Names only appear which are in no sense bibliographic references; otherwise they are to be found in the author index.]

The objects that ATRANS operates upon are abstract relationships and the physical instruments of ATRANS are rarely specified. The'trans' that was referred to in the beginning of this paper is what we call ATRANS. ATRANS takes as object the abstract relationship that holds between two real world objects.

To use language one must be able to make inferences about the information which language conveys. This is apparent in many ways. For one thing, many of the processes which we typically consider "linguistic" require inference making. For example, structural disambiguation: (1) Waiter, I would like spaghetti with meat sauce and wine. You would not expect to be served a bowl of spaghetti floating in meat sauce and wine. That is, you would expect the meal represented by structure (2) rather than that represented by (3).

After an introduction to LOGO thinking and language, the benefits of children writing simple AI programs using the proper tools were described. Finally, the ways in which an Al system designed for education can interact with children were discussed. These ideas should be implemented and tested with children. Only then will the effects on education be known.

B.RANDELL 3 PROGRAM PROOF AND MANIPULATION 2 Some techniques for proving correctness of programs which alter data structures.

INTRODUCTION In this paper we compare three models of transformational grammar: the mathematical model of Ginsburg and Partee (1969) as applied by Salomaa (1971), the mathematical model of Peters and Ritchie (1971 and forthcoming), and the computer model of Friedman et al. (1971). All of these are, of course, based on the work of Chomsky as presented in Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (1965). We were led to this comparison by the observation that the computer model is weaker in three important ways: search depth is not unbounded, structures matching variables cannot be compared, and structures matching variables cannot be moved. All of these are important to the explanatory adequacy of transformational grammar. Both mathematical models allow the first, they each allow some form of the second, one of them allows the third. We were interested in the mathematical consequences of our restrictions. The comparison will be carried out by reformulating in the computer system the most interesting proofs to date of the ability of transformational grammars to generate any recursively enumerable set.

The frame problem in representing natural-language information is discussed. It is argued that the problem is not restricted to problem-solving-type situations, in which it has mostly been studied so far, but also has a broader significance. A new solution to the frame problem, which arose within a larger system for representing natural-language information, is described. The basic idea is to extend the predicate calculus notation with a special operator, Unless, with peculiar properties. Some difficulties with Unless are described. THE FRAME PROBLEM This paper proposes a method for handling the frame problem in representing conceptual, or natural-language-type information.

C. COOPER 21 3 Data representation--the key to conceptualisation: D. B. VIGOR 33 MECHANISED MATHEMATICS 45 4 An approach to analytic integration using ordered algebraic expressions: L. I. HODGSON 47 5 Some theorem-proving strategies based on the resolution principle: J. L DARLINGTON 57 MACHINE LEARNING AND HEURISTIC PROGRAMMING 73 6 Automatic description and recognition of board patterns in Go-Moku: A. M. MURRAY and E. W. Etcomc

When you lose a game of chess to a computer then don't pretend that you didn't think at the game.

In this paper we will be concerned with such reasoning in its most general form, that is, in inferences that are defeasible: given more information, we may retract them. The purpose of this paper is to introduce a form of non-monotonic inference based on the notion of a partial model of the world. We take partial models to reflect our partial knowledge of the true state of affairs. We then define non-monotonic inference as the process of filling in unknown parts of the model with conjectures: statements that could turn out to be false, given more complete knowledge. To take a standard example from default reasoning: since most birds can fly, if Tweety is a bird it is reasonable to assume that she can fly, at least in the absence of any information to the contrary. We thus have some justification for filling in our partial picture of the world with this conjecture. If our knowledge includes the fact that Tweety is an ostrich, then no such justification exists, and the conjecture must be retracted.