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Various groups of ascertainable individuals have been granted the status of "persons" under American law, while that status has been denied to other groups This article examines various analogies that might be drawn by courts in deciding whether to extend "person" status to intelligent machines, and the limitations that might be placed upon such recognition As an alternative analysis: this article questions the legal status of various human/machine interfaces, and notes the difficulty in establishing an absolute point beyond which legal recognition will not extend COMPUTERS INCREASINGLY RESEMBLE Computers have proven capable of far more physical and mental "human" functions than most people believed was possible. The increasing similarity between humans and machines might eventually require legal recognition of computers as "persons." In the United States, there are two triers t'o such Views expressed here are those of the author @ Llarshal S. Willick 1982 41 rights reserved Editor's Note: This article is written by an attorney using a common reference style for legal citations The system of citation is more complex than systems ordinarily used in scientific publications since it must provide numerous variations for different sources of evidence and jurisdictions We have decided not to change t.his article's format for citations. The first tier determines which ascertainable individuals are considered persons (e g., blacks, yes; fetuses, no.) The second tier determines which rights and obligations are vested in the recognized persons, based on their observed or presumed capacities (e.g., the insane are restricted; eighteen-year-olds can vote.)