However, the effect of these design choices on established baselines remains understudied.

Priorworksonadversarial attacks againstRLmainly focus on either observation poisoning attacks or environment poisoning attacks.

Inverse reinforcement learning attempts to reconstruct the reward function in a Markov decision problem, using observations of agent actions. As already observed in Russell [1998] the problem is ill-posed, and the reward function is not identifiable, even under the presence of perfect information about optimal behavior. We provide a resolution to this non-identifiability for problems with entropyregularization.

We study the constrained reinforcement learning problem, in which an agent aims tomaximize the expected cumulativereward subject toaconstraint on the expected total value of a utility function. In contrast to existing model-based approaches or model-free methods accompanied with a'simulator', we aim to develop thefirst model-free, simulator-freealgorithm that achieves a sublinear regret and a sublinear constraint violation even inlarge-scale systems.

We study the constrained reinforcement learning problem, in which an agent aims tomaximize the expected cumulativereward subject toaconstraint on the expected total value of a utility function. In contrast to existing model-based approaches or model-free methods accompanied with a'simulator', we aim to develop thefirst model-free, simulator-freealgorithm that achieves a sublinear regret and a sublinear constraint violation even inlarge-scale systems.

Note that these games are two-player games, we select the runner in You-Shall-Not-Pass and kicker in Kick-And-Defend as our target agent. Section 4 mentioned that we download a well-trained policy for each game.