Two fundamental problems in computational game theory are computing a Nash equilibrium and learning to exploit opponents given observations of their play (opponent exploitation). The latter is perhaps even more important than the former: Nash equilibrium does not have a compelling theoretical justification in game classes other than two-player zero-sum, and for all games one can potentially do better by exploiting perceived weaknesses of the opponent than by following a static equilibrium strategy throughout the match. The natural setting for opponent exploitation is the Bayesian setting where we have a prior model that is integrated with observations to create a posterior opponent model that we respond to. The most natural, and a well-studied prior distribution is the Dirichlet distribution. An exact polynomial-time algorithm is known for best-responding to the posterior distribution for an opponent assuming a Dirichlet prior with multinomial sampling in normal-form games; however, for imperfect-information games the best known algorithm is based on approximating an infinite integral without theoretical guarantees. We present the first exact algorithm for a natural class of imperfect-information games. We demonstrate that our algorithm runs quickly in practice and outperforms the best prior approaches. We also present an algorithm for the uniform prior setting.

Algorithms for equilibrium computation generally make no attempt to ensure that the computed strategies are understandable by humans. For instance the strategies for the strongest poker agents are represented as massive binary files. In many situations, we would like to compute strategies that can actually be implemented by humans, who may have computational limitations and may only be able to remember a small number of features or components of the strategies that have been computed. We study poker games where private information distributions can be arbitrary. We create a large training set of game instances and solutions, by randomly selecting the private information probabilities, and present algorithms that learn from the training instances in order to perform well in games with unseen information distributions. One approach first clusters the training points into a small number of clusters and then creates a small decision tree based on the cluster centers. This approach produces low test error and could be easily implemented by humans since it only requires memorizing a small number of "if-then" rules.

We develop a new approach that computes approximate equilibrium strategies in Jotto, a popular word game. Jotto is an extremely large two-player game of imperfect information; its game tree has many orders of magnitude more states than games previously studied, including no-limit Texas hold 'em. To address the fact that the game is so large, we propose a novel strategy representation called oracular form, in which we do not explicitly represent a strategy, but rather appeal to an oracle that quickly outputs a sample move from the strategy's distribution. Our overall approach is based on an extension of the fictitious play algorithm to this oracular setting. We demonstrate the superiority of our computed strategies over the strategies computed by a benchmark algorithm, both in terms of head-to-head and worst-case performance.

The first ever human vs. computer no-limit Texas hold 'em competition took place from April 24-May 8, 2015 at River's Casino in Pittsburgh, PA. In this article I present my thoughts on the competition design, agent architecture, and lessons learned.

AAAI's 2015 Workshop Program was held Sunday and Monday, January 25–26, 2015 at the Hyatt Regency Austin Hotel in Austion, Texas, USA. The AAAI-15 workshop program included 15 workshops covering a wide range of topics in artificial intelligence. Most workshops were held on a single day. The titles of the workshops included AI and Ethics, AI for Cities, AI for Transportation: Advice, Interactivity and Actor Modeling, Algorithm Configuration, Artificial Intelligence Applied to Assistive Technologies and Smart Environments, Beyond the Turing Test, Computational Sustainability, Computer Poker and Imperfect Information, Incentive and Trust in E-Communities, Multiagent Interaction without Prior Coordination, Planning, Search, and Optimization, Scholarly Big Data: AI Perspectives, Challenges, and Ideas, Trajectory-Based Behaviour Analytics, World Wide Web and Public Health Intelligence, Knowledge, Skill, and Behavior Transfer in Autonomous Robots, and Learning for General Competency in Video Games.

AAAI's 2015 Workshop Program was held Sunday and Monday, January 25–26, 2015 at the Hyatt Regency Austin Hotel in Austion, Texas, USA. The AAAI-15 workshop program included 15 workshops covering a wide range of topics in artificial intelligence. Most workshops were held on a single day. The titles of the workshops included AI and Ethics, AI for Cities, AI for Transportation: Advice, Interactivity and Actor Modeling, Algorithm Configuration, Artificial Intelligence Applied to Assistive Technologies and Smart Environments, Beyond the Turing Test, Computational Sustainability, Computer Poker and Imperfect Information, Incentive and Trust in E-Communities, Multiagent Interaction without Prior Coordination, Planning, Search, and Optimization, Scholarly Big Data: AI Perspectives, Challenges, and Ideas, Trajectory-Based Behaviour Analytics, World Wide Web and Public Health Intelligence, Knowledge, Skill, and Behavior Transfer in Autonomous Robots, and Learning for General Competency in Video Games.

The AAAI-14 Workshop program was held Sunday and Monday, July 27–28, 2012, at the Québec City Convention Centre in Québec, Canada. The AAAI-14 workshop program included fifteen workshops covering a wide range of topics in artificial intelligence. The titles of the workshops were AI and Robotics; Artificial Intelligence Applied to Assistive Technologies and Smart Environments; Cognitive Computing for Augmented Human Intelligence; Computer Poker and Imperfect Information; Discovery Informatics; Incentives and Trust in Electronic Communities; Intelligent Cinematography and Editing; Machine Learning for Interactive Systems: Bridging the Gap between Perception, Action and Communication; Modern Artificial Intelligence for Health Analytics; Multiagent Interaction without Prior Coordination; Multidisciplinary Workshop on Advances in Preference Handling; Semantic Cities -- Beyond Open Data to Models, Standards and Reasoning; Sequential Decision Making with Big Data; Statistical Relational AI; and The World Wide Web and Public Health Intelligence. This article presents short summaries of those events.

The AAAI-14 Workshop program was held Sunday and Monday, July 27–28, 2012, at the Québec City Convention Centre in Québec, Canada. Canada. The AAAI-14 workshop program included fifteen workshops covering a wide range of topics in artificial intelligence. The titles of the workshops were AI and Robotics; Artificial Intelligence Applied to Assistive Technologies and Smart Environments; Cognitive Computing for Augmented Human Intelligence; Computer Poker and Imperfect Information; Discovery Informatics; Incentives and Trust in Electronic Communities; Intelligent Cinematography and Editing; Machine Learning for Interactive Systems: Bridging the Gap between Perception, Action and Communication; Modern Artificial Intelligence for Health Analytics; Multiagent Interaction without Prior Coordination; Multidisciplinary Workshop on Advances in Preference Handling; Semantic Cities — Beyond Open Data to Models, Standards and Reasoning; Sequential Decision Making with Big Data; Statistical Relational AI; and The World Wide Web and Public Health Intelligence. This article presents short summaries of those events.

The leading approach for solving large imperfect-information games is automated abstraction followed by running an equilibrium-finding algorithm. We introduce a distributed version of the most commonly used equilibrium-finding algorithm, counterfactual regret minimization (CFR), which enables CFR to scale to dramatically larger abstractions and numbers of cores. The new algorithm begets constraints on the abstraction so as to make the pieces running on different computers disjoint. We introduce an algorithm for generating such abstractions while capitalizing on state-of-the-art abstraction ideas such as imperfect recall and the earth-mover's-distance similarity metric. Our techniques enabled an equilibrium computation of unprecedented size on a supercomputer with a high inter-blade memory latency. Prior approaches run slowly on this architecture. Our approach also leads to a significant improvement over using the prior best approach on a large shared-memory server with low memory latency. Finally, we introduce a family of post-processing techniques that outperform prior ones. We applied these techniques to generate an agent for two-player no-limit Texas Hold'em. It won the 2014 Annual Computer Poker Competition, beating each opponent with statistical significance.

The leading approach for computing strong game-theoretic strategies in large imperfect-information games is to first solve an abstracted version of the game offline, then perform a table lookup during game play. We consider a modification to this approach where we solve the portion of the game that we have actually reached in real time to a greater degree of accuracy than in the initial computation. We call this approach endgame solving. Theoretically, we show that endgame solving can produce highly exploitable strategies in some games; however, we show that it can guarantee a low exploitability in certain games where the opponent is given sufficient exploitative power within the endgame. Furthermore, despite the lack of a general worst-case guarantee, we describe many benefits of endgame solving. We present an efficient algorithm for performing endgame solving in large imperfect-information games, and present a new variance-reduction technique for evaluating the performance of an agent that uses endgame solving. Experiments on no-limit Texas Hold'em show that our algorithm leads to significantly stronger performance against the strongest agents from the 2013 AAAI Annual Computer Poker Competition.