A Unified Formal Theory on the Logical Limits of Symbol Grounding

This paper synthesizes a series of formal proofs to construct a unified theory on the logical limits of the Symbol Grounding Problem. We distinguish between internal meaning (sense), which formal systems can possess via axioms, and external grounding (reference), which is a necessary condition for connecting symbols to the world. We demonstrate through a four-stage argument that meaningful grounding within a formal system must arise from a process that is external, dynamic, and non-fixed algorithmic. First, we show that for a purely symbolic system, the impossibility of grounding is a direct consequence of its definition. Second, we extend this limitation to systems with any finite, static set of pre-established meanings (Semantic Axioms). By formally modeling the computationalist hypothesis-which equates grounding with internal derivation-we prove via Gödelian arguments that such systems cannot consistently and completely define a "groundability predicate" for all truths. Third, we demonstrate that the "grounding act" for emergent meanings cannot be inferred from internal rules but requires an axiomatic, meta-level update. Drawing on Turing's concept of Oracle Machines and Piccinini's analysis of the mathematical objection, we identify this update as physical transduction. Finally, we prove that this process cannot be simulated by a fixed judgment algorithm, validating the logical necessity of embodied interaction.