As text generation systems' outputs are increasingly anthropomorphic -- perceived as human-like -- scholars have also raised increasing concerns about how such outputs can lead to harmful outcomes, such as users over-relying or developing emotional dependence on these systems. How to intervene on such system outputs to mitigate anthropomorphic behaviors and their attendant harmful outcomes, however, remains understudied. With this work, we aim to provide empirical and theoretical grounding for developing such interventions. To do so, we compile an inventory of interventions grounded both in prior literature and a crowdsourced study where participants edited system outputs to make them less human-like. Drawing on this inventory, we also develop a conceptual framework to help characterize the landscape of possible interventions, articulate distinctions between different types of interventions, and provide a theoretical basis for evaluating the effectiveness of different interventions.

Recent attention to anthropomorphism -- the attribution of human-like qualities to non-human objects or entities -- of language technologies like LLMs has sparked renewed discussions about potential negative impacts of anthropomorphism. To productively discuss the impacts of this anthropomorphism and in what contexts it is appropriate, we need a shared vocabulary for the vast variety of ways that language can be anthropomorphic. In this work, we draw on existing literature and analyze empirical cases of user interactions with language technologies to develop a taxonomy of textual expressions that can contribute to anthropomorphism. We highlight challenges and tensions involved in understanding linguistic anthropomorphism, such as how all language is fundamentally human and how efforts to characterize and shift perceptions of humanness in machines can also dehumanize certain humans. We discuss ways that our taxonomy supports more precise and effective discussions of and decisions about anthropomorphism of language technologies.

Given the rising proliferation and diversity of AI writing assistance tools, especially those powered by large language models (LLMs), both writers and readers may have concerns about the impact of these tools on the authenticity of writing work. We examine whether and how writers want to preserve their authentic voice when co-writing with AI tools and whether personalization of AI writing support could help achieve this goal. We conducted semi-structured interviews with 19 professional writers, during which they co-wrote with both personalized and non-personalized AI writing-support tools. We supplemented writers' perspectives with opinions from 30 avid readers about the written work co-produced with AI collected through an online survey. Our findings illuminate conceptions of authenticity in human-AI co-creation, which focus more on the process and experience of constructing creators' authentic selves. While writers reacted positively to personalized AI writing tools, they believed the form of personalization needs to target writers' growth and go beyond the phase of text production. Overall, readers' responses showed less concern about human-AI co-writing. Readers could not distinguish AI-assisted work, personalized or not, from writers' solo-written work and showed positive attitudes toward writers experimenting with new technology for creative writing.

Many state-of-the-art generative AI (GenAI) systems are increasingly prone to anthropomorphic behaviors, i.e., to generating outputs that are perceived to be human-like. While this has led to scholars increasingly raising concerns about possible negative impacts such anthropomorphic AI systems can give rise to, anthropomorphism in AI development, deployment, and use remains vastly overlooked, understudied, and underspecified. In this perspective, we argue that we cannot thoroughly map the social impacts of generative AI without mapping the social impacts of anthropomorphic AI, and outline a call to action.

Benchmarking is seen as critical to assessing progress in NLP. However, creating a benchmark involves many design decisions (e.g., which datasets to include, which metrics to use) that often rely on tacit, untested assumptions about what the benchmark is intended to measure or is actually measuring. There is currently no principled way of analyzing these decisions and how they impact the validity of the benchmark's measurements. To address this gap, we draw on evidence-centered design in educational assessments and propose Evidence-Centered Benchmark Design (ECBD), a framework which formalizes the benchmark design process into five modules. ECBD specifies the role each module plays in helping practitioners collect evidence about capabilities of interest. Specifically, each module requires benchmark designers to describe, justify, and support benchmark design choices -- e.g., clearly specifying the capabilities the benchmark aims to measure or how evidence about those capabilities is collected from model responses. To demonstrate the use of ECBD, we conduct case studies with three benchmarks: BoolQ, SuperGLUE, and HELM. Our analysis reveals common trends in benchmark design and documentation that could threaten the validity of benchmarks' measurements.

Longstanding data labeling practices in machine learning involve collecting and aggregating labels from multiple annotators. But what should we do when annotators disagree? Though annotator disagreement has long been seen as a problem to minimize, new perspectivist approaches challenge this assumption by treating disagreement as a valuable source of information. In this position paper, we examine practices and assumptions surrounding the causes of disagreement--some challenged by perspectivist approaches, and some that remain to be addressed--as well as practical and normative challenges for work operating under these assumptions. We conclude with recommendations for the data labeling pipeline and avenues for future research engaging with subjectivity and disagreement.

As machine learning applications proliferate, we need an understanding of their potential for harm. However, current fairness metrics are rarely grounded in human psychological experiences of harm. Drawing on the social psychology of stereotypes, we use a case study of gender stereotypes in image search to examine how people react to machine learning errors. First, we use survey studies to show that not all machine learning errors reflect stereotypes nor are equally harmful. Then, in experimental studies we randomly expose participants to stereotype-reinforcing, -violating, and -neutral machine learning errors. We find stereotype-reinforcing errors induce more experientially (i.e., subjectively) harmful experiences, while having minimal changes to cognitive beliefs, attitudes, or behaviors. This experiential harm impacts women more than men. However, certain stereotype-violating errors are more experientially harmful for men, potentially due to perceived threats to masculinity. We conclude that harm cannot be the sole guide in fairness mitigation, and propose a nuanced perspective depending on who is experiencing what harm and why.

AI and NLP publication venues have increasingly encouraged researchers to reflect on possible ethical considerations, adverse impacts, and other responsible AI issues their work might engender. However, for specific NLP tasks our understanding of how prevalent such issues are, or when and why these issues are likely to arise, remains limited. Focusing on text summarization -- a common NLP task largely overlooked by the responsible AI community -- we examine research and reporting practices in the current literature. We conduct a multi-round qualitative analysis of 333 summarization papers from the ACL Anthology published between 2020-2022. We focus on how, which, and when responsible AI issues are covered, which relevant stakeholders are considered, and mismatches between stated and realized research goals. We also discuss current evaluation practices and consider how authors discuss the limitations of both prior work and their own work. Overall, we find that relatively few papers engage with possible stakeholders or contexts of use, which limits their consideration of potential downstream adverse impacts or other responsible AI issues. Based on our findings, we make recommendations on concrete practices and research directions.

Fairness-related assumptions about what constitutes appropriate NLG system behaviors range from invariance, where systems are expected to respond identically to social groups, to adaptation, where responses should instead vary across them. We design and conduct five case studies, in which we perturb different types of identity-related language features (names, roles, locations, dialect, and style) in NLG system inputs to illuminate tensions around invariance and adaptation. We outline people's expectations of system behaviors, and surface potential caveats of these two contrasting yet commonly-held assumptions. We find that motivations for adaptation include social norms, cultural differences, feature-specific information, and accommodation; motivations for invariance include perspectives that favor prescriptivism, view adaptation as unnecessary or too difficult for NLG systems to do appropriately, and are wary of false assumptions. Our findings highlight open challenges around defining what constitutes fair NLG system behavior.

Generative AI systems across modalities, ranging from text, image, audio, and video, have broad social impacts, but there exists no official standard for means of evaluating those impacts and which impacts should be evaluated. We move toward a standard approach in evaluating a generative AI system for any modality, in two overarching categories: what is able to be evaluated in a base system that has no predetermined application and what is able to be evaluated in society. We describe specific social impact categories and how to approach and conduct evaluations in the base technical system, then in people and society. Our framework for a base system defines seven categories of social impact: bias, stereotypes, and representational harms; cultural values and sensitive content; disparate performance; privacy and data protection; financial costs; environmental costs; and data and content moderation labor costs. Suggested methods for evaluation apply to all modalities and analyses of the limitations of existing evaluations serve as a starting point for necessary investment in future evaluations. We offer five overarching categories for what is able to be evaluated in society, each with their own subcategories: trustworthiness and autonomy; inequality, marginalization, and violence; concentration of authority; labor and creativity; and ecosystem and environment. Each subcategory includes recommendations for mitigating harm. We are concurrently crafting an evaluation repository for the AI research community to contribute existing evaluations along the given categories. This version will be updated following a CRAFT session at ACM FAccT 2023.