scheme applied prior to RL. Behavior injection enriches the supervised finetuning (SFT) data by seeding exploratory and exploitative behaviors, effectively making the model more RL-ready. We evaluate our method across two reasoning benchmarks with multiple base models. The results demonstrate that our theoretically motivated augmentation can significantly increase the performance gain from RL over the pre-RL model.

Autonomous UI agents powered by AI have tremendous potential to boost human productivity by automating routine tasks such as filing taxes and paying bills. However, a major challenge in unlocking their full potential is security, which is exacerbated by the agent's ability to take action on their user's behalf. Existing tests for prompt injections in web agents either over-simplify the threat by testing unrealistic scenarios or giving the attacker too much power, or look at single-step isolated tasks. To more accurately measure progress for secure web agents, we introduce WASP - a new publicly available benchmark for end-to-end evaluation of Web Agent Security against Prompt Injection attacks. Evaluating with WASP shows that even top-tier AI models, including those with advanced reasoning capabilities, can be deceived by simple, low-effort human-written injections in very realistic scenarios. Our end-to-end evaluation reveals a previously unobserved insight: while attacks partially succeed in up to 86% of the case, even state-of-the-art agents often struggle to fully complete the attacker goals - highlighting the current state of security by incompetence.

Competing objectives arise when a model's capabilities

AI agents aim to solve complex tasks by combining text-based reasoning with external tool calls.

Recently, diffusion models [10, 11] have emerged as a promising alternative, delivering noteworthy results in real-world image restoration [12, 13, 14].