gemma-7b-it
What Features in Prompts Jailbreak LLMs? Investigating the Mechanisms Behind Attacks
Kirch, Nathalie Maria, Field, Severin, Casper, Stephen
While `jailbreaks' have been central to research on the safety and reliability of LLMs (large language models), the underlying mechanisms behind these attacks are not well understood. Some prior works have used linear methods to analyze jailbreak prompts or model refusal. Here, however, we compare linear and nonlinear methods to study the features in prompts that contribute to successful jailbreaks. We do this by probing for jailbreak success based only on the portions of the latent representations corresponding to prompt tokens. First, we introduce a dataset of 10,800 jailbreak attempts from 35 attack methods. We then show that different jailbreaking methods work via different nonlinear features in prompts. Specifically, we find that while probes can distinguish between successful and unsuccessful jailbreaking prompts with a high degree of accuracy, they often transfer poorly to held-out attack methods. We also show that nonlinear probes can be used to mechanistically jailbreak the LLM by guiding the design of adversarial latent perturbations. These mechanistic jailbreaks are able to jailbreak Gemma-7B-IT more reliably than 34 of the 35 techniques that it was trained on. Ultimately, our results suggest that jailbreaks cannot be thoroughly understood in terms of universal or linear prompt features alone.
Evaluating Cultural Awareness of LLMs for Yoruba, Malayalam, and English
Dawson, Fiifi, Mosunmola, Zainab, Pocker, Sahil, Dandekar, Raj Abhijit, Dandekar, Rajat, Panat, Sreedath
Although LLMs have been extremely effective in a large number of complex tasks, their understanding and functionality for regional languages and cultures are not well studied. In this paper, we explore the ability of various LLMs to comprehend the cultural aspects of two regional languages: Malayalam (state of Kerala, India) and Yoruba (West Africa). Using Hofstede's six cultural dimensions: Power Distance (PDI), Individualism (IDV), Motivation towards Achievement and Success (MAS), Uncertainty Avoidance (UAV), Long Term Orientation (LTO), and Indulgence (IVR), we quantify the cultural awareness of LLM-based responses. We demonstrate that although LLMs show a high cultural similarity for English, they fail to capture the cultural nuances across these 6 metrics for Malayalam and Yoruba. We also highlight the need for large-scale regional language LLM training with culturally enriched datasets. This will have huge implications for enhancing the user experience of chat-based LLMs and also improving the validity of large-scale LLM agent-based market research.
LLMs Are Biased Towards Output Formats! Systematically Evaluating and Mitigating Output Format Bias of LLMs
Long, Do Xuan, Ngoc, Hai Nguyen, Sim, Tiviatis, Dao, Hieu, Joty, Shafiq, Kawaguchi, Kenji, Chen, Nancy F., Kan, Min-Yen
We present the first systematic evaluation examining format bias in performance of large language models (LLMs). Our approach distinguishes between two categories of an evaluation metric under format constraints to reliably and accurately assess performance: one measures performance when format constraints are adhered to, while the other evaluates performance regardless of constraint adherence. We then define a metric for measuring the format bias of LLMs and establish effective strategies to reduce it. Subsequently, we present our empirical format bias evaluation spanning four commonly used categories -- multiple-choice question-answer, wrapping, list, and mapping -- covering 15 widely-used formats. Our evaluation on eight generation tasks uncovers significant format bias across state-of-the-art LLMs. We further discover that improving the format-instruction following capabilities of LLMs across formats potentially reduces format bias. Based on our evaluation findings, we study prompting and fine-tuning with synthesized format data techniques to mitigate format bias. Our methods successfully reduce the variance in ChatGPT's performance among wrapping formats from 235.33 to 0.71 (%$^2$).
Can LLMs "Reason" in Music? An Evaluation of LLMs' Capability of Music Understanding and Generation
Zhou, Ziya, Wu, Yuhang, Wu, Zhiyue, Zhang, Xinyue, Yuan, Ruibin, Ma, Yinghao, Wang, Lu, Benetos, Emmanouil, Xue, Wei, Guo, Yike
Symbolic Music, akin to language, can be encoded in discrete symbols. Recent research has extended the application of large language models (LLMs) such as GPT-4 and Llama2 to the symbolic music domain including understanding and generation. Yet scant research explores the details of how these LLMs perform on advanced music understanding and conditioned generation, especially from the multi-step reasoning perspective, which is a critical aspect in the conditioned, editable, and interactive human-computer co-creation process. This study conducts a thorough investigation of LLMs' capability and limitations in symbolic music processing. We identify that current LLMs exhibit poor performance in song-level multi-step music reasoning, and typically fail to leverage learned music knowledge when addressing complex musical tasks. An analysis of LLMs' responses highlights distinctly their pros and cons. Our findings suggest achieving advanced musical capability is not intrinsically obtained by LLMs, and future research should focus more on bridging the gap between music knowledge and reasoning, to improve the co-creation experience for musicians.
Enhancing Jailbreak Attack Against Large Language Models through Silent Tokens
Yu, Jiahao, Luo, Haozheng, Hu, Jerry Yao-Chieh, Guo, Wenbo, Liu, Han, Xing, Xinyu
Along with the remarkable successes of Language language models, recent research also started to explore the security threats of LLMs, including jailbreaking attacks. Attackers carefully craft jailbreaking prompts such that a target LLM will respond to the harmful question. Existing jailbreaking attacks require either human experts or leveraging complicated algorithms to craft jailbreaking prompts. In this paper, we introduce BOOST, a simple attack that leverages only the eos tokens. We demonstrate that rather than constructing complicated jailbreaking prompts, the attacker can simply append a few eos tokens to the end of a harmful question. It will bypass the safety alignment of LLMs and lead to successful jailbreaking attacks. We further apply BOOST to four representative jailbreak methods and show that the attack success rates of these methods can be significantly enhanced by simply adding eos tokens to the prompt. To understand this simple but novel phenomenon, we conduct empirical analyses. Our analysis reveals that adding eos tokens makes the target LLM believe the input is much less harmful, and eos tokens have low attention values and do not affect LLM's understanding of the harmful questions, leading the model to actually respond to the questions. Our findings uncover how fragile an LLM is against jailbreak attacks, motivating the development of strong safety alignment approaches.