We target passive dementia screening from short camera-facing talking head video, developing a facial temporal micro dynamics analysis for language free detection of early neuro cognitive change. This enables unscripted, in the wild video analysis at scale to capture natural facial behaviors, transferrable across devices, topics, and cultures without active intervention by clinicians or researchers during recording. Most existing resources prioritize speech or scripted interviews, limiting use outside clinics and coupling predictions to language and transcription. In contrast, we identify and analyze whether temporal facial kinematics, including blink dynamics, small mouth jaw motions, gaze variability, and subtle head adjustments, are sufficient for dementia screening without speech or text. By stabilizing facial signals, we convert these micro movements into interpretable facial microdynamic time series, smooth them, and summarize short windows into compact clip level statistics for screening. Each window is encoded by its activity mix (the relative share of motion across streams), thus the predictor analyzes the distribution of motion across streams rather than its magnitude, making per channel effects transparent. We also introduce YT DemTalk, a new dataset curated from publicly available, in the wild camera facing videos. It contains 300 clips (150 with self reported dementia, 150 controls) to test our model and offer a first benchmarking of the corpus. On YT DemTalk, ablations identify gaze lability and mouth/jaw dynamics as the most informative cues, and light weighted shallow classifiers could attain a dementia prediction performance of (AUROC) 0.953, 0.961 Average Precision (AP), 0.851 F1-score, and 0.857 accuracy.

Diffusion Large Language Models (dLLMs) have recently emerged as a competitive non-autoregressive paradigm due to their unique training and inference approach. However, there is currently a lack of safety study on this novel architecture. In this paper, we present the first analysis of dLLMs' safety performance and propose a novel safety alignment method tailored to their unique generation characteristics. Specifically, we identify a critical asymmetry between the defender and attacker in terms of security. For the defender, we reveal that the middle tokens of the response, rather than the initial ones, are more critical to the overall safety of dLLM outputs; this seems to suggest that aligning middle tokens can be more beneficial to the defender. The attacker, on the contrary, may have limited power to manipulate middle tokens, as we find dLLMs have a strong tendency towards a sequential generation order in practice, forcing the attack to meet this distribution and diverting it from influencing the critical middle tokens. Building on this asymmetry, we introduce Middle-tOken Safety Alignment (MOSA), a novel method that directly aligns the model's middle generation with safe refusals exploiting reinforcement learning. We implement MOSA and compare its security performance against eight attack methods on two benchmarks. We also test the utility of MOSA-aligned dLLM on coding, math, and general reasoning. The results strongly prove the superiority of MOSA.

Vision-Language-Action (VLA) policies excel in aligning language, perception, and robot control. However, most VLAs are trained purely by imitation, which overfits to demonstrations, and is brittle under distribution shift. Reinforcement learning (RL) directly optimizes task reward and thus addresses this misalignment, but real-robot interaction is expensive and conventional simulators are hard to engineer and transfer. We address both data efficiency and optimization stability in VLA post-training via a learned world model and an RL procedure tailored to flow-based action heads. Specifically, we introduce Prophet, a unified action-to-video robot actuation pretrained across large-scale, heterogeneous robot data to learn reusable action-outcome dynamics. It is able to few-shot adapt to new robots, objects, and environments, yielding a rollout-ready simulator. Upon Prophet, we reinforce action policies with Flow-action-GRPO (FA-GRPO), which adapts Flow-GRPO to operate on VLA actions, and with FlowScale, a stepwise reweighting that rescales per-step gradients in the flow head. Together, Prophet, FA-GRPO, and FlowScale constitute ProphRL, a practical, data- and compute-efficient path to VLA post-training. Experiments show 5-17% success gains on public benchmarks and 24-30% gains on real robots across different VLA variants.

As demand for LLM inference grows, it is becoming increasingly important that providers and their customers can verify that inference processes are performed correctly, without errors or tampering. However, re-running the same inference process twice often leads to different results due to benign numerical noise, making it difficult to distinguish legitimate variation from actual problems. To address this problem, we introduce Token-DiFR (Token-Divergence-From-Reference), a method for verifying inference outputs by comparing generated tokens against predictions made by a trusted reference implementation conditioned on the same random seed. Sampling seed synchronization tightly constrains valid outputs, leaving providers minimal room to deviate from correct inference, which allows output tokens themselves to serve as auditable evidence of correctness at zero additional cost to the provider. Token-DiFR reliably identifies sampling errors, simulated bugs, and model quantization, detecting 4-bit quantization with AUC $>$ 0.999 within 300 output tokens. For applications requiring sample-efficient forward-pass verification, we additionally introduce Activation-DiFR, a scheme that uses random orthogonal projections to compress activations into compact fingerprints for subsequent verification. Activation-DiFR detects 4-bit quantization with AUC $>$ 0.999 using just 2 output tokens, while reducing communication overhead by 25-75% relative to existing methods. We release an open-source integration with vLLM to accelerate practical deployment of verifiable inference.

The integration of artificial intelligence (AI) agents into web browsers introduces security challenges that go beyond traditional web application threat models. Prior work has identified prompt injection as a new attack vector for web agents, yet the resulting impact within real-world environments remains insufficiently understood. In this work, we examine the landscape of prompt injection attacks and synthesize a benchmark of attacks embedded in realistic HTML payloads. Our benchmark goes beyond prior work by emphasizing injections that can influence real-world actions rather than mere text outputs, and by presenting attack payloads with complexity and distractor frequency similar to what real-world agents encounter. We leverage this benchmark to conduct a comprehensive empirical evaluation of existing defenses, assessing their effectiveness across a suite of frontier AI models. We propose a multi-layered defense strategy comprising both architectural and model-based defenses to protect against evolving prompt injection attacks. Our work offers a blueprint for designing practical, secure web agents through a defense-in-depth approach.

The recovery of training data from generative models (``model inversion'') has been extensively studied for diffusion models in the data domain. The encoder/decoder pair and corresponding latent codes have largely been ignored by inversion techniques applied to latent space generative models, e.g., Latent Diffusion models (LDMs). In this work we describe two key findings: (1) The diffusion model exhibits non-uniform memorization across latent codes, tending to overfit samples located in high-distortion regions of the decoder pullback metric. (2) Even within a single latent code, different dimensions contribute unequally to memorization. We introduce a principled method to rank latent dimensions by their per-dimensional contribution to the decoder pullback metric, identifying those most responsible for memorization. Empirically, removing less-memorizing dimensions when computing attack statistics for score-based membership inference attacker significantly improves performance, with average AUROC gains of 2.7\% and substantial increases in TPR@1\%FPR (6.42\%) across diverse datasets including CIFAR-10, CelebA, ImageNet-1K, Pokémon, MS-COCO, and Flickr. This indicates stronger confidence in identifying members under extremely low false-positive tolerance. Our results highlight the overlooked influence of the auto-encoder geometry on LDM memorization and provide a new perspective for analyzing privacy risks in diffusion-based generative models.

Advanced Persistent Threats (APT) pose a major cybersecurity challenge due to their stealth, persistence, and adaptability. Traditional machine learning detectors struggle with class imbalance, high dimensional features, and scarce real world traces. They often lack transferability-performing well in the training domain but degrading in novel attack scenarios. We propose a hybrid transfer framework that integrates Transfer Learning, Explainable AI (XAI), contrastive learning, and Siamese networks to improve cross-domain generalization. An attention-based autoencoder supports knowledge transfer across domains, while Shapley Additive exPlanations (SHAP) select stable, informative features to reduce dimensionality and computational cost. A Siamese encoder trained with a contrastive objective aligns source and target representations, increasing anomaly separability and mitigating feature drift. We evaluate on real-world traces from the DARPA Transparent Computing (TC) program and augment with synthetic attack scenarios to test robustness. Across source to target transfers, the approach delivers improved detection scores with classical and deep baselines, demonstrating a scalable, explainable, and transferable solution for APT detection.

To address the scarcity and privacy concerns of network traffic data, various generative models have been developed to produce synthetic traffic. However, synthetic traffic is not inherently privacy-preserving, and the extent to which it leaks sensitive information, and how to measure such leakage, remain largely unexplored. This challenge is further compounded by the diversity of model architectures, which shape how traffic is represented and synthesized. We introduce a comprehensive set of privacy metrics for synthetic network traffic, combining standard approaches like membership inference attacks (MIA) and data extraction attacks with network-specific identifiers and attributes. Using these metrics, we systematically evaluate the vulnerability of different representative generative models and examine the factors that influence attack success. Our results reveal substantial variability in privacy risks across models and datasets. MIA success ranges from 0% to 88%, and up to 100% of network identifiers can be recovered from generated traffic, highlighting serious privacy vulnerabilities. We further identify key factors that significantly affect attack outcomes, including training data diversity and how well the generative model fits the training data. These findings provide actionable guidance for designing and deploying generative models that minimize privacy leakage, establishing a foundation for safer synthetic network traffic generation.

W e propose RankOOD, a rank-based Out-of-Distribution (OOD) detection approach based on training a model with the Placket-Luce loss, which is now extensively used for preference alignment tasks in foundational models. Our approach is based on the insight that with a deep learning model trained using the Cross Entropy Loss, in-distribution (ID) class prediction induces a ranking pattern for each ID class prediction. The RankOOD framework formalizes the insight by first extracting a rank list for each class using an initial classifier and then uses another round of training with the Plackett-Luce loss, where the class rank, a fixed permutation for each class, is the predicted variable. An OOD example may get assigned with high probability to an ID example, but the probability of it respecting the ranking classification is likely to be small. RankOOD, achieves SOTA performance on the near-ODD TinyImageNet evaluation benchmark, reducing FPR95 by 4.3%.

Version control relies on commit messages to convey the rationale for code changes, but these messages are often low quality and, more critically, inconsistent with their diffs-known as message-code inconsistency (MCI). MCIs mislead reviewers, hinder maintenance, contaminate research datasets, and may obscure security patches. Yet, no dedicated benchmark exists to evaluate models for MCI detection. We introduce CODEFUSE-COMMITEVAL, the first benchmark designed for MCI detection using large language models (LLMs). Built on the ApacheCM dataset for diversity and quality, we generate seven types of inconsistent messages through rule-guided mutations of originally consistent commits and apply two-fold validation to verify both positive and negative samples. Using this labeled dataset of message-diff pairs, we evaluate six state-of-the-art open-source LLMs under a vanilla setting and with three augmentation strategies: few-shot prompting, chain-of-thought, and extended context. Results show models detect inconsistent commits more reliably than consistent ones (average Recall 85.95%, Precision 80.28%, Specificity 63.8%); gpt-oss-20B performs best overall but uses over twice the tokens of others. Augmentation effects vary: adjacent context helps larger models but adds noise for smaller ones; few-shot improves accuracy and reduces token use, yet increases universally incorrect predictions; chain-of-thought boosts precision and specificity at the cost of recall and higher token consumption. Type-wise analysis reveals higher detectability for component, file-path, and operation inconsistencies, but lower accuracy and higher token cost for intent-level "purpose" inconsistencies. CODEFUSE-COMMITEVAL provides a rigorous foundation for measuring, comparing, and advancing MCI detection, highlighting the need for richer context and balanced data to capture high-level semantic gaps.