We propose the Multimodal Clinical Benchmark for Emergency Care (MC-BEC), a comprehensive benchmark for evaluating foundation models in Emergency Medicine using a dataset of 100K+ continuously monitored Emergency Department visits from 2020-2022. MC-BEC focuses on clinically relevant prediction tasks at timescales from minutes to days, including predicting patient decompensation, disposition, and emergency department (ED) revisit, and includes a standardized evaluation framework with train-test splits and evaluation metrics. The multimodal dataset includes a wide range of detailed clinical data, including triage information, prior diagnoses and medications, continuously measured vital signs, electrocardiogram and photoplethysmograph waveforms, orders placed and medications administered throughout the visit, free-text reports of imaging studies, and information on ED diagnosis, disposition, and subsequent revisits. We provide performance baselines for each prediction task to enable the evaluation of multimodal, multitask models. We believe that MC-BEC will encourage researchers to develop more effective, generalizable, and accessible foundation models for multimodal clinical data.

The classical iteratively reweighted least-squares (IRLS) algorithm aims to recover an unknown signal from linear measurements by performing a sequence of weighted least squares problems, where the weights are recursively updated at each step.

In minimax optimization, the extragradient (EG) method has been extensively studied because it outperforms the gradient descent-ascent method in convex-concave (C-C) problems.

The long-run behavior of multi-agent learning - and, in particular, no-regret learning - is relatively well-understood in potential games, where players have aligned interests. By contrast, in harmonic games - the strategic counterpart of potential games, where players have conflicting interests - very little is known outside the narrow subclass of 2-player zero-sum games with a fully-mixed equilibrium. Our paper seeks to partially fill this gap by focusing on the full class of (generalized) harmonic games and examining the convergence properties of follow-the-regularizedleader (FTRL), the most widely studied class of no-regret learning schemes. As a first result, we show that the continuous-time dynamics of FTRL are Poincaré recurrent, that is, they return arbitrarily close to their starting point infinitely often, and hence fail to converge. In discrete time, the standard, "vanilla" implementation of FTRL may lead to even worse outcomes, eventually trapping the players in a perpetual cycle of best-responses. However, if FTRL is augmented with a suitable extrapolation step - which includes as special cases the optimistic and mirror-prox variants of FTRL - we show that learning converges to a Nash equilibrium from any initial condition, and all players are guaranteed at most O(1) regret. These results provide an in-depth understanding of no-regret learning in harmonic games, nesting prior work on 2-player zero-sum games, and showing at a high level that harmonic games are the canonical complement of potential games, not only from a strategic, but also from a dynamic viewpoint.

Transformers have achieved great success in machine learning applications. Normalization techniques, such as Layer Normalization (LayerNorm, LN) and Root Mean Square Normalization (RMSNorm), play a critical role in accelerating and stabilizing the training of Transformers.

Preference learning methods make use of models of human choice in order to infer the latent utilities that underlie human behavior. However, accurate modeling of human choice behavior is challenging due to a range of context effects that arise from how humans contrast and evaluate options. Cognitive science has proposed several models that capture these intricacies but, due to their intractable nature, work on preference learning has, in practice, had to rely on tractable but simplified variants of the well-known Bradley-Terry model. In this paper, we take one stateof-the-art intractable cognitive model and propose a tractable surrogate that is suitable for deployment in preference learning. We then introduce a mechanism for fitting the surrogate to human data and extend it to account for data that cannot be explained by the original cognitive model. We demonstrate on large-scale human data that this model produces significantly better inferences on static and actively elicited data than existing Bradley-Terry variants. We further show in simulation that when using this model for preference learning, we can significantly improve utility in a range of real-world tasks.

We propose a novel algorithm for offline reinforcement learning using optimal transport. Typically, in offline reinforcement learning, the data is provided by various experts and some of them can be sub-optimal. To extract an efficient policy, it is necessary to stitch the best behaviors from the dataset. To address this problem, we rethink offline reinforcement learning as an optimal transport problem. And based on this, we present an algorithm that aims to find a policy that maps states to a partial distribution of the best expert actions for each given state. We evaluate the performance of our algorithm on continuous control problems from the D4RL suite and demonstrate improvements over existing methods.