We study the iteration complexity of decentralized learning of approximate correlated equilibria in incomplete information games. On the negative side, we prove that in $\mathit{extensive}$-$\mathit{form}$ $\mathit{games}$, assuming $\mathsf{PPAD} \not\subset \mathsf{TIME}(n^{\mathsf{polylog}(n)})$, any polynomial-time learning algorithms must take at least $2^{\log_2^{1-o(1)}(|\mathcal{I}|)}$ iterations to converge to the set of $\epsilon$-approximate correlated equilibrium, where $|\mathcal{I}|$ is the number of nodes in the game and $\epsilon > 0$ is an absolute constant. This nearly matches, up to the $o(1)$ term, the algorithms of [PR'24, DDFG'24] for learning $\epsilon$-approximate correlated equilibrium, and resolves an open question of Anagnostides, Kalavasis, Sandholm, and Zampetakis [AKSZ'24]. Our lower bound holds even for the easier solution concept of $\epsilon$-approximate $\mathit{coarse}$ correlated equilibrium On the positive side, we give uncoupled dynamics that reach $\epsilon$-approximate correlated equilibria of a $\mathit{Bayesian}$ $\mathit{game}$ in polylogarithmic iterations, without any dependence of the number of types. This demonstrates a separation between Bayesian games and extensive-form games.

We study repeated first-price auctions and general repeated Bayesian games between two players, where one player, the learner, employs a no-regret learning algorithm, and the other player, the optimizer, knowing the learner's algorithm, strategizes to maximize its own utility. For a commonly used class of no-regret learning algorithms called mean-based algorithms, we show that (i) in standard (i.e., full-information) first-price auctions, the optimizer cannot get more than the Stackelberg utility -- a standard benchmark in the literature, but (ii) in Bayesian first-price auctions, there are instances where the optimizer can achieve much higher than the Stackelberg utility. On the other hand, Mansour et al. (2022) showed that a more sophisticated class of algorithms called no-polytope-swap-regret algorithms are sufficient to cap the optimizer's utility at the Stackelberg utility in any repeated Bayesian game (including Bayesian first-price auctions), and they pose the open question whether no-polytope-swap-regret algorithms are necessary to cap the optimizer's utility. For general Bayesian games, under a reasonable and necessary condition, we prove that no-polytope-swap-regret algorithms are indeed necessary to cap the optimizer's utility and thus answer their open question. For Bayesian first-price auctions, we give a simple improvement of the standard algorithm for minimizing the polytope swap regret by exploiting the structure of Bayesian first-price auctions.

We give a simple and computationally efficient algorithm that, for any constant $\varepsilon>0$, obtains $\varepsilon T$-swap regret within only $T = \mathsf{polylog}(n)$ rounds; this is an exponential improvement compared to the super-linear number of rounds required by the state-of-the-art algorithm, and resolves the main open problem of [Blum and Mansour 2007]. Our algorithm has an exponential dependence on $\varepsilon$, but we prove a new, matching lower bound. Our algorithm for swap regret implies faster convergence to $\varepsilon$-Correlated Equilibrium ($\varepsilon$-CE) in several regimes: For normal form two-player games with $n$ actions, it implies the first uncoupled dynamics that converges to the set of $\varepsilon$-CE in polylogarithmic rounds; a $\mathsf{polylog}(n)$-bit communication protocol for $\varepsilon$-CE in two-player games (resolving an open problem mentioned by [Babichenko-Rubinstein'2017, Goos-Rubinstein'2018, Ganor-CS'2018]); and an $\tilde{O}(n)$-query algorithm for $\varepsilon$-CE (resolving an open problem of [Babichenko'2020] and obtaining the first separation between $\varepsilon$-CE and $\varepsilon$-Nash equilibrium in the query complexity model). For extensive-form games, our algorithm implies a PTAS for $\mathit{normal}$ $\mathit{form}$ $\mathit{correlated}$ $\mathit{equilibria}$, a solution concept often conjectured to be computationally intractable (e.g. [Stengel-Forges'08, Fujii'23]).

In the experts problem, on each of $T$ days, an agent needs to follow the advice of one of $n$ ``experts''. After each day, the loss associated with each expert's advice is revealed. A fundamental result in learning theory says that the agent can achieve vanishing regret, i.e. their cumulative loss is within $o(T)$ of the cumulative loss of the best-in-hindsight expert. Can the agent perform well without sufficient space to remember all the experts? We extend a nascent line of research on this question in two directions: $\bullet$ We give a new algorithm against the oblivious adversary, improving over the memory-regret tradeoff obtained by [PZ23], and nearly matching the lower bound of [SWXZ22]. $\bullet$ We also consider an adaptive adversary who can observe past experts chosen by the agent. In this setting we give both a new algorithm and a novel lower bound, proving that roughly $\sqrt{n}$ memory is both necessary and sufficient for obtaining $o(T)$ regret.

We consider the problem of optimization from samples of monotone submodular functions with bounded curvature. In numerous applications, the function optimized is not known a priori, but instead learned from data. What are the guarantees we have when optimizing functions from sampled data? In this paper we show that for any monotone submodular function with curvature c there is a (1 - c)/(1 + c - c^2) approximation algorithm for maximization under cardinality constraints when polynomially-many samples are drawn from the uniform distribution over feasible sets. Moreover, we show that this algorithm is optimal. That is, for any c < 1, there exists a submodular function with curvature c for which no algorithm can achieve a better approximation. The curvature assumption is crucial as for general monotone submodular functions no algorithm can obtain a constant-factor approximation for maximization under a cardinality constraint when observing polynomially-many samples drawn from any distribution over feasible sets, even when the function is statistically learnable.

It is well known that Sparse PCA (Sparse Principal Component Analysis) is NP-hard to solve exactly on worst-case instances. What is the complexity of solving Sparse PCA approximately? Our contributions include: 1) a simple and efficient algorithm that achieves an $n^{-1/3}$-approximation; 2) NP-hardness of approximation to within $(1-\varepsilon)$, for some small constant $\varepsilon > 0$; 3) SSE-hardness of approximation to within any constant factor; and 4) an $\exp\exp\left(\Omega\left(\sqrt{\log \log n}\right)\right)$ ("quasi-quasi-polynomial") gap for the standard semidefinite program.