We develop a framework that leverages the smoothed complexity analysis by Spielman and Teng [60] to circumvent paradoxes and impossibility theorems in social choice, motivated by modern applications of social choice powered by AI and ML. For Condrocet's paradox, we prove that the smoothed likelihood of the paradox either vanishes at an exponential rate as the number of agents increases, or does not vanish at all. For the ANR impossibility on the non-existence of voting rules that simultaneously satisfy anonymity, neutrality, and resolvability, we characterize the rate for the impossibility to vanish, to be either polynomially fast or exponentially fast. We also propose a novel easy-to-compute tie-breaking mechanism that optimally preserves anonymity and neutrality for even number of alternatives in natural settings. Our results illustrate the smoothed possibility of social choice--even though the paradox and the impossibility theorem hold in the worst case, they may not be a big concern in practice.

Mathematical morphology provides a nonlinear framework for image and spatial data processing and analysis. Although there have been many successful applications of mathematical morphology to vector-valued images, such as color and hyperspectral images, there is still no consensus on the most suitable vector ordering for constructing morphological operators. This paper addresses this issue by examining a reduced ordering approximating the Condorcet ranking derived from a set of vector orderings. Inspired by voting problems, the Condorcet ordering ranks elements from most to least voted, with voters representing different orderings. In this paper, we develop a machine learning approach that learns a reduced ordering that approximates the Condorcet ordering. Preliminary computational experiments confirm the effectiveness of learning the reduced mapping to define vector-valued morphological operators for color images.

--Explainability is crucial for improving the transparency of black-box machine learning models. With the advancement of explanation methods such as LIME and SHAP, various XAI performance metrics have been developed to evaluate the quality of explanations. However, different explainers can provide contrasting explanations for the same prediction, introducing trade-offs across conflicting quality metrics. Although available aggregation approaches improve robustness, reducing explanations' variability, very limited research employed a multi-criteria decision-making approach. T o address this gap, this paper introduces a multi-criteria rank-based weighted aggregation method that balances multiple quality metrics simultaneously to produce an ensemble of explanation models. Furthermore, we propose rank-based versions of existing XAI metrics (complexity, faithfulness and stability) to better evaluate ranked feature importance explanations. Extensive experiments on publicly available datasets demonstrate the robustness of the proposed model across these metrics. Comparative analyses of various multi-criteria decision-making and rank aggregation algorithms showed that TOPSIS and WSUM are the best candidates for this use case. The emphasis in the machine learning community has changed to deep learning models [1].

Additional Feedback: Major comments: 1) Smoothed analysis: Calling your analysis "smoothed analysis" is a bit confusing. Smoothed analysis would take worst-case over profiles, and then expectation over noise added. But as you say in your related work, you're taking worst-case over distributions coming from a family. Such analysis was already done in the past. For example, consider work that analyzed the probability of Condorcet's paradox under any distribution from the Mallows family.

The gold standard in human-AI collaboration is complementarity -- when combined performance exceeds both the human and algorithm alone. We investigate this challenge in binary classification settings where the goal is to maximize 0-1 accuracy. Given two or more agents who can make calibrated probabilistic predictions, we show a "No Free Lunch"-style result. Any deterministic collaboration strategy (a function mapping calibrated probabilities into binary classifications) that does not essentially always defer to the same agent will sometimes perform worse than the least accurate agent. In other words, complementarity cannot be achieved "for free." The result does suggest one model of collaboration with guarantees, where one agent identifies "obvious" errors of the other agent. We also use the result to understand the necessary conditions enabling the success of other collaboration techniques, providing guidance to human-AI collaboration.

The well-known Condorcet's Jury theorem posits that the majority rule selects the best alternative among two available options with probability one, as the population size increases to infinity. We study this result under an asymmetric two-candidate setup, where supporters of both candidates may have different participation costs. When the decision to abstain is fully rational i.e., when the vote pivotality is the probability of a tie, the only equilibrium outcome is a trivial equilibrium where all voters except those with zero voting cost, abstain. We propose and analyze a more practical, boundedly rational model where voters overestimate their pivotality, and show that under this model, non-trivial equilibria emerge where the winning probability of both candidates is bounded away from one. We show that when the pivotality estimate strongly depends on the margin of victory, victory is not assured to any candidate in any non-trivial equilibrium, regardless of population size and in contrast to Condorcet's assertion. Whereas, under a weak dependence on margin, Condorcet's Jury theorem is restored.

Epistemic social choice aims at unveiling a hidden ground truth given votes, which are interpreted as noisy signals about it. We consider here a simple setting where votes consist of approval ballots: each voter approves a set of alternatives which they believe can possibly be the ground truth. Based on the intuitive idea that more reliable votes contain fewer alternatives, we define several noise models that are approval voting variants of the Mallows model. The likelihood-maximizing alternative is then characterized as the winner of a weighted approval rule, where the weight of a ballot decreases with its cardinality. We have conducted an experiment on three image annotation datasets; they conclude that rules based on our noise model outperform standard approval voting; the best performance is obtained by a variant of the Condorcet noise model.