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 Belief Revision


Robust Goal Recognition with Operator-Counting Heuristics

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

Goal recognition is the problem of inferring the correct Operator-counting heuristics provide a unifying framework goal towards which an agent executes a plan, for a variety of sources of information from planning heuristics given a set of goal hypotheses, a domain model, [Hoffmann that provide both an estimate ofet al., 2004] and a (possibly noisy) sample of the plan being the total cost of a goal from any given state and and indication executed. This is a key problem in both cooperative of the actual operators likely to be in such plans. This and competitive agent interactions and recent information proves to be effective at differentiating between approaches have produced fast and accurate goal goal hypotheses in goal recognition, as we empirically show recognition algorithms.


Amortized Object and Scene Perception for Long-term Robot Manipulation

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

Mobile robots, performing long-term manipulation activities in human environments, have to perceive a wide variety of objects possessing very different visual characteristics and need to reliably keep track of these throughout the execution of a task. In order to be efficient, robot perception capabilities need to go beyond what is currently perceivable and should be able to answer queries about both current and past scenes. In this paper we investigate a perception system for long-term robot manipulation that keeps track of the changing environment and builds a representation of the perceived world. Specifically we introduce an amortized component that spreads perception tasks throughout the execution cycle. The resulting query driven perception system asynchronously integrates results from logged images into a symbolic and numeric (what we call sub-symbolic) representation that forms the perceptual belief state of the robot.


First steps to a constructor theory of cognition

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

This article applies the conceptual framework of constructor theory of information to cognition theory. The main result of this work is that cognition theory, in specific situations concerning for example the conjunction fallacy heuristic, requires the use of superinformation media, just as quantum theory. This result entails that quantum and cognition theories can be considered as elements of a general class of superinformation-based subsidiary theories.


On Convergence Rate of the Gaussian Belief Propagation Algorithm for Markov Networks

arXiv.org Machine Learning

Gaussian Belief Propagation (BP) algorithm is one of the most important distributed algorithms in signal processing and statistical learning involving Markov networks. It is well known that the algorithm correctly computes marginal density functions from a high dimensional joint density function over a Markov network in a finite number of iterations when the underlying Gaussian graph is acyclic. It is also known more recently that the algorithm produces correct marginal means asymptotically for cyclic Gaussian graphs under the condition of walk summability. This paper extends this convergence result further by showing that the convergence is exponential under the walk summability condition, and provides a simple bound for the convergence rate.


Iterated Belief Base Revision: A Dynamic Epistemic Logic Approach

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

AGM's belief revision is one of the main paradigms in the study of belief change operations. In this context, belief bases (prioritised bases) have been largely used to specify the agent's belief state - whether representing the agent's `explicit beliefs' or as a computational model for her belief state. While the connection of iterated AGM-like operations and their encoding in dynamic epistemic logics have been studied before, few works considered how well-known postulates from iterated belief revision theory can be characterised by means of belief bases and their counterpart in a dynamic epistemic logic. This work investigates how priority graphs, a syntactic representation of preference relations deeply connected to prioritised bases, can be used to characterise belief change operators, focusing on well-known postulates of Iterated Belief Change. We provide syntactic representations of belief change operators in a dynamic context, as well as new negative results regarding the possibility of representing an iterated belief revision operation using transformations on priority graphs.


Cost-Based Goal Recognition in Navigational Domains

Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research

Goal recognition is the problem of determining an agent's intent by observing her behaviour. Contemporary solutions for general task-planning relate the probability of a goal to the cost of reaching it. We adapt this approach to goal recognition in the strict context of path-planning. We show (1) that a simpler formula provides an identical result to current state-of-the-art in less than half the time under all but one set of conditions. Further, we prove (2) that the probability distribution based on this technique is independent of an agent's past behaviour and present a revised formula that achieves goal recognition by reference to the agent's starting point and current location only. Building on this, we demonstrate (3) that a Radius of Maximum Probability (i.e., the distance from a goal within which that goal is guaranteed to be the most probable) can be calculated from relative cost-distances between the candidate goals and a start location, without needing to calculate any actual probabilities. In this extended version of earlier work, we generalise our framework to the continuous domain and discuss our results, including the conditions under which our findings can be generalised back to goal recognition in general task-planning.


A Generalisation of AGM Contraction and Revision to Fragments of First-Order Logic

Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research

AGM contraction and revision assume an underlying logic that contains propositional logic. Consequently, this assumption excludes many useful logics such as the Horn fragment of propositional logic and most description logics. Our goal in this paper is to generalise AGM contraction and revision to (near-)arbitrary fragments of classical first-order logic. To this end, we first define a very general logic that captures these fragments. In so doing, we make the modest assumptions that a logic contains conjunction and that information is expressed by closed formulas or sentences. The resulting logic is called first-order conjunctive logic or FC logic for short. We then take as the point of departure the AGM approach of constructing contraction functions through epistemic entrenchment, that is the entrenchment-based contraction. We redefine entrenchment-based contraction in ways that apply to any FC logic, which we call FC contraction. We prove a representation theorem showing its compliance with all the AGM contraction postulates except for the controversial recovery postulate. We also give methods for constructing revision functions through epistemic entrenchment which we call FC revision; which also apply to any FC logic. We show that if the underlying FC logic contains tautologies then FC revision complies with all the AGM revision postulates. Finally, in the context of FC logic, we provide three methods for generating revision functions via a variant of the Levi Identity, which we call contraction, withdrawal and cut generated revision, and explore the notion of revision equivalence. We show that withdrawal and cut generated revision coincide with FC revision and so does contraction generated revision under a finiteness condition.


Iterated Belief Revision Under Resource Constraints: Logic as Geometry

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

We propose a variant of iterated belief revision designed for settings with limited computational resources, such as mobile autonomous robots. The proposed memory architecture---called the {\em universal memory architecture} (UMA)---maintains an epistemic state in the form of a system of default rules similar to those studied by Pearl and by Goldszmidt and Pearl (systems $Z$ and $Z^+$). A duality between the category of UMA representations and the category of the corresponding model spaces, extending the Sageev-Roller duality between discrete poc sets and discrete median algebras provides a two-way dictionary from inference to geometry, leading to immense savings in computation, at a cost in the quality of representation that can be quantified in terms of topological invariants. Moreover, the same framework naturally enables comparisons between different model spaces, making it possible to analyze the deficiencies of one model space in comparison to others. This paper develops the formalism underlying UMA, analyzes the complexity of maintenance and inference operations in UMA, and presents some learning guarantees for different UMA-based learners. Finally, we present simulation results to illustrate the viability of the approach, and close with a discussion of the strengths, weaknesses, and potential development of UMA-based learners.


Adams Conditioning and Likelihood Ratio Transfer Mediated Inference

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

Bayesian inference as applied in a legal setting is about belief transfer and involves a plurality of agents and communication protocols. A forensic expert (FE) may communicate to a trier of fact (TOF) first its value of a certain likelihood ratio with respect to FE's belief state as represented by a probability function on FE's proposition space. Subsequently FE communicates its recently acquired confirmation that a certain evidence proposition is true. Then TOF performs likelihood ratio transfer mediated reasoning thereby revising their own belief state. The logical principles involved in likelihood transfer mediated reasoning are discussed in a setting where probabilistic arithmetic is done within a meadow, and with Adams conditioning placed in a central role.


Rethinking Epistemic Logic with Belief Bases

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

We introduce a new semantics for a logic of explicit and implicit beliefs based on the concept of multi-agent belief base. Differently from existing Kripke-style semantics for epistemic logic in which the notions of possible world and doxastic/epistemic alternative are primitive, in our semantics they are non-primitive but are defined from the concept of belief base. We provide a complete axiomatization and prove decidability for our logic via a finite model argument. We also provide a polynomial embedding of our logic into Fagin & Halpern's logic of general awareness and establish a complexity result for our logic via the embedding.