Learning Management
Gradient-Variation Online Learning under Generalized Smoothness
Gradient-variation online learning aims to achieve regret guarantees that scale with variations in the gradients of online functions, which is crucial for attaining fast convergence in games and robustness in stochastic o ptimization, hence receiving increased attention. Existing results often req uire the smoothness condition by imposing a fixed bound on gradient Lipschitzness, w hich may be unrealistic in practice. Recent efforts in neural network optim ization suggest a generalized smoothness condition, allowing smoothness to correlate with gradient norms. In this paper, we systematically study gradient-var iation online learning under generalized smoothness. We extend the classic optimi stic mirror descent algorithm to derive gradient-variation regret by analyzin g stability over the optimization trajectory and exploiting smoothness locally. Th en, we explore universal online learning, designing a single algorithm with the optimal gradient-va riation regrets for convex and strongly convex functions simultane ously, without requiring prior knowledge of curvature. This algorithm adopts a tw o-layer structure with a meta-algorithm running over a group of base-learners . To ensure favorable guarantees, we design a new Lipschitz-adaptive meta-a lgorithm, capable of handling potentially unbounded gradients while ensuring a second-order bound to effectively ensemble the base-learners. Finally, we provi de the applications for fast-rate convergence in games and stochastic extended adv ersarial optimization.
Online Learning for Uninformed Markov Games: Empirical Nash-Value Regret and Non-Stationarity Adaptation
Liu, Junyan, Luo, Haipeng, Zhang, Zihan, Ratliff, Lillian J.
We study online learning in two-player uninformed Markov games, where the opponent's actions and policies are unobserved. In this setting, Tian et al. (2021) show that achieving no-external-regret is impossible without incurring an exponential dependence on the episode length $H$. They then turn to the weaker notion of Nash-value regret and propose a V-learning algorithm with regret $O(K^{2/3})$ after $K$ episodes. However, their algorithm and guarantee do not adapt to the difficulty of the problem: even in the case where the opponent follows a fixed policy and thus $O(\sqrt{K})$ external regret is well-known to be achievable, their result is still the worse rate $O(K^{2/3})$ on a weaker metric. In this work, we fully address both limitations. First, we introduce empirical Nash-value regret, a new regret notion that is strictly stronger than Nash-value regret and naturally reduces to external regret when the opponent follows a fixed policy. Moreover, under this new metric, we propose a parameter-free algorithm that achieves an $O(\min \{\sqrt{K} + (CK)^{1/3},\sqrt{LK}\})$ regret bound, where $C$ quantifies the variance of the opponent's policies and $L$ denotes the number of policy switches (both at most $O(K)$). Therefore, our results not only recover the two extremes -- $O(\sqrt{K})$ external regret when the opponent is fixed and $O(K^{2/3})$ Nash-value regret in the worst case -- but also smoothly interpolate between these extremes by automatically adapting to the opponent's non-stationarity. We achieve so by first providing a new analysis of the epoch-based V-learning algorithm by Mao et al. (2022), establishing an $O(ηC + \sqrt{K/η})$ regret bound, where $η$ is the epoch incremental factor. Next, we show how to adaptively restart this algorithm with an appropriate $η$ in response to the potential non-stationarity of the opponent, eventually achieving our final results.