A fundamental problem in artificial intelligence is that nobody really knows what intelligence is. The problem is especially acute when we need to consider artificial systems which are significantly different to humans. In this paper we approach this problem in the following way: We take a number of well known informal definitions of human intelligence that have been given by experts, and extract their essential features. These are then mathematically formalised to produce a general measure of intelligence for arbitrary machines. We believe that this measure formally captures the concept of machine intelligence in the broadest reasonable sense.

The Raven's Progressive Matrices (RPM) test is a commonly used test of general human intelligence. The RPM is somewhat unique as a general intelligence test in that it focuses on visual problem solving, and in particular, on visual similarity and analogy. We are developing a small set of methods for problem solving in the RPM which use propositional, imagistic, and multimodal representations, respectively, to investigate how different representations can contribute to visual problem solving and how the effects of their use might emerge in behavior.

Creativity isn’t magical. It’s an aspect of normal human intelligence, not a special faculty granted to a tiny elite. There are three forms: combinational, exploratory, and transformational. All three can be modeled by AI—in some cases, with impressive results. AI techniques underlie various types of computer art. Whether computers could “really” be creative isn’t a scientific question but a philosophical one, to which there’s no clear answer. But we do have the beginnings of a scientific understanding of creativity.

This paper deals with computational approaches to storytelling, or the production of stories by computers, with a particular attention on the way human creativity is modelled or emulated, also in computational terms. Features relevant to creativity and to stories are analysed, and existing systems are reviewed under the light of that analysis.The extent to which they implement the key features proposed in recent models of computational creativity is discussed. Limitations, avenues of future research and expected trends are outlined.

Such creative software can be used for autonomous creative tasks, such as inventing mathematical theories, writing poems, painting pictures, and composing music. However, computational creativity studies also enable us to understand human creativity and to produce programs for creative people to use, where the software acts as a creative collaborator rather than a mere tool. Historically, it's been difficult for society to come to terms with machines that purport to be intelligent and even more difficult to admit that they might be creative. For instance, in 1934, some professors at the University of Manchester in the United Kingdom built meccano models that were able to solve some mathematical equations. Groundbreaking for its time, this project was written up in a piece in Meccano Magazine. The article was titled "Are Thinking Machines Possible" and was very upbeat, but surprisingly ends by stating that "Truly creative thinking of course will always remain beyond the power of any machine." Surely, though, this attitude has changed in light of the amazing advances in hardware and software technology that followed those meccano models?

This paper deals with the relationship between intelligent behaviour, on the   one hand, and the mental qualities needed to produce it, on the other.  We   consider two well-known opposing positions on this issue: one due to Alan   Turing and one due to John Searle (via the Chinese Room).  In particular, we   argue against Searle, showing that his answer to the so-called System Reply   does not work.  The argument takes a novel form:   we shift the debate to a different and more plausible room where the   required conversational behaviour is much easier to characterize and to   analyze.  Despite being much simpler than the Chinese Room, we show that    the  behaviour there is still complex enough that it cannot be produced without   appropriate mental qualities.

Moving toward true robot autonomy may require new paradigms, hardware, and ways of thinking. The goal of the AAAI 2008 Workshop on Mobility and Manipulation was not only to demonstrate current research successes to the AAAI community but also to road-map future mobility and manipulation challenges that create synergies between artificial intelligence and robotics. The half-day workshop included both a session on the exhibits and a panel discussion. The panel consisted of five prominent researchers who led a discussion of future directions for mobility and manipulation research. Andrew Ng of Stanford University (along with students Ashutosh Saxena and Ellen Klingbeil) focuses on opening arbitrary doors through learning a few visual keypoints, such as the location and type of door handle.

Contradiction is often seen as a defect of intelligent systems and a dangerous limitation on efficiency. In this paper we raise the question of whether, on the contrary, it could be considered a key tool in increasing intelligence in biological structures. A possible way of answering this question in a mathematical context is shown, formulating a proposition that suggests a link between intelligence and contradiction. A concrete approach is presented in the well-defined setting of cellular automata. Here we define the models of ``observer'', ``entity'', ``environment'', ``intelligence'' and ``contradiction''. These definitions, which roughly correspond to the common meaning of these words, allow us to deduce a simple but strong result about these concepts in an unbiased, mathematical manner. Evidence for a real-world counterpart to the demonstrated formal link between intelligence and contradiction is provided by three computational experiments.

A fundamental problem in artificial intelligence is that nobody really knows what intelligence is. The problem is especially acute when we need to consider artificial systems which are significantly different to humans. In this paper we approach this problem in the following way: We take a number of well known informal definitions of human intelligence that have been given by experts, and extract their essential features. These are then mathematically formalised to produce a general measure of intelligence for arbitrary machines. We believe that this equation formally captures the concept of machine intelligence in the broadest reasonable sense. We then show how this formal definition is related to the theory of universal optimal learning agents. Finally, we survey the many other tests and definitions of intelligence that have been proposed for machines.

Creativity is sometimes taken to be an inexplicable aspect of human activity. By summarizing a considerable body of literature on creativity, I hope to show how to turn some of the best ideas about creativity into programs that are demonstrably more creative than any we have seen to date. I believe the key to building more creative programs is to give them the ability to reflect on and modify their own frameworks and criteria. That is, I believe that the key to creativity is at the metalevel.