The belief revision field is opulent in new proposals and indigent in analyses of existing approaches. Much work hinge on postulates, employed as syntactic characterizations: some revision mechanism is equivalent to some properties. Postulates constraint specific revision instances: certain revisions update certain beliefs in a certain way. As an example, if the revision is consistent with the current beliefs, it is incorporated with no other change. A postulate like this tells what revisions must do and neglect what they can do. Can they reach a certain state of beliefs? Can they reach all possible states of beliefs? Can they reach all possible states of beliefs from no previous belief? Can they reach a dogmatic state of beliefs, where everything not believed is impossible? Can they make two conditions equally believed? An application where every possible state of beliefs is sensible requires each state of beliefs to be reachable. An application where conditions may be equally believed requires such a belief state to be reachable. An application where beliefs may become dogmatic requires a way to make them dogmatic. Such doxastic states need to be reached in a way or another. Not in specific way, as dictated by a typical belief revision postulate. This is an ability, not a constraint: the ability of being plastic, equating, dogmatic. Amnesic, correcting, believer, damascan, learnable are other abilities. Each revision mechanism owns some of these abilities and lacks the others: lexicographic, natural, restrained, very radical, full meet, radical, severe, moderate severe, deep severe, plain severe and deep severe revisions, each of these revisions is proved to possess certain abilities.

We introduce a mathematically rigorous framework for an artificial intelligence system composed of probabilistic agents evolving through structured competition and belief revision. The architecture, grounded in Bayesian inference, measure theory, and population dynamics, defines agent fitness as a function of alignment with a fixed external oracle representing ground truth. Agents compete in a discrete-time environment, adjusting posterior beliefs through observed outcomes, with higher-rated agents reproducing and lower-rated agents undergoing extinction. Ratings are updated via pairwise truth-aligned utility comparisons, and belief updates preserve measurable consistency and stochastic convergence. We introduce hash-based cryptographic identity commitments to ensure traceability, alongside causal inference operators using do-calculus. Formal theorems on convergence, robustness, and evolutionary stability are provided. The system establishes truth as an evolutionary attractor, demonstrating that verifiable knowledge arises from adversarial epistemic pressure within a computable, self-regulating swarm.

This paper outlines a comprehensive theoretical and architectural framework for constructing epistemically grounded artificial intelligence systems capable of propositional commitment, metacognitive reasoning, contradiction detection, and normative truth maintenance. Moving beyond the constraints of stochastic language generation, we propose a model in which artificial agents engage in structured, rule-governed reasoning that adheres to explicit epistemic norms. The approach integrates insights from epistemology, formal logic, inferential semantics, knowledge graph structuring, probabilistic justification, and immutable blockchain evidence to create systems that do not merely simulate knowledge, but operate under explicit, verifiable constraints on belief, justification, and truth. We begin with an analysis of epistemic norms in artificial reasoning, contrasting evi-dentialist, Bayesian, and logical foundations, and establishing a requirement for internal consistency and constraint against falsehood. Central to the proposed system is a prohibition against internal deception: no model component may assert what it internally contradicts.

The crisis of epistemic overload in modern scientific inquiry has exposed a critical deficiency in how truth claims are assessed, validated, and integrated across time and domain. The exponential growth in peer-reviewed publications, accompanied by inconsistent replication rates, entrenched citation biases, and the sociological entanglements of scientific authorship, has rendered traditional mechanisms of epistemic filtering increasingly obsolete. Simultaneously, artificial intelligence--while having demonstrated capacity in data correlation and language generation--remains fundamentally ill-equipped to perform rigorous epistemic reasoning. This gap is not merely technical but conceptual: current AI systems lack any principled framework for evaluating the truth-promoting value of claims, discerning authoritative sources, or understanding belief as a structured probabilistic relation between agents, claims, and contexts. The present work introduces a formal architecture--Bayesian Epistemology with Weighted Authority (BEW A)--which systematically encodes the logic of belief formation, update, and decay, guided by the core axioms of Bayesian rationality, tempered by structural mechanisms for authority weighting, replication scoring, and temporal reassessment.

People regularly make inferences about objects in the world that they cannot see by flexibly integrating information from multiple sources: auditory and visual cues, language, and our prior beliefs and knowledge about the scene. How are we able to so flexibly integrate many sources of information to make sense of the world around us, even if we have no direct knowledge? In this work, we propose a neurosymbolic model that uses neural networks to parse open-ended multi-modal inputs and then applies a Bayesian model to integrate different sources of information to evaluate different hypotheses. We evaluate our model with a novel object guessing game called "What's in the Box?" where humans and models watch a video clip of an experimenter shaking boxes and then try to guess the objects inside the boxes. Through a human experiment, we show that our model correlates strongly with human judgments, whereas unimodal ablated models and large multi-modal neural model baselines showed poor correlation.

We present a tractable, incremental framework for topological dialogue semantics based on finite, discrete semantic spaces. Building on the intuition that utterances correspond to open sets and their combinatorial relations form a simplicial complex (the dialogue nerve), we give a rigorous foundation, a provably correct incremental algorithm for nerve updates, and a reference implementation in the Wolfram Language. The framework supports negative nerve computation (inconsistency tracking), consequence extraction, and a transparent, set-theoretic ranking of entailments. We clarify which combinatorial properties hold in the discrete case, provide motivating examples, and outline limitations and prospects for richer logical and categorical extensions.

Recent developments in aligning Large Language Models (LLMs) with human preferences have significantly enhanced their utility in human-AI collaborative scenarios. However, such approaches often neglect the critical role of "epistemic friction," or the inherent resistance encountered when updating beliefs in response to new, conflicting, or ambiguous information. In this paper, we define dynamic epistemic friction as the resistance to epistemic integration, characterized by the misalignment between an agent's current belief state and new propositions supported by external evidence. We position this within the framework of Dynamic Epistemic Logic (Van Benthem and Pacuit, 2011), where friction emerges as nontrivial belief-revision during the interaction. We then present analyses from a situated collaborative task that demonstrate how this model of epistemic friction can effectively predict belief updates in dialogues, and we subsequently discuss how the model of belief alignment as a measure of epistemic resistance or friction can naturally be made more sophisticated to accommodate the complexities of real-world dialogue scenarios.

Multimodal intent recognition (MIR) seeks to accurately interpret user intentions by integrating verbal and non-verbal information across video, audio and text modalities. While existing approaches prioritize text analysis, they often overlook the rich semantic content embedded in non-verbal cues. This paper presents a novel W avelet-Driven Multimodal Intent Recognition (WDMIR) framework that enhances intent understanding through frequency-domain analysis of non-verbal information. To be more specific, we propose: (1) a wavelet-driven fusion module that performs synchronized decomposition and integration of video-audio features in the frequency domain, enabling fine-grained analysis of temporal dynamics; (2) a cross-modal interaction mechanism that facilitates progressive feature enhancement from bimodal to trimodal integration, effectively bridging the semantic gap between verbal and non-verbal information. Extensive experiments on MIntRec demonstrate that our approach achieves state-of-the-art performance, surpassing previous methods by 1.13% on accuracy. Ablation studies further verify that the wavelet-driven fusion module significantly improves the extraction of semantic information from non-verbal sources, with a 0.41% increase in recognition accuracy when analyzing subtle emotional cues.

Understanding how humans revise their beliefs in light of new information is crucial for developing AI systems which can effectively model, and thus align with, human reasoning. While theoretical belief revision frameworks rely on a set of principles that establish how these operations are performed, empirical evidence from cognitive psychology suggests that people may follow different patterns when presented with conflicting information. In this paper, we present three comprehensive user studies showing that people consistently prefer explanation-based revisions, i.e., those which are guided by explanations, that result in changes to their belief systems that are not necessarily captured by classical belief change theory. Our experiments systematically investigate how people revise their beliefs with explanations for inconsistencies, whether they are provided with them or left to formulate them themselves, demonstrating a robust preference for what may seem non-minimal revisions across different types of scenarios. These findings have implications for AI systems designed to model human reasoning or interact with humans, suggesting that such systems should accommodate explanation-based, potentially non-minimal belief revision operators to better align with human cognitive processes.

We study how partial information about scoring rules affects fairness in strategic learning settings. In strategic learning, a learner deploys a scoring rule, and agents respond strategically by modifying their features -- at some cost -- to improve their outcomes. However, in our work, agents do not observe the scoring rule directly; instead, they receive a noisy signal of said rule. We consider two different agent models: (i) naive agents, who take the noisy signal at face value, and (ii) Bayesian agents, who update a prior belief based on the signal. Our goal is to understand how disparities in outcomes arise between groups that differ in their costs of feature modification, and how these disparities vary with the level of transparency of the learner's rule. For naive agents, we show that utility disparities can grow unboundedly with noise, and that the group with lower costs can, perhaps counter-intuitively, be disproportionately harmed under limited transparency. In contrast, for Bayesian agents, disparities remain bounded. We provide a full characterization of disparities across groups as a function of the level of transparency and show that they can vary non-monotonically with noise; in particular, disparities are often minimized at intermediate levels of transparency. Finally, we extend our analysis to settings where groups differ not only in cost, but also in prior beliefs, and study how this asymmetry influences fairness.