It is extremely difficult to train a superhuman Artificial Intelligence (AI) for games of similar size to StarCraft II. AlphaStar is the first AI that beat human professionals in the full game of StarCraft II, using a league training framework that is inspired by a game-theoretic approach. In this paper, we improve AlphaStar's league training in two significant aspects. We train goal-conditioned exploiters, whose abilities of spotting weaknesses in the main agent and the entire league are greatly improved compared to the unconditioned exploiters in AlphaStar. In addition, we endow the agents in the league with the new ability of opponent modeling, which makes the agent more responsive to the opponent's real-time strategy. Based on these improvements, we train a better and superhuman AI with orders of magnitude less resources than AlphaStar (see Table 1 for a full comparison). Considering the iconic role of StarCraft II in game AI research, we believe our method and results on StarCraft II provide valuable design principles on how one would utilize the general league training framework for obtaining a least-exploitable strategy in various, large-scale, real-world games.

In this paper, we improve AlphaStar's league training

It is extremely difficult to train a superhuman Artificial Intelligence (AI) for games of similar size to StarCraft II. AlphaStar is the first AI that beat human professionals in the full game of StarCraft II, using a league training framework that is inspired by a game-theoretic approach. In this paper, we improve AlphaStar's league training in two significant aspects. We train goal-conditioned exploiters, whose abilities of spotting weaknesses in the main agent and the entire league are greatly improved compared to the unconditioned exploiters in AlphaStar. In addition, we endow the agents in the league with the new ability of opponent modeling, which makes the agent more responsive to the opponent's real-time strategy.

Recent advances in reinforcement learning (RL) heavily rely on a variety of well-designed benchmarks, which provide environmental platforms and consistent criteria to evaluate existing and novel algorithms. Specifically, in multi-agent RL (MARL), a plethora of benchmarks based on cooperative games have spurred the development of algorithms that improve the scalability of cooperative multi-agent systems. However, for the competitive setting, a lightweight and open-sourced benchmark with challenging gaming dynamics and visual inputs has not yet been established. In this work, we present FightLadder, a real-time fighting game platform, to empower competitive MARL research. Along with the platform, we provide implementations of state-of-the-art MARL algorithms for competitive games, as well as a set of evaluation metrics to characterize the performance and exploitability of agents. We demonstrate the feasibility of this platform by training a general agent that consistently defeats 12 built-in characters in single-player mode, and expose the difficulty of training a non-exploitable agent without human knowledge and demonstrations in two-player mode. FightLadder provides meticulously designed environments to address critical challenges in competitive MARL research, aiming to catalyze a new era of discovery and advancement in the field. Videos and code at https://sites.google.com/view/fightladder/home.

Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) agents have demonstrated impressive success in a wide range of game genres. However, existing research primarily focuses on optimizing DRL competence rather than addressing the challenge of prolonged player interaction. In this paper, we propose a practical DRL agent system for fighting games named Sh\=ukai, which has been successfully deployed to Naruto Mobile, a popular fighting game with over 100 million registered users. Sh\=ukai quantifies the state to enhance generalizability, introducing Heterogeneous League Training (HELT) to achieve balanced competence, generalizability, and training efficiency. Furthermore, Sh\=ukai implements specific rewards to align the agent's behavior with human expectations. Sh\=ukai's ability to generalize is demonstrated by its consistent competence across all characters, even though it was trained on only 13% of them. Additionally, HELT exhibits a remarkable 22% improvement in sample efficiency. Sh\=ukai serves as a valuable training partner for players in Naruto Mobile, enabling them to enhance their abilities and skills.

Recent advances in Competitive Self-Play (CSP) have achieved, or even surpassed, human level performance in complex game environments such as Dota 2 and StarCraft II using Distributed Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL). One core component of these methods relies on creating a pool of learning agents -- consisting of the Main Agent, past versions of this agent, and Exploiter Agents -- where Exploiter Agents learn counter-strategies to the Main Agents. A key drawback of these approaches is the large computational cost and physical time that is required to train the system, making them impractical to deploy in highly iterative real-life settings such as video game productions. In this paper, we propose the Minimax Exploiter, a game theoretic approach to exploiting Main Agents that leverages knowledge of its opponents, leading to significant increases in data efficiency. We validate our approach in a diversity of settings, including simple turn based games, the arcade learning environment, and For Honor, a modern video game. The Minimax Exploiter consistently outperforms strong baselines, demonstrating improved stability and data efficiency, leading to a robust CSP-MARL method that is both flexible and easy to deploy.

Many real-world games suffer from information asymmetry: one player is only aware of their own payoffs while the other player has the full game information. Examples include the critical domain of security games and adversarial multi-agent reinforcement learning. Information asymmetry renders traditional solution concepts such as Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium (SSE) and Robust-Optimization Equilibrium (ROE) inoperative. We propose a novel solution concept called VISER (Victim Is Secure, Exploiter best-Responds). VISER enables an external observer to predict the outcome of such games. In particular, for security applications, VISER allows the victim to better defend itself while characterizing the most damaging attacks available to the attacker. We show that each player's VISER strategy can be computed independently in polynomial time using linear programming (LP). We also extend VISER to its Markov-perfect counterpart for Markov games, which can be solved efficiently using a series of LPs.

This paper proposes new, end-to-end deep reinforcement learning algorithms for learning two-player zero-sum Markov games. Different from prior efforts on training agents to beat a fixed set of opponents, our objective is to find the Nash equilibrium policies that are free from exploitation by even the adversarial opponents. We propose (a) Nash-DQN algorithm, which integrates the deep learning techniques from single DQN into the classic Nash Q-learning algorithm for solving tabular Markov games; (b) Nash-DQN-Exploiter algorithm, which additionally adopts an exploiter to guide the exploration of the main agent. We conduct experimental evaluation on tabular examples as well as various two-player Atari games. Our empirical results demonstrate that (i) the policies found by many existing methods including Neural Fictitious Self Play and Policy Space Response Oracle can be prone to exploitation by adversarial opponents; (ii) the output policies of our algorithms are robust to exploitation, and thus outperform existing methods.

Modern reinforcement learning (RL) commonly engages practical problems with large state spaces, where function approximation must be deployed to approximate either the value function or the policy. While recent progresses in RL theory address a rich set of RL problems with general function approximation, such successes are mostly restricted to the single-agent setting. It remains elusive how to extend these results to multi-agent RL, especially due to the new challenges arising from its game-theoretical nature. This paper considers two-player zero-sum Markov Games (MGs). We propose a new algorithm that can provably find the Nash equilibrium policy using a polynomial number of samples, for any MG with low multi-agent Bellman-Eluder dimension -- a new complexity measure adapted from its single-agent version (Jin et al., 2021). A key component of our new algorithm is the exploiter, which facilitates the learning of the main player by deliberately exploiting her weakness. Our theoretical framework is generic, which applies to a wide range of models including but not limited to tabular MGs, MGs with linear or kernel function approximation, and MGs with rich observations.