Consider an important meeting to be held in a team-based organization. Taking availability constraints into account, an online scheduling poll is being used in order to decide upon the exact time of the meeting. Decisions are to be taken during the meeting, therefore each team would like to maximize its relative attendance (i.e. the proportional number of its team members attending the meeting). We introduce a corresponding game, where each team can declare a lower total availability in the scheduling poll in order to improve its relative attendance—the pay-off. We are especially interested in situations where teams can form coalitions. We provide an efficient algorithm that, given a coalition, finds an optimal way for each team in a coalition to improve its pay-off. In contrast, we show that deciding whether such a coalition exists is NP-hard. We also study the existence of Nash equilibria: Finding Nash equilibria for various small sizes of teams and coalitions can be done in polynomial time while it is coNP-hard if the coalition size is unbounded.

A simple Neural Network model is presented for end-to-end visual learning of arithmetic operations from pictures of numbers. The input consists of two pictures, each showing a 7-digit number. The output, also a picture, displays the number showing the result of an arithmetic operation (e.g., addition or subtraction) on the two input numbers. The concepts of a number, or of an operator, are not explicitly introduced. This indicates that addition is a simple cognitive task, which can be learned visually using a very small number of neurons. Other operations, e.g., multiplication, were not learnable using this architecture. Some tasks were not learnable end-to-end (e.g., addition with Roman numerals), but were easily learnable once broken into two separate sub-tasks: a perceptual Character Recognition and cognitive Arithmetic sub-tasks. This indicates that while some tasks may be easily learnable end-to-end, other may need to be broken into sub-tasks.

In this paper we expand the standard Hotelling-Downs model of spatial competition to a setting where clients do not necessarily choose their closest candidate (retail product or political). Specifically, we consider a setting where clients may disavow all candidates if there is no candidate that is sufficiently close to the client preferences. Moreover, if there are multiple candidates that are sufficiently close, the client may choose amongst them at random. We show the existence of Nash Equilibria for some such models, and study the price of anarchy and stability in such scenarios.

Motivated by a radically new peer review system that the National Science Foundation recently experimented with, we study peer review systems in which proposals are reviewed by PIs who have submitted proposals themselves. An (m,k)-selection mechanism asks each PI to review m proposals, and uses these reviews to select (at most) k proposals. We are interested in impartial mechanisms, which guarantee that the ratings given by a PI to others' proposals do not affect the likelihood of the PI's own proposal being selected. We design an impartial mechanism that selects a k-subset of proposals that is nearly as highly rated as the one selected by the non-impartial (abstract version of) the NSF pilot mechanism, even when the latter mechanism has the "unfair" advantage of eliciting honest reviews.

Following recent studies of iterative voting and its effects on plurality vote outcomes, we provide characterisations and complexity results for three models of iterative voting under the plurality rule. Our focus is on providing a better understanding regarding the set of equilibria attainable by iterative voting processes. We start with the basic model of plurality voting. We first establish some useful properties of equilibria, reachable by iterative voting, which enable us to show that deciding whether a given profile is an iteratively reachable equilibrium is NP-complete. We then proceed to combine iterative voting with the concept of truth bias, a model where voters prefer to be truthful when they cannot affect the outcome. We fully characterise the set of attainable truth-biased equilibria, and show that it is possible to determine all such equilibria in polynomial time. Finally, we also examine the model of lazy voters, in which a voter may choose to abstain from the election. We establish convergence of the iterative process, albeit not necessarily to a Nash equilibrium. As in the case with truth bias, we also provide a polynomial time algorithm to find all the attainable equilibria.

We study the stability of cooperative games played over an interaction network, in a model that was introduced by Myerson ['77]. We show that the cost of stability of such games (i.e., the subsidy required to stabilize the game) can be bounded in terms  of natural parameters of their underlying interaction networks. Specifically, we prove that if the treewidth of the interaction network H is k , then the relative cost of stability of any game played over H is at most k + 1, and if the pathwidth of H is k ', then the relative cost of stability is at most k '. We show that these bounds are tight for all k ≥ 2 and all k ' ≥ 1, respectively.

The paper describes a method of relation extraction, which is based on parsing the input text using a combination of a generic HPSG-based grammar and a highly focused domain- and relation-specific lexicon. We also show a method of unsupervised acquisition of such a lexicon from a large unlabeled corpus. Together, the methods introduce a novel approach to the “Open IE” task, which is superior in accuracy and in quality of relation identification to the existing approaches.

The paper describes a method of relation extraction, which is based on parsing the input text using a combination of a generic HPSG-based grammar and a highly focused domain- and relation-specific lexicon. We also show a method of unsupervised acquisition of such a lexicon from a large unlabeled corpus. Together, the methods introduce a novel approach to the “Open IE” task, which is superior in accuracy and in quality of relation identification to the existing approaches.

The paper describes a method of relation extraction, which is based on parsing the input text using a combination of a generic HPSG-based grammar and a highly focused domain- and relation-specific lexicon. We also show a method of unsupervised acquisition of such a lexicon from a large unlabeled corpus. Together, the methods introduce a novel approach to the “Open IE” task, which is superior in accuracy and in quality of relation identification to the existing approaches.

The paper describes a method of relation extraction, which is based on parsing the input text using a combination of a generic HPSG-based grammar and a highly focused domain- and relation-specific lexicon. We also show a method of unsupervised acquisition of such a lexicon from a large unlabeled corpus. Together, the methods introduce a novel approach to the “Open IE” task, which is superior in accuracy and in quality of relation identification to the existing approaches.