Genre
SESSION 2 PAPER 5 TIGRIS AND EUPHRATES - A COMPARISON BETWEEN HUMAN AND MACHINE TRANSLATION
An unsophisticated translation of such a sentence will therefore not be a good translation. Again, contrary to Mr. Richensi opinion, I believe that the problem involved is serious. There is no simple procedure to find out which, and in what way, the words of the English language are context-dependent. And I don't think that the issue can be belittled for tae reason that contextdependent words do not occur in scientific discussions and writings. They might not be too abundant in ordinary scientific papers on matters physical or chemical, but there would surely be plenty of them in discussions of matters linguistic, for instance. This might be one reason why so far hardly anybody has tried to machine translate papers in linguistics. As soon as this is attempted, the seriousness of the problem will become immediately evident.
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
Marvin Lee Minsky was born in New York on 9th August, 1927. He received his B.A from Harvard in 1950 and Ph.D in Mathematics from Princeton in 1954. For the next three years he was a member of the Harvard University Society of Fellows, and in 1957-58 was staff member of the M.I.T. Lincoln Laboratories. At present he is Assistant Professor of Mathematics at M.I.T. where he is giving a course in Automata and Artificial Intelligence and is also staff member of the Research Laboratory of Electronics. SUMMARY THIS paper is an attempt to discuss and partially organize a number of ideas concerning the design or programming of machines to work on problems for which the designer does not have, in advance, practical methods of solution. Particular attention is given to processes involving pattern recognition, learning, planning ahead, and the use of analogies or?models!. Also considered is the question of designing "administrative" procedures to manage the use of these other devices.
Mechanisation of Thought Processes
Biology seems to be a science in its own right, or set of sciences having common aims, and so it should have its own language and explanatory concepts; yet when any specifically biological concept is suggested and used as an explanatory concept it seems to be unsatisfactory and even mystical. There are many biological concepts of this kind: Purpose, Drive, elan vital, Entelechy, Gestalten.* Physicists and engineers seem, on the other hand, to have clearly defined concepts having great power within biology.
A note on dimensions and factors
In this short note, we discuss several aspects of "dimensions" and the related construct of "factors". We concentrate on those aspects that are relevant to articles in this special issue, especially those dealing with the analysis of the wild animal cases discussed in Berman and Hafner's 1993 ICAIL article. We review the basic ideas about dimensions, as used in HYPO, and point out differences with factors, as used in subsequent systems like CATO. Our goal is to correct certain misconceptions that have arisen over the years.
COGNITIVE SCIENCE 2 361 383 1978
He knows about examples and heuristics and how they are related. He has a sense of what to use and when to use it, and what is worth remembering. He has an intuitive feeling for the subject, how it hangs together, and how it relates to other theories. He knows how not to be swamped by details, but also to reference them when he needs them. This paper is concerned with this important extra-logical knowledge that is often outside of traditional discussions in mathematics.