Sampling and Updating Higher Order Beliefs in Decision-Theoretic Bargaining Under Uncertainty

In this paper we study the sequential strategic interactive setting of two-person, two-stage, seller-offers bargaining under uncertainty. We model the epistemology of the problem in a finite interactive decision-theoretic framework and solve it for three types of agents of successively increasing (epistemological) sophistication (or, capacity to represent and reason with higher orders of beliefs). In particular, we remove common knowledge assumptions about the agents' epistemology which, if made, would be sufficient to imply the existence of a, possibly unique, game-theoretic equilibrium solution. In this context, we present a characterization of a monotonic relationship between an agent's optimal behavior and its beliefs under a particular moment-based ordering. Further, based on this characterization, we present the \emph{spread-accumulate} sampling technique -- a method of sampling an agent's higher order belief by generating ``evenly dispersed" beliefs for which we (pre)compute offline solutions. Then, we present a method for approximating higher order prior belief update to arbitrary precision by identifying a (previously solved) belief ``closest" to the true belief. In addition, these methods directly suggest a mechanism for achieving a balance between efficiency and the quality of the approximation -- either by generating a large number of offline solutions or by allowing the agent to search online for a ``closer" belief in the vicinity of best current solution.