The field of artificial intelligence has grown by leaps and bounds in recent years, already providing new capabilities that we see used in real life. Smart phones can recognize our faces to identify us as their proper owners. We can now translate street signs in a different language using an app. And we are starting to have computers that can respond to voice commands. The future seems bright, with talk of autonomous vehicles, robots, and advances in many different fields--from medical diagnostics to automated factories.

We study discrete-time mean-field Markov games with infinite numbers of agents where each agent aims to minimize its ergodic cost. We consider the setting where the agents have identical linear state transitions and quadratic cost functions, while the aggregated effect of the agents is captured by the population mean of their states, namely, the mean-field state. For such a game, based on the Nash certainty equivalence principle, we provide sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of its Nash equilibrium. Moreover, to find the Nash equilibrium, we propose a mean-field actor-critic algorithm with linear function approximation, which does not require knowing the model of dynamics. Specifically, at each iteration of our algorithm, we use the single-agent actor-critic algorithm to approximately obtain the optimal policy of the each agent given the current mean-field state, and then update the mean-field state. In particular, we prove that our algorithm converges to the Nash equilibrium at a linear rate. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first success of applying model-free reinforcement learning with function approximation to discrete-time mean-field Markov games with provable non-asymptotic global convergence guarantees.

Centralised training with decentralised execution is an important setting for cooperative deep multi-agent reinforcement learning due to communication constraints during execution and computational tractability in training. In this paper, we analyse value-based methods that are known to have superior performance in complex environments [43]. We specifically focus on QMIX [40], the current state-of-the-art in this domain. We show that the representational constraints on the joint action-values introduced by QMIX and similar methods lead to provably poor exploration and suboptimality. Furthermore, we propose a novel approach called MAVEN that hybridises value and policy-based methods by introducing a latent space for hierarchical control. The value-based agents condition their behaviour on the shared latent variable controlled by a hierarchical policy. This allows MAVEN to achieve committed, temporally extended exploration, which is key to solving complex multi-agent tasks. Our experimental results show that MAVEN achieves significant performance improvements on the challenging SMAC domain [43].

The principal contribution of this paper is a conceptual framework for off-policy reinforcement learning, based on conditional expectations of importance sampling ratios. This framework yields new perspectives and understanding of existing off-policy algorithms, and reveals a broad space of unexplored algorithms. We theoretically analyse this space, and concretely investigate several algorithms that arise from this framework.

A great variety of off-policy learning algorithms exist in the literature, and new breakthroughs in this area continue to be made, improving theoretical understanding and yielding state-of-the-art reinforcement learning algorithms. In this paper, we take a unifying view of this space of algorithms, and consider their trade-offs of three fundamental quantities: update variance, fixed-point bias, and contraction rate. This leads to new perspectives of existing methods, and also naturally yields novel algorithms for off-policy evaluation and control. We develop one such algorithm, C-trace, demonstrating that it is able to more efficiently make these trade-offs than existing methods in use, and that it can be scaled to yield state-of-the-art performance in large-scale environments.

Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) has emerged as a powerful control technique in robotic science. In contrast to control theory, DRL is more robust in the thorough exploration of the environment. This capability of DRL generates more human-like behaviour and intelligence when applied to the robots. To explore this capability, we designed challenging manipulation tasks to observe robots strategy to handle complex scenarios. We observed that robots not only perform tasks successfully, but also transpire a creative and non intuitive solution. We also observed robot's persistence in tasks that are close to success and its striking ability in discerning to continue or give up.

We consider the problem of how a teacher algorithm can enable an unknown Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) student to become good at a skill over a wide range of diverse environments. To do so, we study how a teacher algorithm can learn to generate a learning curriculum, whereby it sequentially samples parameters controlling a stochastic procedural generation of environments. Because it does not initially know the capacities of its student, a key challenge for the teacher is to discover which environments are easy, difficult or unlearnable, and in what order to propose them to maximize the efficiency of learning over the learnable ones. To achieve this, this problem is transformed into a surrogate continuous bandit problem where the teacher samples environments in order to maximize absolute learning progress of its student. We present a new algorithm modeling absolute learning progress with Gaussian mixture models (ALP-GMM). We also adapt existing algorithms and provide a complete study in the context of DRL. Using parameterized variants of the BipedalWalker environment, we study their efficiency to personalize a learning curriculum for different learners (embodiments), their robustness to the ratio of learnable/unlearnable environments, and their scalability to non-linear and high-dimensional parameter spaces. Videos and code are available at https://github.com/flowersteam/teachDeepRL.

Infinite horizon off-policy policy evaluation is a highly challenging task due to the excessively large variance of typical importance sampling (IS) estimators. Recently, Liu et al. (2018a) proposed an approach that significantly reduces the variance of infinite-horizon off-policy evaluation by estimating the stationary density ratio, but at the cost of introducing potentially high biases due to the error in density ratio estimation. In this paper, we develop a bias-reduced augmentation of their method, which can take advantage of a learned value function to obtain higher accuracy. Our method is doubly robust in that the bias vanishes when either the density ratio or the value function estimation is perfect. In general, when either of them is accurate, the bias can also be reduced. Both theoretical and empirical results show that our method yields significant advantages over previous methods.

Recently, researchers of Google Brain and UC Berkeley introduced ROBEL (Robotics Benchmarks for Learning with Low-Cost Robots) to the world. ROBEL is an open-source platform of cost-effective robots and curated benchmarks designed primarily to facilitate research and development on physical hardware in the real world. The robot includes in this platform are low-cost, modular, easy to maintain, and are robust enough to sustain on-hardware reinforcement learning from scratch. According to the researchers, the platform serves as a rapid experimentation platform, supporting a broad range of experimental needs along with the development of important algorithms like reinforcement learning.

This paper addresses the problem of multi-agent inverse reinforcement learning (MIRL) in a two-player general-sum stochastic game framework. Five variants of MIRL are considered: uCS-MIRL, advE-MIRL, cooE-MIRL, uCE-MIRL, and uNE-MIRL, each distinguished by its solution concept. Problem uCS-MIRL is a cooperative game in which the agents employ cooperative strategies that aim to maximize the total game value. In problem uCE-MIRL, agents are assumed to follow strategies that constitute a correlated equilibrium while maximizing total game value. Problem uNE-MIRL is similar to uCE-MIRL in total game value maximization, but it is assumed that the agents are playing a Nash equilibrium. Problems advE-MIRL and cooE-MIRL assume agents are playing an adversarial equilibrium and a coordination equilibrium, respectively. We propose novel approaches to address these five problems under the assumption that the game observer either knows or is able to accurately estimate the policies and solution concepts for players. For uCS-MIRL, we first develop a characteristic set of solutions ensuring that the observed bi-policy is a uCS and then apply a Bayesian inverse learning method. For uCE-MIRL, we develop a linear programming problem subject to constraints that define necessary and sufficient conditions for the observed policies to be correlated equilibria. The objective is to choose a solution that not only minimizes the total game value difference between the observed bi-policy and a local uCS, but also maximizes the scale of the solution. We apply a similar treatment to the problem of uNE-MIRL. The remaining two problems can be solved efficiently by taking advantage of solution uniqueness and setting up a convex optimization problem. Results are validated on various benchmark grid-world games.