Things to Do in L.A. Tap to enable a layout that focuses on the article. Bernie Sanders kicks off billionaires tax campaign with choice words for the'oligarchs' Sen. Bernie Sanders speaks Wednesday night at the Wiltern at the formal kickoff of the campaign for the California billionaires tax. This is read by an automated voice. Please report any issues or inconsistencies here . Populist Sen. Bernie Sanders on Wednesday formally kicked off the campaign to place a billionaires tax on the November ballot, framing the proposal as something larger than a debate about economic and tax policy as he appeared at a storied Los Angeles venue.

We consider the fundamental problem of balanced $k$-means clustering. In particular, we introduce an optimal transport approach to alternating minimization called BalLOT, and we show that it delivers a fast and effective solution to this problem. We establish this with a variety of numerical experiments before proving several theoretical guarantees. First, we prove that for generic data, BalLOT produces integral couplings at each step. Next, we perform a landscape analysis to provide theoretical guarantees for both exact and partial recoveries of planted clusters under the stochastic ball model. Finally, we propose initialization schemes that achieve one-step recovery of planted clusters.

Political consultant Bradley Tusk has spent a fortune on mobile voting efforts. Now, he's launching a protocol to try to mainstream the technology. Joe Kiniry, a security expert specializing in elections, was attending an annual conference on voting technology in Washington, DC, when a woman approached him with an unusual offer. She said she represented a wealthy client interested in funding voting systems that would encourage bigger turnouts. Did he have any ideas?

Former GOP operative Scott Leiendecker just bought Dominion Voting Systems, giving him ownership of voting systems used in 27 states. The news last week that Dominion Voting Systems was purchased by the founder and CEO of Knowink, a Missouri-based maker of electronic poll books, has left election integrity activists confused over what, if anything, this could mean for voters and the integrity of US elections. The company, acquired by Scott Leiendecker, a former Republican Party operative and election director in Missouri before founding Knowink, said in a press release that he was rebranding Dominion, which has headquarters in Canada and the United States, under the name Liberty Vote "in a bold and historic move to transform and improve election integrity in America" and to distance the company from false allegations made previously by President Donald Trump and his supporters that the company had rigged the 2020 presidential election to give the win to President Joe Biden. The Liberty release said that the rebranded company will be 100 percent American owned, that it will have a "paper ballot focus" that leverages hand-marked paper ballots, will "prioritize facilitating third-party auditing," and is "committed to domestic staffing and software development." The press release provided no details, however, to explain what this means in practice.

We show the security risk associated with using machine learning classifiers in United States election tabulators. The central classification task in election tabulation is deciding whether a mark does or does not appear on a bubble associated to an alternative in a contest on the ballot. Barretto et al. (E-Vote-ID 2021) reported that convolutional neural networks are a viable option in this field, as they outperform simple feature-based classifiers. Our contributions to election security can be divided into four parts. To demonstrate and analyze the hypothetical vulnerability of machine learning models on election tabulators, we first introduce four new ballot datasets. Second, we train and test a variety of different models on our new datasets. These models include support vector machines, convolutional neural networks (a basic CNN, VGG and ResNet), and vision transformers (Twins and CaiT). Third, using our new datasets and trained models, we demonstrate that traditional white box attacks are ineffective in the voting domain due to gradient masking. Our analyses further reveal that gradient masking is a product of numerical instability. We use a modified difference of logits ratio loss to overcome this issue (Croce and Hein, ICML 2020). Fourth, in the physical world, we conduct attacks with the adversarial examples generated using our new methods. In traditional adversarial machine learning, a high (50% or greater) attack success rate is ideal. However, for certain elections, even a 5% attack success rate can flip the outcome of a race. We show such an impact is possible in the physical domain. We thoroughly discuss attack realism, and the challenges and practicality associated with printing and scanning ballot adversarial examples.

We study proportional representation in the framework of temporal voting with approval ballots. Prior work adapted basic proportional representation concepts -- justified representation (JR), proportional JR (PJR), and extended JR (EJR) -- from the multiwinner setting to the temporal setting. Our work introduces and examines ways of going beyond EJR. Specifically, we consider stronger variants of JR, PJR, and EJR, and introduce temporal adaptations of more demanding multiwinner axioms, such as EJR+, full JR (FJR), full proportional JR (FPJR), and the Core. For each of these concepts, we investigate its existence and study its relationship to existing notions, thereby establishing a rich hierarchy of proportionality concepts. Notably, we show that two of our proposed axioms -- EJR+ and FJR -- strengthen EJR while remaining satisfiable in every temporal election.

Consider the decision-making setting where agents elect a panel by expressing both positive and negative preferences. Prominently, in constitutional AI, citizens democratically select a slate of ethical preferences on which a foundation model is to be trained. There, in practice, agents may both approve and disapprove of different ethical principles. Proportionality has been well-studied in computational social choice for approval ballots, but its meaning remains unclear when negative sentiments are also considered. In this work, we propose two conceptually distinct approaches to interpret proportionality in the presence of up and down votes. The first approach treats the satisfaction from electing candidates and the impact of vetoing them as comparable, leading to combined proportionality guarantees. The second approach considers veto power separately, introducing guarantees distinct from traditional proportionality. We formalize axioms for each perspective and examine their satisfiability by suitable adaptations of Phragm\'en's rule, Proportional Approval Voting rule and the Method of Equal Shares.

AI systems often exhibit political bias, influencing users' opinions and decision-making. While political neutrality-defined as the absence of bias-is often seen as an ideal solution for fairness and safety, this position paper argues that true political neutrality is neither feasible nor universally desirable due to its subjective nature and the biases inherent in AI training data, algorithms, and user interactions. However, inspired by Joseph Raz's philosophical insight that "neutrality [...] can be a matter of degree" (Raz, 1986), we argue that striving for some neutrality remains essential for promoting balanced AI interactions and mitigating user manipulation. Therefore, we use the term "approximation" of political neutrality to shift the focus from unattainable absolutes to achievable, practical proxies. We propose eight techniques for approximating neutrality across three levels of conceptualizing AI, examining their trade-offs and implementation strategies. In addition, we explore two concrete applications of these approximations to illustrate their practicality. Finally, we assess our framework on current large language models (LLMs) at the output level, providing a demonstration of how it can be evaluated. This work seeks to advance nuanced discussions of political neutrality in AI and promote the development of responsible, aligned language models.

We examine an approval-based model of Liquid Democracy with a budget constraint on voting and delegating costs, aiming to centrally select casting voters ensuring complete representation of the electorate. From a computational complexity perspective, we focus on minimizing overall costs, maintaining short delegation paths, and preventing excessive concentration of voting power. Furthermore, we explore computational aspects of strategic control, specifically, whether external agents can change election components to influence the voting power of certain voters.

In the context of voting with ranked ballots, an important class of voting rules is the class of margin-based rules (also called pairwise rules). A voting rule is margin-based if whenever two elections generate the same head-to-head margins of victory or loss between candidates, then the voting rule yields the same outcome in both elections. Although this is a mathematically natural invariance property to consider, whether it should be regarded as a normative axiom on voting rules is less clear. In this paper, we address this question for voting rules with any kind of output, whether a set of candidates, a ranking, a probability distribution, etc. We prove that a voting rule is margin-based if and only if it satisfies some axioms with clearer normative content. A key axiom is what we call Preferential Equality, stating that if two voters both rank a candidate $x$ immediately above a candidate $y$, then either voter switching to rank $y$ immediately above $x$ will have the same effect on the election outcome as if the other voter made the switch, so each voter's preference for $y$ over $x$ is treated equally.