It is well-known in social choice that people may misreport their preferences to improve group decisions in their favor. Consider, for example, Alice, Bob, and Charlie deciding on which ice cream flavor to order for a party, and Charlie prefers strawberry to chocolate to vanilla. Given that Alice wants chocolate and Bob wants vanilla, Charlie would be better off voting for chocolate than truthfully (i.e., strawberry), by which vanilla may win as the tie-breaker. This form of strategic behavior is prolific in political science in narrowing the number of political parties (see e.g., Duvuger's law [Riker, 1982]). Still, it is unclear what effect strategic behavior has on the social welfare of chosen outcomes. Iterative voting (IV) is one model which naturally describes agents' strategic behavior - in misreporting their truthful preferences - over time. After agents reveal their preferences initially, they have the opportunity to repeatedly update their votes given information about other agents' votes, before the final decision is reached. Meir et al. [2010] first proposed iterative plurality voting and identified many sufficient conditions for IV to converge. This was followed up by a series of work examining various social choice rules, information and behavioral assumptions, and settings to determine when, to what outcomes, and how fast IV converges (see e.g.

Differential privacy (DP) is a widely-accepted and widely-applied notion of privacy based on worst-case analysis. Often, DP classifies most mechanisms without additive noise as non-private (Dwork et al., 2014). Thus, additive noises are added to improve privacy (to achieve DP). However, in many real-world applications, adding additive noise is undesirable (Bagdasaryan et al., 2019) and sometimes prohibited (Liu et al., 2020). In this paper, we propose a natural extension of DP following the worst average-case idea behind the celebrated smoothed analysis (Spielman & Teng, May 2004). Our notion, smoothed DP, can effectively measure the privacy leakage of mechanisms without additive noises under realistic settings. We prove that any discrete mechanism with sampling procedures is more private than what DP predicts, while many continuous mechanisms with sampling procedures are still non-private under smoothed DP. In addition, we prove several desirable properties of smoothed DP, including composition, robustness to post-processing, and distribution reduction. Based on those properties, we propose an efficient algorithm to calculate the privacy parameters for smoothed DP. Experimentally, we verify that, according to smoothed DP, the discrete sampling mechanisms are private in real-world elections, and some discrete neural networks can be private without adding any additive noise. We believe that these results contribute to the theoretical foundation of realistic privacy measures beyond worst-case analysis.

Finding preferences expressed in natural language is an important but challenging task. State-of-the-art(SotA) methods leverage transformer-based models such as BERT, RoBERTa, etc. and graph neural architectures such as graph attention networks. Since Large Language Models (LLMs) are equipped to deal with larger context lengths and have much larger model sizes than the transformer-based model, we investigate their ability to classify comparative text directly. This work aims to serve as a first step towards using LLMs for the CPC task. We design and conduct a set of experiments that format the classification task into an input prompt for the LLM and a methodology to get a fixed-format response that can be automatically evaluated. Comparing performances with existing methods, we see that pre-trained LLMs are able to outperform the previous SotA models with no fine-tuning involved. Our results show that the LLMs can consistently outperform the SotA when the target text is large -- i.e. composed of multiple sentences --, and are still comparable to the SotA performance in shorter text. We also find that few-shot learning yields better performance than zero-shot learning.

In social choice theory, anonymity (all agents being treated equally) and neutrality (all alternatives being treated equally) are widely regarded as ``minimal demands'' and ``uncontroversial'' axioms of equity and fairness. However, the ANR impossibility -- there is no voting rule that satisfies anonymity, neutrality, and resolvability (always choosing one winner) -- holds even in the simple setting of two alternatives and two agents. How to design voting rules that optimally satisfy anonymity, neutrality, and resolvability remains an open question. We address the optimal design question for a wide range of preferences and decisions that include ranked lists and committees. Our conceptual contribution is a novel and strong notion of most equitable refinements that optimally preserves anonymity and neutrality for any irresolute rule that satisfies the two axioms. Our technical contributions are twofold. First, we characterize the conditions for the ANR impossibility to hold under general settings, especially when the number of agents is large. Second, we propose the most-favorable-permutation (MFP) tie-breaking to compute a most equitable refinement and design a polynomial-time algorithm to compute MFP when agents' preferences are full rankings.

For the assignment problem where multiple indivisible items are allocated to a group of agents given their ordinal preferences, we design randomized mechanisms that satisfy first-choice maximality (FCM), i.e., maximizing the number of agents assigned their first choices, together with Pareto efficiency (PE). Our mechanisms also provide guarantees of ex-ante and ex-post fairness. The generalized eager Boston mechanism is ex-ante envy-free, and ex-post envy-free up to one item (EF1). The generalized probabilistic Boston mechanism is also ex-post EF1, and satisfies ex-ante efficiency instead of fairness. We also show that no strategyproof mechanism satisfies ex-post PE, EF1, and FCM simultaneously. In doing so, we expand the frontiers of simultaneously providing efficiency and both ex-ante and ex-post fairness guarantees for the assignment problem.

In the assignment problem, the goal is to assign indivisible items to agents who have ordinal preferences, efficiently and fairly, in a strategyproof manner. In practice, first-choice maximality, i.e., assigning a maximal number of agents their top items, is often identified as an important efficiency criterion and measure of agents' satisfaction. In this paper, we propose a natural and intuitive efficiency property, favoring-eagerness-for-remaining-items (FERI), which requires that each item is allocated to an agent who ranks it highest among remaining items, thereby implying first-choice maximality. Using FERI as a heuristic, we design mechanisms that satisfy ex-post or ex-ante variants of FERI together with combinations of other desirable properties of efficiency (Pareto-efficiency), fairness (strong equal treatment of equals and sd-weak-envy-freeness), and strategyproofness (sd-weak-strategyproofness). We also explore the limits of FERI mechanisms in providing stronger efficiency, fairness, or strategyproofness guarantees through impossibility results.

Recent work in iterative voting has defined the additive dynamic price of anarchy (ADPoA) as the difference in social welfare between the truthful and worst-case equilibrium profiles resulting from repeated strategic manipulations. While iterative plurality has been shown to only return alternatives with at most one less initial votes than the truthful winner, it is less understood how agents' welfare changes in equilibrium. To this end, we differentiate agents' utility from their manipulation mechanism and determine iterative plurality's ADPoA in the worst- and average-cases. We first prove that the worst-case ADPoA is linear in the number of agents. To overcome this negative result, we study the average-case ADPoA and prove that equilibrium winners have a constant order welfare advantage over the truthful winner in expectation. Our positive results illustrate the prospect for social welfare to increase due to strategic manipulation.

Voting is used widely to identify a collective decision for a group of agents, based on their preferences. In this paper, we focus on evaluating and designing voting rules that support both the privacy of the voting agents and a notion of fairness over such agents. To do this, we introduce a novel notion of group fairness and adopt the existing notion of local differential privacy. We then evaluate the level of group fairness in several existing voting rules, as well as the trade-offs between fairness and privacy, showing that it is not possible to always obtain maximal economic efficiency with high fairness or high privacy levels. Then, we present both a machine learning and a constrained optimization approach to design new voting rules that are fair while maintaining a high level of economic efficiency. Finally, we empirically examine the effect of adding noise to create local differentially private voting rules and discuss the three-way trade-off between economic efficiency, fairness, and privacy. This paper appears in the special track on AI & Society.

In the assignment problem, items must be assigned to agents who have unit demands, based on agents' ordinal preferences. Often the goal is to design a mechanism that is both fair and efficient. In this paper, we first prove that, unfortunately, the desirable efficiency notions rank-maximality, ex-post favoring-higher-ranks, and ex-ante favoring-higher-ranks, which aim to allocate each item to agents who rank it highest over all the items, are incompatible with the desirable fairness notions strong equal treatment of equals (SETE) and sd-weak-envy-freeness (sd-WEF) simultaneously. In light of this, we propose novel properties of efficiency based on a subtly different notion to favoring higher ranks, by favoring "eagerness" for remaining items and aiming to guarantee that each item is allocated to agents who rank it highest among remaining items. We prove that the eager Boston mechanism satisfies ep-FERI and sd-WSP, and that the uniform probabilistic respecting eagerness mechanism satisfies ea-FERI. We also prove that both mechanisms satisfy SETE and sd-WEF, and show that no mechanism can satisfy stronger versions of envyfreeness and strategyproofness while simultaneously maintaining SETE, and either ep-FERI or ea-FERI. X. Guo and Y. Cao are with Key Laboratory of High Confidence Software Technologies (MOE), Department of Computer Science and Technology, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China (e-mail: guoxiaoxi@pku.edu.cn; S. Sikdar is with Department of Computer Science, Binghamton University (email: ssikdar@binghamton.edu). H. Wang is with School of Computer Science and Cyber Engineering, Guangzhou University, China, and Key Laboratory of High Confidence Software Technologies (MOE), Department of Computer Science and Technology, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China (whpxhy@pku.edu.cn). This serves as a useful model for a variety of problems where the items may be either indivisible such as houses (Shapley and Scarf, 1974), dormitory rooms (Chen and Sönmez, 2002), and school choice without priorities (Miralles, 2009); or divisible such as natural resources like land and water (Segal-Halevi, 2016), and computational resources in cloud computing (Ghodsi et al., 2011, 2012; Grandl et al., 2014).

Motivated by the recent discovery that the interpretation maps of CNNs could easily be manipulated by adversarial attacks against network interpretability, we study the problem of interpretation robustness from a new perspective of \Renyi differential privacy (RDP). The advantages of our Renyi-Robust-Smooth (RDP-based interpretation method) are three-folds. First, it can offer provable and certifiable top-$k$ robustness. That is, the top-$k$ important attributions of the interpretation map are provably robust under any input perturbation with bounded $\ell_d$-norm (for any $d\geq 1$, including $d = \infty$). Second, our proposed method offers $\sim10\%$ better experimental robustness than existing approaches in terms of the top-$k$ attributions. Remarkably, the accuracy of Renyi-Robust-Smooth also outperforms existing approaches. Third, our method can provide a smooth tradeoff between robustness and computational efficiency. Experimentally, its top-$k$ attributions are {\em twice} more robust than existing approaches when the computational resources are highly constrained.