This paper synthesizes a series of formal proofs to construct a unified theory on the logical limits of the Symbol Grounding Problem. We distinguish between internal meaning (sense), which formal systems can possess via axioms, and external grounding (reference), which is a necessary condition for connecting symbols to the world. We demonstrate through a four-stage argument that meaningful grounding within a formal system must arise from a process that is external, dynamic, and non-fixed algorithmic. First, we show that for a purely symbolic system, the impossibility of grounding is a direct consequence of its definition. Second, we extend this limitation to systems with any finite, static set of pre-established meanings (Semantic Axioms). By formally modeling the computationalist hypothesis-which equates grounding with internal derivation-we prove via Gödelian arguments that such systems cannot consistently and completely define a "groundability predicate" for all truths. Third, we demonstrate that the "grounding act" for emergent meanings cannot be inferred from internal rules but requires an axiomatic, meta-level update. Drawing on Turing's concept of Oracle Machines and Piccinini's analysis of the mathematical objection, we identify this update as physical transduction. Finally, we prove that this process cannot be simulated by a fixed judgment algorithm, validating the logical necessity of embodied interaction.

This paper reflects on the literature that rejects the use of Large Language Models (LLMs) in qualitative data analysis. It illustrates through empirical evidence as well as critical reflections why the current critical debate is focusing on the wrong problems . The paper proposes that the focus of researching the use of the LLMs for qualitative analysis is not the method per se, but rather the empirical investigation of an artificial system performing an analysis . The paper bui lds on the seminal work of Alan Turing and reads the current debate using key ideas from Turing's "Computing Machinery and Intelligence". Th is paper therefore reframes the debate on qualitative analysis with LLMs and states that ra ther than asking whether machines can perform qualitative analysis in principle, we should ask whether with LLMs we can produce analyses that are sufficiently comparable to human analysts. In the final part the contrary views to performing qualitative analysis with LLMs are analysed using the same writing and rhetorical style that Turing used in his seminal work, to discuss the contrary views to the main question.

Human achievement, whether in culture, science, or technology, is unparalleled in the known existence. This achievement is tied to the enormous communities of knowledge, made possible by language: leaving theological content aside, it is very much true that "in the beginning was the word", and that in Western societies, this became particularly identified with the written word. There lies the challenge regarding modern age chatbots: they can 'do' language apparently as well as ourselves and there is a natural question of whether they can be considered intelligent, in the same way as we are or otherwise. Are humans uniquely intelligent? We consider this question in terms of the psychological literature on intelligence, evidence for intelligence in non-human animals, the role of written language in science and technology, progress with artificial intelligence, the history of intelligence testing (for both humans and machines), and the role of embodiment in intelligence. We think that it is increasingly difficult to consider humans uniquely intelligent. There are current limitations in chatbots, e.g., concerning perceptual and social awareness, but much attention is currently devoted to overcoming such limitations.

Considering that Turing's original test was co-opted by Weizenbaum and that six of the most common criticisms of the Turing test are unfair to both Turing's argument and the historical development of AI. The Turing test has faced criticism for decades, most recently at the Royal Society event "Celebrating the 75th Anniversary of the Turing Test." The question of the Turing test's significance has intensified with recent advances in large language model technology, which now enable machines to pass it. In this article, I address six of the most common criticisms of the Turing test: The Turing test encourages fooling people; Turing overestimated human intelligence, as people can be easily fooled (the ELIZA effect); The Turing test is not a good benchmark for AI; Turing's 1950 paper is not serious and/or has contradictions; Imitation should not be a goal for AI, and it is also harmful to society; Passing the Turing test teaches nothing about AI. All six criticisms largely derive from Joseph Weizenbaum's influential reinterpretation of the Turing test. The first four fail to withstand a close examination of the internal logic of Turing's 1950 paper, particularly when the paper is situated within its mid-twentieth-century context.

Turing AI Institute boss denies accusations of'toxic internal culture' The Alan Turing Institute Chair has told the BBC there is no substance to a number of serious accusations which rocked the organisation in the summer. In August, whistleblowers accused the charity's leadership of misusing public funds, overseeing a toxic internal culture, and failing to deliver on its mission. They said the Turing Institute, the UK's national body for artificial intelligence (AI), was on the brink of collapse after Peter Kyle, the then technology secretary, threatened to withdraw its £100m funding. But speaking exclusively to the BBC, Chair Dr Doug Gurr said the whistleblower claims were independently investigated by a third party which found them to have no substance. I fully sympathise that going through any transition is always challenging, he said.

Environment Animals Wildlife Why do animals have spots and stripes? Zebra's stripes and leopard's spots are perfectly imperfect. Breakthroughs, discoveries, and DIY tips sent every weekday. The fur and scales of the animal kingdom are far from boring and full of wild colors and patterns. These mathematically inspired designs like leopard spots and tiger stripes are as interesting as they are intricate .

Tommy Flowers: nothing like the machine he proposed had ever been contemplated. Tommy Flowers: nothing like the machine he proposed had ever been contemplated. Move over, Alan Turing: meet the working-class hero of Bletchley Park you didn't see in the movies The Oxbridge-educated boffin is feted as the codebreaking genius who helped Britain win the war. But should a little-known Post Office engineer named Tommy Flowers be seen as the real father of computing? T his is a story you know, right? It's early in the war and western Europe has fallen. Only the Channel stands between Britain and the fascist yoke; only Atlantic shipping lanes offer hope of the population continuing to be fed, clothed and armed. But hunting "wolf packs" of Nazi U-boats pick off merchant shipping at will, coordinated by radio instructions the Brits can intercept but can't read, thanks to the fiendish Enigma encryption machine.

This paper presents a theory of systemic undecidability, reframing incomputability as a structural property of systems rather than a localized feature of specific functions or problems. We define a notion of causal embedding and prove a closure principle: any subsystem that participates functionally in the computation of an undecidable system inherits its undecidability. This result positions undecidability as a pervasive constraint on prediction, modeling, and epistemic access in both natural and artificial systems. Our framework disarms oracle mimicry and challenges the view that computational limits can be circumvented through architectural innovation. By generalizing classical results into a dynamic systems context, this work augments the logical trajectory of Gödel, Turing, and Chaitin, offering a new perspective of the topology of computability and its interrelation to the boundaries of scientific knowledge.