Instrumental variable (IV) analyses generally start by posing a structural equation: Y = hstructural(X)+ϵ, (1) where hstructural represents the causal effect of X on Y, and X and ϵ may be endogenous (E[ϵ | X] = 0). Then given an exogenous instrument Z satisfying the exclusion restriction, the common statistical solution given joint observations of W = (X,Y,Z) P is to conduct inference on some continuous linear functional h 7 EP[m(W;h)] of a solution h H to the linear equation implied by exclusion: TPh = rP, (2) where TP: H G maps h 7 argming GEP(h(X) g(Z))2, rP = argminr GEP(Y r(Z))2, and H, G are closed linear subspaces of square-integrable functions of X and of Z, respectively. For example, if these are all square-integrable functions, then (TPh)(Z) = EP[h(X) | Z] is the conditional expectation.

$L_1$-Approximating polynomials, i.e., polynomials that approximate indicator functions in $L_1$-norm under certain distributions, are widely used in computational learning theory. We study the existence of \textit{non-negative} $L_1$-approximating polynomials with respect to Gaussian distributions. This is a stronger requirement than $L_1$-approximation but weaker than sandwiching polynomials (which themselves have many applications). These non-negative approximating polynomials have recently found uses in smoothed learning from positive-only examples. In this short note, we prove that every class of sets with Gaussian surface area (GSA) at most $Γ$ under the standard Gaussian admits degree-$k$ non-negative polynomials that $\eps$-approximate its indicator functions in $L_1$-norm, for $k=\tilde{O}(Γ^2/\varepsilon^2)$. Equivalently, finite GSA implies $L_1$-approximation with the stronger pointwise guarantee that the approximating polynomial has range contained in $[0,\infty)$. Up to a constant-factor, this matches the degree of the best currently known Gaussian $L_1$-approximation degree bound without the non-negativity constraint.

While it has been the subject of several recent theoretical studies, many important questions related to adversarial robustness are still open.

This paper characterizes the best possible rate of growth of wealth in a Kelly betting game when repeatedly betting against a general i.i.d. null hypothesis $\mathscr{P}$, but the data are drawn i.i.d from an arbitrary alternative $Q$. We prove that it equals $\lim_{n \to \infty}n^{-1}\inf_{P \in (\mathscr P)^n)^{\circ\circ}} \mathrm{KL}(Q^n,P)$, where ${\mathscr P}^n = \{P^n: P \in \mathscr{P}\}$ and $(\mathscr {P}^n)^{\circ\circ}$ is its bipolar, i.e., this rate is achievable and one cannot do better. This quantity is in general smaller than a more popular quantity in the literature, $\mathrm{KL}_{\inf}(Q,\mathscr{P}) := \inf_{P \in \mathscr P}\mathrm{KL}(Q,P)$. If $\mathrm{KL}_{\mathrm{inf}}(\cdot,\mathscr P)$ is weakly lowersemicontinuous (w.l.s.c.) at $Q$, we show that the two quantities are equal; in particular, this happens when $\mathscr P$ is weakly compact. For simple alternatives, we provide the first matching necessary and sufficient condition for when power-one sequential tests exist (without assumptions on $\mathscr P, Q$). We also derive the optimal worst-case growth rate against composite $\mathscr Q$. We emphasize that test supermartingales on reduced filtrations suffice for all i.i.d. testing problems, and more general e-processes are not required. We thus completely generalize the recent results of Larsson et al.~\cite{larsson2025numeraire} to the sequential setting.

Adversarial risk quantifies the performance of classifiers on adversarially perturbed data. Numerous definitions of adversarial risk--not all mathematically rigorous and differing subtly in the details--have appeared in the literature. In this paper, we revisit these definitions, make them rigorous, and critically examine their similarities and differences. Our technical tools derive from optimal transport, robust statistics, functional analysis, and game theory. Our contributions include the following: generalizing Strassen's theorem to the unbalanced optimal transport setting with applications to adversarial classification with unequal priors; showing an equivalence between adversarial robustness and robust hypothesis testing with -Wasserstein uncertainty sets; proving the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium in the two-player game between the adversary and the algorithm; and characterizing adversarial risk by the minimum Bayes error between a pair of distributions belonging to the -Wasserstein uncertainty sets. Our results generalize and deepen recently discovered connections between optimal transport and adversarial robustness and reveal new connections to Choquet capacities and game theory.

Adversarial risk quantifies the performance of classifiers on adversarially perturbed data. Numerous definitions of adversarial risk--not all mathematically rigorous and differing subtly in the details--have appeared in the literature. In this paper, we revisit these definitions, make them rigorous, and critically examine their similarities and differences. Our technical tools derive from optimal transport, robust statistics, functional analysis, and game theory. Our contributions include the following: generalizing Strassen's theorem to the unbalanced optimal transport setting with applications to adversarial classification with unequal priors; showing an equivalence between adversarial robustness and robust hypothesis testing with -Wasserstein uncertainty sets; proving the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium in the two-player game between the adversary and the algorithm; and characterizing adversarial risk by the minimum Bayes error between a pair of distributions belonging to the -Wasserstein uncertainty sets. Our results generalize and deepen recently discovered connections between optimal transport and adversarial robustness and reveal new connections to Choquet capacities and game theory.

Robust 6d object pose estimation by learning rgb-d features.

Do you need to worry about Mythos, Anthropic's computer-hacking AI? A powerful AI kept from public access because of its ability to hack computers with impunity is making headlines around the world. But what is Mythos, does it really represent a risk and might it even be used to improve cybersecurity? Anthropic's Project Glasswing aims to improve online security The past few weeks have brought apparently alarming news of Mythos, an AI that can identify cybersecurity flaws in a matter of moments, leaving operating systems and software vulnerable to hackers. The cybersecurity community is now beginning to get a better sense of how Mythos may change the face of cybersecurity - and not necessarily for the worse.

Partial monitoring games are repeated games where the learner receives feedback that might be different from adversary's move or even the reward gained by the learner. Recently, a general model of combinatorial partial monitoring (CPM) games was proposed [1], where the learner's action space can be exponentially large and adversary samples its moves from a bounded, continuous space, according to a fixed distribution. The paper gave a confidence bound based algorithm (GCB) that achieves O(T2/3 log T) distribution independent and O(log T) distribution dependent regret bounds. The implementation of their algorithm depends on two separate offline oracles and the distribution dependent regret additionally requires existence of a unique optimal action for the learner. Adopting their CPM model, our first contribution is a Phased Exploration with Greedy Exploitation (PEGE) algorithmic framework for the problem.